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ABSTRACT
Motor imagery (MI), a top-down knowledge-driven process involving the
deliberate cognitive simulation or rehearsal of an action without engaging in overt
physical movements, shares the same neural networks as movement execution
improving motor learning and enhancing performance of motor tasks. The capacity to
form images is not universal, and is a variable, moderating factor of neural activity
impacting intervention effectiveness and distinguishing between individual imagery
abilities. Measuring imagery abilities through self-report measures (i.e., MIQ-3 and
VMIQ-2) is common, but the importance of behavioral and neuroimaging techniques
have also been highlighted. Despite the robustness of these questionnaires, few studies
have investigated their biological validity. This is surprising given that these
questionnaires are frequently used to determine participants’ imagery abilities and
adopting them in the neuroscience literature for screening purposes. Therefore, two
studies were conducted to help extend present MI theories by examining the
convergent validity of self-report questionnaires through fMRI. In the first study, 17
females aged 18-30 screened by the MIQ-3 as having good imagery abilities were
recruited to examine the construct validity of the MIQ-3. Following an fMRI simulation
session, participants were scanned to determine the neural networks active during KI,
IVI, and EVI of the arm rotation task of the MIQ-3. Results revealed common and distinct
brain activity providing initial biological validation for the imagery abilities delineated in
v

the MIQ-3. For study two, an additional 17 participants aged 18-30 were screened as
having poor imagery abilities. The task and procedure were identical to the previous
study. As expected, both good and poor imagers had peak activations in the inferior
parietal lobule and motor-related areas. Inter-group comparisons revealed that good
imagers had greater activation in the frontal, parietal and premotor areas. By contrast,
poor imagers recruited a wider neural network (i.e., middle frontal gyrus and subcortical
areas). Overall, both studies provide central evidence for common and divergent neural
networks of imagery abilities defined in the sport sciences. Future research should
expand this body of literature to other tasks and male participants as well as investigate
imagery abilities used to create cognitive and affective image content.
Key Words: Imagery Ability, MIQ-3, fMRI, Kinesthetic Imagery, Internal Visual Imagery,
External Visual Imagery
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Mental simulation is frequently regarded as a classical type of psychological
training used to improve performance in a variety of movement contexts. Theoretically,
mental simulation is largely focused on perception and experience, allowing one’s mind
to create a representation of an event or a series of events that have previously
occurred, or that of a future scenario. In order for mental simulation to occur, it is
argued that mental techniques and/or cognitive strategies for motor retrieval, motor
planning/preparation, and mental execution must properly be utilized. One such
technique that has received attention, with regard to the improvement on the
acquisition of performance of motor skills, is imagery.
Broadly defined, imagery involves an individual imaging a self-performed action
that is an internally generated, cognitive and spatial representation of an object or
experience without the accompaniment of subjective sensations or overt movement
(Moran, 2004). Further integrating concepts from information processing, perception
and neuroscience research, imagery here is considered an ability resembling
perception; consisting of internal representations produced from memory, similar to
those during the initial phases of like-modality perception (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson,
2001). Collectively, evidence shows imagery to be a strategy for enhancing various
aspects of performance including skills, cognition and motivation (Hall, Mack,
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Paivio, & Hausenblas, 1998), as well as an adjunct to sport performance (Orlick &
Partington, 1988). Imagery is considered a multidimensional (including implicit and
explicit aspects) cognitive skill (McAvinue & Robertson, 2009) that has been extensively
researched within many fields including sport, dance (Cumming & Ramsey, 2008),
rehabilitation (de Vries & Mulder, 2007; Gregg, Hall & Butler, 2010) and allied health
professions (Sanders et al., 2004; Speck, 1990), including athletic training (Monsma et
al., 2011).
Aligned with the functional equivalence theory (Finke & Shepard, 1986) and
simulation theory (Jeannerod, 2001), studies have shown that muscular (Bakker,
Boschker, & Chung, 1996; Lutz & Linder, 2001) and neurological (Cuthbert, Vrana, &
Bradley, 1991; Szameitat, Shen, & Sterr, 2007) activations are similar when physically
performing or imaging the same movement. An accumulation of evidence suggests that
individuals with better imagery skills (i.e., vividness and ease of generating images)
benefit more from using imagery than those with poorer skills (Lawrence, Callow, &
Roberts, 2013); learn better skills, executing fewer errors (Goss, Hall, Buckolz, &
Fishburne, 1986), can perform skills faster (Borst & Kosslyn, 2010; Guillot & Collet, 2010)
and experience positive affect (i.e., confidence and low anxiety) typically associated with
competition (Gregg, Hall, & Nederhof, 2005) or high stakes assessments (i.e.,
competition and audition) (Gregg et al., 2005; Monsma & Overby, 2004).
Consistent with Paivio’s (1985) early notion that imagery is an ability that
improves with practice and that genetic variability may limit these effects, imagery
ability (IA) is conceptualized in the sport and neuroscience literature in terms of imagery
2

perspective and sensory specific modes where visual and kinesthetic imagery abilities
are most relevant to, and frequently considered in movement context studies. That is, in
a given sample, some participants report good imagery abilities in both visual and
kinesthetic modes, others report poor imagery abilities in both, while others report
good visual and poor kinesthetic, or, least likely, poor visual and good kinesthetic
abilities. This variability has both methodological and practical importance. Because IA
moderates the effectiveness of imagery interventions, design strategies such as
stratifying experimental groups by IA should be common practice. Practically, coaches
and educators should help athletes and students explore their IA strengths and
weaknesses.
Imagery ability definitions vary across the literature and depend on the purpose
for which the imagery description is used, challenging generalizability. With this, the
validity of IA measures has been an important and ongoing topic in cognitive and sport
psychology as well as neuroscience research paradigms where the content and structure
of covert processes that precede the execution of action are considered (e.g., Decety &
Grezes, 2006).Throughout this parallel evolution of imagery, there has been a great deal
of debate regarding imagery’s qualities and characteristics across several disciplines of
imagery inquiry as well as it’s convergent validity between two measurement
procedures and research methods (i.e., pencil-and-paper and brain mapping) in order to
support the use of common IA assessments. The utility of imagery characteristics
discovered throughout research is that they serve as external prompts that if deemed
effective, can be used in interventions geared at enhancing various motor performance
3

attributes: skill learning, movement precision, anticipation of events and even
emotional regulation in challenging situations.
The bulk of what we know about imagery measurement, especially in the sport
science literature, rests on various psychometric iterations of two self-report
inventories: the Movement Imagery Questionnaire (MIQ: Hall, Pongrac, & Buckholz,
1985) which measures the ease of generating images, and the Vividness of Movement
Imagery Questionnaire (VMIQ: Isaac, Marks, & Russell, 1986) measuring the vividness of
the imagery experience. Through psychometric validation processes, the VMIQ-2
(Roberts, Callow, Hardy, Markland, & Bringer, 2008) and MIQ-3 (Williams, Cumming,
Ntoumanis, Nordin-Bates, Ramsey, & Hall, 2012) are the most current versions available
and each instrument measures three scales (i.e., internal visual imagery, external visual
imagery, and kinesthetic imagery) confirmed in factor analyses. Both questionnaires
offer an efficient way of measuring IA but the fundamental difference between them is
how they define IA, which may lead to inconsistent results across studies. Recently, the
validity of imagery assessment has been questioned because of imagery scores not
correctly classifying IA groups (van der Meulen, Allali, Rieger, Assal, & Vuilleumier,
2012).
Interestingly, these questionnaires have been adopted in neuroscience for
screening purposes (e.g., Guillot et al., 2009) and testing intervention effects (e.g.,
Guillot et al., 2008; Roure et al., 1999). Despite their current use, it is currently unknown
if objective measures (i.e., PET and fMRI) support the construct validity of the self-report
IA measures in order to inform researchers about the efficacy of the continued use of
4

the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2. This is a logical next step because of the susceptibility of selfreport measures to various types of bias, including social desirability and the ability of
participants to modulate their behavioral responses under experimental conditions,
impeding reliable measurements. However, using brain mapping techniques should limit
participant’s ability to manipulate their brain response during imagery and remove the
variability in imagery ability from memory decay, which will help elucidate that
individuals are imaging what they say they are imaging.
There is already evidence to suggest that motor imagery (MI) and movement
execution (ME) share some of the same neural substrates (Decety, 1996; Hetu et al.,
2013; Jeannerod, 2001). If a major goal of imagery is to enhance performance in sport
and other skill-oriented settings, it is necessary for an individual to have good MI ability.
It is vital that researchers continue their efforts of connecting subjective and objective
imagery measures in order to map the theoretical construct of imagery onto brain
areas. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to determine if there is convergent validity
between self-reported IA and brain activation measured by fMRI which will further
allow researchers and clinicians to reliably use self-report questionnaires.
The following literature review opens with a brief delineation between MI and
ME, followed by a description of the neurological components that are important in
motor control and ME, and thus important in MI. It is followed with a description and
supporting evidence of the major theoretical frameworks used to explain the similarity
between MI and ME. The subsequent section provides a comprehensive review of
research on the qualities of imagery, specifically IA, how MI ability is measured, and
5

individual differences that moderate the effectiveness of imagery. Finally, major
limitations of the current literature are discussed along with an explanation of how this
study will help advance the understanding of how to measure MI ability.
Intersection of Motor Imagery and Movement Execution
Researchers have examined many types of knowledge, including memory for
movements (Engelkamp, Zimmer, Mohr, & Snellen, 1994). One way to recall and
practice movement memories is through motor imagery (MI). In contrast to actual
physical movement during movement execution (ME), MI has been recognized as a
method that enables the mind to mentally simulate or rehearse an action without
engaging in overt physical movements (Moran, Guillot, MacIntyre, & Collet, 2012;
Olsson & Nyberg, 2010). Evidence indicates that MI is not a unitary constructed but one
that is multidimensional in nature. Dimensions of imagery include the perceived ease or
difficulty with which a participant generates movement images (Williams, Cumming,
Ntoumanis, Nordin-Bates, & Hall, 2012), the ability to control and generate mental
representations, and imagery vividness (McAvinue & Robertson, 2009). In order to
provide learners with precise instructions on how to use imagery for motor
performance improvements in athletics and other skill oriented disciplines, it is
important to understand the intersection of MI and ME.
According to Jeannerod (1997, 1995), MI is a hierarchical model of action
control. Within this model, it is argued that action includes the two covert stages of
intending and planning/preparation, and the overt stage of execution. These stages of
ME are important because MI has been considered a dynamic state during which a
6

motor task is imagined in working memory without any overt motor output (Collet &
Guillot, 2010; Decety, 2002; Decety, 1996). For example, in order to complete a reaching
and grasping task, an individual first has to recall previous episodes with a similar goal in
order to develop the intent to complete an action. This intention must then be
translated into a set of internal commands, a programmed action sequence, which can
be performed to satisfy the intention. For example, measuring regional cerebral blood
flow (rCBF) with positron emission tomography (PET) Jenkins, Jahanshahi, Jueptner,
Passingham, & Brooks (2000) found that imagery increased rostral SMA, anterior
cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation. Finally, the action
sequence is physically executed (i.e., ME). At each stage, a conscious simulation of a
motor representation (i.e., imagery) specifying the goal of the action is created to aid in
its execution (Jeannerod, 2001; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999; McAvinue & Robertson, 2009,
2008). These representations are voluntarily controlled on the part of the imager, which
goes beyond simply attending to an object of consciousness (Annett, 1995). Shepard
(1988) refers to this feeling of having voluntary control as the subjective effort of
imagined transformations, such that these internal manipulations use some of the same
properties of overt, voluntary actions, including brain mechanisms (i.e., primary
somatosensory cortex/postcentral gyrus and secondary sensorimotor cortex/superior
parietal lobule).
Based on more recent research in cognitive psychology (Smith & Kosslyn, 2006),
actions involve both covert and overt stages in which all overtly executed actions imply
the existence of a covert stage, but covert actions do not necessarily have to produce an
7

overt action (Jeannerod, 2001); that is, imagery does not always lead to action. This
convergence between MI and ME is evidenced in the neuroscience literature that
identified brain areas active during both MI and ME. These include the precentral gyrus,
supplementary motor area (SMA) (rostral), cingular gyrus, and inferior parietal lobule
(Decety et al., 1997; Gerardin et al., 2000; Lotze et al., 1999; Stephan et al., 1995). This
similarity in brain activity indicates that when individuals engage in MI of a motor task,
several brain areas for ME are already activated prior to physically completing the
movement (See Table 1.1 for overlapping areas between MI and ME).
Table 1.1
Intersection of Active Brain Areas during MI and ME.
Brain Areas
Precentral gyrus
Precentral gyrus (dorsal)
Precentral gyrus (ventral)
Superior parietal lobule
Premotor cortex/Premotor
area
Supplementary motor area
Supplementary motor area
(rostral)
Supplementary motor area
(caudal)
Insular cortex
Cingular gyrus
Superior frontal gyrus
Middle frontal gyrus
Inferior frontal gyrus
Inferior parietal lobule

Motor imagery
6, 7, 9, 11, 12,
13, 14
2, 5, 6, 7, 10
2, 10

Stages of Movement Execution
Overt Stage
Covert Stage
Intention Planning/Preparation
Movement
execution
2, 5, 7, 8, 9
1, 5, 7, 10
1, 10
10
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20

23, 24, 25
5, 6, 7

2, 5, 7, 10
2, 5
2, 5, 6
2, 5, 6
2, 5, 6, 10

4

10, 21, 22

3, 7, 9

26
27, 28, 29
30

1, 2, 5, 7, 8

4
1, 3, 7, 8, 10

Note. Numbers in the table correspond to those studies listed below indicating that they described activation in this
particular area during each condition. (1) Binkofski et al. (1999); (2) Decety et al. (1997); (3) Faillenot et al. (1997); (4)
Frith et al. (1991); (5) Gerardin et al. (2000); (6) Grafton et al. (1996); (7) Lotze et al. (1999); (8) Rizzolatti et al. (1996);
(9) Roth et al. (1996); (10) Stephan et al. (1995); (11) Porro et al. (1996); (12) Munzert et al. (2008); (13) Sharma et al.
(2008); (14) Tomasino et al. (2007); (15) Catalan et al. (1998); (16) Bischoff-Grethe et al. (2004); (17) Schubotz & von
Cramon (2002); (18) Menon et al. (2000); (19) Schubotz & von Cramon (2001); (20) Dagher et al. (1999); (21) Jenkins
et al. (2000); (22) Freund (1990); (23) Malouin et al. (2003); (24) Boecker et al. (2002); (25) Halpern & Zatorre (1999);
(26) Beurze et al. (2007); (27) Wiese et al. (2004); (28) Heun et al. (2000); (29) Ruby et al. (2002); (30) Meister et al.
(2004).
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Imaging motor tasks is a cognitive skill that engages multiple parts of the motor
system. The motor system includes lower and upper motor neurons, cerebellum, basal
ganglia, and the motor cortex which are important in interpreting sensory signals and
controlling voluntary movements. This central pattern of activation results in covert
actions that correspond to the stages of ME, involving a true simulation of movements
of one’s own body (de Lange, Helmich, & Toni, 2006). On account of the continual
activation of brain regions responsible for MI (i.e., primary motor cortex/precentral
gyrus, SMA, and anterior cingulate gyrus) and ME (i.e., M1 and secondary sensorimotor
cortex/superior parietal lobule) during each phase of action, it is logical that the
intended, overt motor action would be facilitated.
Moreover, this overlap in motor cognition is possible because of the activation of
the corticospinal pathway (Jeannerod, 2001). These pathways originate from the motor
cortex and are important because they help shape the motor system by providing
information from long term and working memory concerning potential actions, the
anticipation of voluntary movements, and preparing specific responses. Functions of
both long term and working memory are represented by overlapping networks that are
associated with the retrieval, formation, and maintenance of the image (Tarkka &
Stokic, 2013), which are necessary for MI as it activates a diverse neural network that
overlaps with areas involved with ME. Therefore, the resulting image, and potential
movement, reflects the representation displayed in working memory (Lorey et al.,
2011). For example, neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the SMA, M1,
inferior parietal cortex, basal ganglia, and the cerebellum (Buccino et al., 2004, 2001;
9

Decety et al., 1994; Ehrsson, Geyer, & Naito, 2003; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti,
1995; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Gerardin et al., 2000; Strafella & Paus,
2000; Mushiake, Inase, & Tanji, 1991; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi,1996;
Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) are activated in the early stage of motor control (i.e.,
planning/preparation). With specific activation, it places the action representation in a
“true” motor format so that the motor system interprets it as a “real” action (PascualLeone et al., 1995). Since motor images cannot be separated from the motor generation
process, MI and motor planning/preparation are proposed to have the same motor
representation system in the brain (Jeannerod, 1994). Therefore, motor images should
be involved in imagined movement allowing the generated motor representation to
prime the intention and planning/preparation stages of an overt movement.
Research using temporal equivalence paradigms (i.e., the time for mental
simulated movements being highly correlated with the time to actually make such
movements) (Decety, Jeannerod, & Prablanc, 1989; Parsons, 1994), peripheral activity of
the autonomic nervous system (ANS) (Decety, Jeannerod, Durozard, & Baverel, 1993;
Decety, Jeannerod, Germain, & Pastene, 1991; Wang & Morgan, 1992; Wuyam et al.,
1995), and various brain imaging techniques (Abbruzzese, Trompetto, & Schieppati,
1996; Holmes & Collins, 2001; Ingvar & Philipson, 1977; Lotze et al., 1999; Marks, 1999)
have provided strong support for the overlap of common neural mechanisms of MI and
ME. However, the extent to which these networks overlap is still a matter of debate.
These shared neurological components, and the associated studies, which are relevant
to both ME and MI, are discussed next.
10

Neurological Components Relevant to Motor Imagery and Movement Execution
The neurological components involved in MI have shown partially overlapping
networks associated with ME (Gerardin et al., 2000). Voluntary movement, whether
imagined or physically executed, is a specific type of movement which is learned,
attended to, and based on a comparison among alternatives while being organized
around the performance of a purposeful task. The selection of what joints, muscles, and
body segments to use when executing a movement also depends on the goal of the
movement. Within the human motor system, goal-directed movements are controlled
by selecting the target of action, generating a motor plan, and coordinating the forces
needed to achieve those objectives (Wise & Shadmehr, 2002).
The motor system consists of two interacting parts: peripheral and central. The
peripheral motor system includes muscles and nerve fibers that are used for the actual
execution of an overt movement, while the central motor system includes mechanisms
throughout the central nervous system (CNS), including the cerebral cortex, basal
ganglia, cerebellum, brain stem, and spinal cord that are responsible for higher-order
characteristics of movements (i.e., sequencing and timing). The following sections will
review the major components of the CNS that are relevant to MI. These systems include
the (1) sensory system (somatosensory, viscerosensory, auditory, vestibular, olfactory,
gustatory, and visual systems), (2) motor system (motor units, skeletal muscles, spinal
reflexes, autonomic system, cerebellum, several subcortical and cortical sites, and the
brain stem), and (3) systems responsible for homeostatic and higher brain functions;
with the first two systems largely important in the imagery process.
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These systems, and their components, are housed in specific cortices and gyri
which are distinguished based on their function(s). Specifically, the frontal lobe is the
largest lobe comprised of four gyri: the precentral gyrus, superior, middle and inferior
frontal gyri. In addition, the frontal lobe consists of four general functional areas,
including the primary motor area (M1: controls simple features of movements),
premotor cortex (PMC) and SMA (responsible for learning sequences of discrete
movements and selection of action), and the prefrontal cortex (implicated in planning
complex cognitive behavior, short- and long-term decision making, creating strategies,
attention, and concentration). The parietal lobe is comprised of three gyri: the
postcentral gyrus (houses the primary somatosensory cortex), superior parietal gyrus
(involved with spatial orientation), and inferior parietal gyri (interprets sensory
information). The temporal lobe is formed by three oblique oriented gyri: the superior,
middle, and inferior temporal gyri. These gyri are responsible for auditory processing,
contemplating distance and recognition, and visual object recognition, respectively.
Lastly, the most caudal aspect of the brain, the occipital lobe, is comprised of several
irregular lateral gyri forming the primary visual cortex. Together, these cortices and gyri
are organized into the cerebral cortex to functionally convey specific types of
information to various areas of the brain in order to accomplish specific tasks; both
physically and imagined.
MI is dependent upon the capacity of sensory, perceptual, and perceptual-motor
functions stored in memory to physically execute a movement. However, the imagery
process is not dependent on the actual ability to execute a task, but instead depends on
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the mechanisms of the human motor system. Thus, the overt execution of a movement
cannot be completed unless the covert stages of intention and planning/preparation are
present. For example, studies examining neurological rehabilitation patients (Butler &
Page, 2006; Mulder, 2007; Page, Szaflarski, Eliassen, Pan, & Cramer, 2009; Sharma,
Pomeroy, & Baron, 2006) found that patients unable to produce physical movement can
use MI to activate the overlapping brain areas of ME. Evidence in this setting indicates
that MI can be used for motor recovery when physical movement is contraindicated or
not possible. These mechanisms have been predominantly examined using fMRI
(measures functional brain activity by detecting associated changes in blood flow) and
PET (measures functional processes in the body by detecting positron emitting
radionuclides). Although both measure the functional properties of the brain, fMRI does
not include the introduction of a nucleotide; rather it measures the associated changes
in magnetization between oxygen-rich and oxygen-poor blood as a function of neural
activity. For example, M1 represents a complex set of muscles and joints that make it
possible for the cortex to organize combinations of movements to complete specific
movements. Specifically, the neurons that are in M1 become active only shortly before
and during voluntary movement. In contrast, the firing patterns of movement-related
neurons in the PMC (responsible for planning movement, spatial/sensory guidance of
movement, and understanding actions of others), are related to specific qualities of the
movement being executed. These set-related neurons are active in the absence of any
overt behavior, such as during a delay between task instructions and execution of the
task, or during MI. The planning and execution of voluntary movements relies on
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sensorimotor transformations, which is the product of the PMC and M1 operating in
conjunction with sensory and association areas (i.e., SMA) in order to integrate various
representations into motor programs. This is illustrated by the communication between
parietal and motor areas during various tasks (i.e., visually guided reaching) (Blohn,
Keith, & Crawford, 2009; Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, & Mishkin, 2011), relying less on
supplementary brain areas as the motor behavior becomes more well-known.
In a seminal fMRI study identifying the neural substrates mediating MI in good
and poor imagers (n = 28), Guillot et al. (2008) demonstrated that the pre-SMA and SMA
are active during the learning of a sequential finger sequence task but become less
active as learning progresses. In addition, this behavior becomes more automatic,
successively increasing activation in the PMC and M1 in both good and poor imagers.
More specifically, both good and poor imagers recruited similar neural networks (i.e.,
inferior and superior parietal lobules, lateral and medial PMC, cerebellum, and
putamen), but the pattern of activation of poor imagers showed a more widely
distributed activation pattern (i.e., parietal, ventrolateral premotor areas, and
cerebellum) compared to good imagers to compensate for their difficulties in eliciting a
vivid mental representation of sequential movement; poor imagers used more of their
brain, while good imagers used less with greater intensity. For the first time, imagery
ability screening used a global imagery score involving the use of ANS (e.g., skin
resistance responses), behavioral (e.g., Movement Imagery Questionnaire-Revised
(MIQ-R)), auto-estimation and mental chronometry (MC) scores calculated with the
following equation: (ANS score + MIQ-R score + auto-estimation score – (MC score)).
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The importance of this study lies in the identification of good and poor imagers using a
more rigorous pre-selection process that was able to provide greater reliability and
convergent validity with brain imaging findings.
Several central mechanisms that appear to be important in human motor control
have been studied in relation to MI. The phase of motor action where movement
planning/preparation occurs activates the PMC/lateral premotor area (Bischoff-Grethe,
Goedert, Willingham, & Grafton, 2004; Catalan, Honda, Weeks, Cohen, & Hallett, 1998;
Menon, Anagnoson, Glover, & Pfefferbaum, 2000; Schubotz & von Cramon, 2002), SMA
(rostral aspect) (Jenkins et al., 2000; Stephan et al., 1995), anterior cingulate cortex
(Ruby, Sirigu, & Decety, 2002; Wiese et al., 2004) and the inferior parietal
lobule/supramarginal gyrus (Meister et al., 2004). Movement initiation activates the
SMA (caudal aspect) (Jenkins et al., 2000), while motor execution activates the superior
parietal lobule and M1 (Stephan et al., 1995). Studies measuring rCBF (blood supply in
the brain at a given time) have found a significant increase in blood supply in the
premotor and frontal regions during MI (Ingvar & Philipson, 1977), as well as the SMA
(Decety, Philippon, & Ingvar, 1988), cerebellum and basal ganglia (Decety et al., 1988;
Decety, Sjoholm, Ryding, Stenberg, & Ingvar, 1990; Ryding, Decety, Sjoholm, Stenberg, &
Ingvar, 1993). In addition, fMRI studies measuring the blood oxygenation leveldependent (BOLD) hemodynamic response show that M1, parietal lobe (specifically the
somatosensory cortex), PMC, SMA, cerebellum (subcortical areas), and basal ganglia
(Belardinelli, Palmiero, & di Matteo, 2009; Decety, 1996; Decety et al., 1990; Guillot &
Collet, 2005; Guillot et al., 2008; Jeannerod, 2001; Hanakawa, Dimyan, & Hallet, 2008;
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Higuchi, Imamizu, & Kawato, 2007; Lotze et al., 1999; Munzert, Lorey, & Zentgraf, 2009;
Zacks, 2008) consistently play an important role in both ME and MI.
Functional MRI studies demonstrate that similar voxels (unit of analysis used in
fMRI research representing single data points on a regularly spaced, three dimensional
grid) activated during the contraction of a group of muscles (ME) are also activated
during imagery of a movement involving the same muscles (MI) (Lotze et al., 1999;
Munzert, Zentgraf, Stark, & Vaitl, 2008; Porro et al., 1996; Sharma, Jones, Carpenter, &
Baron, 2008; Tomasino, Werner, Weiss, & Fink, 2007). To demonstrate neural
mechanisms involved in imagery, specifically in participant who purport to have superior
imagery abilities, Munzert et al. (2008) examined the activation of motor-related areas
during MI of gymnastic movements. Participants were 10 right-handed female students
that had good to very good imagery abilities (2.2 ± 0.8), as assessed by the Movement
Imagery Questionnaire (MIQ: Hall & Martin, 1997). An overlap in activation for both ME
and motor imagery in M1, PMC, and the SMA as well as the intraparietal sulcus,
cerebellar hemispheres, and the basal ganglia using fMRI was found. Not only did this
study corroborate the concept of overlapping core motor and motor-related areas
during MI, it also served as construct validity evidence of the MIQ.
Sharma et al. (2008) specifically examined the extent and distribution of the M1
involvement during motor imagery compared to ME. Analysis of fMRI data using a voxelbased region of interest approach demonstrated that the anterior and posterior
portions of M1 were both activated during motor imagery and ME of a right hand fingerthumb opposition sequence. Although M1 was activated to a lesser degree during
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motor imagery compared to ME, this study indicates that the activation of M1 is still
similar to executed movement. These results are similar to earlier electromyography
(EMG) studies that found comparable muscle activity during MI and ME of the same
movement (Hale, 1982). Furthermore, other studies have also reported contralateral (to
the imagined movement) activation of M1 during motor imagery (Gerardin et al., 2000;
Lotze et al., 1999; Porro et al., 1996; Sharma et al., 2008).
Contradictory evidence from PET studies did not find significant activation in M1,
such as in Stephan et al.’s (1995) study, during MI (Decety et al., 1994; Sharma et al.,
2008). This study examined the differences in the distribution of rCBF of six healthy
volunteers during ME and MI of a joy-stick movement. Results demonstrated that the
medial and lateral premotor cortices, anterior cingulate cortex and parts of the superior
and inferior parietal areas were all activated during MI. When comparing ME to MI the
left primary sensorimotor cortex, medial and lateral PMC, cingulate areas, and left
superior parietal cortex were also activated. These data indicate that imagined
movements activate brain areas associated with the selection of actions associated with
the planning/preparation phase of movement. While specific reports of activation
during MI have been confirmed in similar brain areas compared to ME, the magnitude of
activation is documented to be less than ME. For example, the activated voxels during
MI in the contralateral M1 showed a reduction of about 50%, the contralateral
somatosensory cortex of about 70%, and the anterior cerebellar lobule of about 30%
compared to ME; while the SMA and PMC did not show any significant differences
between MI and ME (Lotze et al., 1999; Porro et al., 1996).
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Closely involved with M1 and the predominant areas involved in motor imagery
are the PMC and SMA. Both are consistently reported as activations in MI studies
(Guillot et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 1995), and are primarily involved in the
planning/preparation of movement (Leonard, 1998). Particularly, the dorsal aspect of
the PMC has been found to be involved in MI (Gerardin et al., 2000; Stephan et al.,
1995). Orienting the body and preparing postural muscles, specifically motor
sequencing/planning, working memory and observation of actions, are important
functions produced by the PMC. For example, Decety et al. (1994), as well as others
(Gerardin et al., 2000; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Stephan et al., 1995), found significant
activation of the dorsal and ventral aspects of the lateral part of the PMC during
imagined hand movements. The same degree of overlap between covert and overt
actions is also seen with the SMA which is important for the planning and production of
complex movement sequences (Rosenbaum, 1991). Specifically, Stephan et al. (1995)
found that MI neurons were located in the posterior rostral aspect of the SMA, whereas
ME activated a caudoventral part of the SMA. Other studies confirmed these findings,
and additionally demonstrated pre-SMA activation during MI (Gerardin et al., 2000).
In contrast, imagined movements have shown activation specifically
concentrated in the rostral area of the SMA compared to executed movements
(Gerardin et al., 2000; Lotze et al., 1999; Stephan et al., 1995). Nevertheless, motor
learning (i.e. movement preparation/imagined movement and movement initiation) is
controlled by the various parts of the SMA which projects primarily to M1 and brain
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stem motor areas. Together, M1, PMC, and SMA lead to fibers of the corticospinal tract,
which is the primary pathway for the voluntary control of movement (Rose, 1997).
The associated cortical structures have also been found to be important in motor
control and further studied in relation to MI. Specific subdivisions of the parietal cortex,
including the inferior parietal lobule and the intraparietal sulcus, are activated during
imagined grasping movements (Decety et al., 1994), decision making and action
judgments (Parsons et al., 1995), and action observation (Buccino et al., 2001). During
ME, these same parietal areas are also significantly recruited (Binkofski et al., 1999).
Particularly, the posterior parietal cortex is important for transforming visual
information into motor commands, including spatial localization of the body and
external objects (Rosenbaum, 1991), as well as the storage and generation of action
representations. Since this area integrates a large amount of visual and somatosensory
information, it appears important for transforming object spatial coordinates and/or
processing the constraints related to objects (Jeannerod, 2001). In addition, the
prefrontal cortex is activated during the planning/preparation states when a decision
has to be made preceding an overt action.
The subcortical structures of the cerebellum and basal ganglia are strongly
activated during motor control. The basal ganglia appear to play a role in initiating
movement and scaling movement parameters (Rose, 1997), and are found to be
activated during both imagined and real actions; however, engaging different parts of
the striatum (Gerardin et al., 2000). Specifically, ME has been shown to activate the
putamen (sensorimotor coticocortical loop), while activation during MI involves the
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head of the caudate, which is part of a more cognitive loop. Lastly, the activation of the
cerebellum during overt actions is consistent with that of the corticospinal system
where it receives feedback from the spinal cord and cerebral cortex concerning
movement (Shumway-Cook & Woollacott, 2001); therefore, it is strongly related with
those activations of the sensorimotor cortex (Braitenberg, Heck, & Sultan, 1997).
Cerebellar activation has been found to be involved in skill learning (Shumway-Cook &
Woollacott, 2001) and during MI of simple hand movements (Decety et al., 1994; Ryding
et al., 1993), allowing for the comparison of intended movement with actual movement
commands in order to modulate movement (Morris, Spittle, & Watt, 2005). Activation
of the cerebellum, including the medial and lateral aspects, is identified in imagined
actions (Ryding et al., 1993), perceptually based motor decisions (Parsons et al., 1995),
and during action observation (Lotze et al., 1999). An in-depth look at cerebellar
activation revealed that areas activated during MI are located more posterior and
inferior than those described during ME (Lotze et al., 1999).
Overall, it has been illustrated that MI and ME activate many of the same
anatomical substrates including the motor and premotor cortices, SMA, parietal lobule,
cerebellum, and basal ganglia, though to a lesser degree. Although recent studies are
beginning to apply this concept to the study of larger body movements, we do not
accurately know what characteristics alter and to what degree this activation is
decreased in relation to ME. Regardless of the degree of overlap, MI has an important
role in the overt phases of movement, as well as motor learning/control, motor
sequencing, and movement initiation in order to prime the human motor system. The
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correspondence between brain areas activated by MI and ME is evident using two
theories that have advanced the neurophysiological aspects in imagery research:
functional equivalence theory and simulation theory.
Theoretical Framework
Previous theories (i.e., psychoneuromuscular, symbolic learning, and
bioinformational) have generally been criticized for providing a vague or inadequate
explanation for the underlying mechanism(s) of imagery, especially regarding
performance benefits. The advent of more sophisticated neurophysiological measures
has allowed researchers to gain a greater understanding of how imagery and movement
overlap. Two theoretical frameworks that capture these overlapping aspects of
movement and imagery and include neurophysiological measures to explain how
imagery activates the brain are the functional equivalence theory (Farah, 1989; Finke,
1985, 1980; Finke & Shepard, 1986; Jeannerod, 1995, 1994) and simulation theory
(Jeannerod, 2001).
Functional Equivalence Theory
As proposed by Marks (1977) “imagined stimuli and perceptual or ‘real’ stimuli
have a qualitatively similar status in our conscious mental life” (p. 285). Ongoing
research in cognitive psychology concerning how imagery functions has been guided by
three broad theoretical categories, each focusing on different aspects between imagery
and perception. First, structural theories focus on the similarities between the
appearance of real and imagined objects. Kosslyn (1980) and Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, and
Shwartz (1979) used this type of theory to explain the spatial and pictorial properties of
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mental images (i.e., image-scanning tasks). Second, functional theories offer
explanations of how the formation and transformation of mental images contributes to
the process of comparing two objects (Shepard & Cooper, 1982). Functional theories are
supported by mental rotation paradigms, a cognitive operation during which a mental
image is formed and rotated into a different orientation in space, have been used to
compare MI and ME in a temporal manner (Cooper & Shepard, 1973; Corballis, 1997;
Pinker, 1980; Pinker & Finke, 1980; Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Mental rotation tasks
measure performance by response time and accuracy usually requiring cognitive
manipulation and spatial transformation of an object or body parts. Lastly, perceptual
theories try to explain how imagery influences ongoing perceptual processes (Segal &
Fusella, 1970); for example, how information from others and the situation guide future
actions. Collectively, these are important to movement qualities because of the varying
perspectives learners and athletes must possess in their visual field. As a relatively new
area of research in neuroscience, the idea of accessing processes that correspond to
thinking and feeling (i.e., cognitive or mental states) is characterized by the absence of
overt actions and consists of mental representations and propositional attitudes.
Propositional attitudes are relational mental states connecting a person to a
proposition, which are often assumed to be the simplest components of thought. This
coupled with concerns of early imagery theories led to the development of the
functional equivalence theory.
According to the functional equivalence theory, the properties of motor images
are analogous to ME (Farah, 1989; Finke, 1985, 1980; Finke & Shepard, 1986; Jeannerod,
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1995, 1994); wherein “imagery draws on the same neural network that is used in actual
perception and motor control, which may also activate neural circuits in memory and
emotion” (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001, p. 299). A key idea is that imagery mimics
perception allowing for the organization, identification, and interpretation of mental
information in order to represent and understand the environment (Smith & Kosslyn,
2006). Technological advances in cognitive neuroscience have enabled researchers to
examine the degree of overlap by measuring brain activity. This overlap between
imagery and perception has been observed in visual imagery (VI) (Kosslyn, Thompson, &
Alpert, 1997), auditory imagery (Halpern & Zatorre, 1999), and olfactory imagery
(Djordjevic, Zatorre, Petrides, Boyle, & Jones-Gotman, 2005). Because of this overlap,
Kosslyn et al. (2001) suggested that imagery has the capacity to re-present a specific
perceptual stimulus or situation, truly allowing an individual to experience what is
cognitively occurring. Because it originated in cognitive psychology, the functional
equivalence theory typically references the perception of sensory information, but
methods (i.e., MC) have revealed that motor images retain several properties which are
observed in the corresponding ME allowing for the perception of real action.
The bridge joining MI and ME is based on the notion that the brain stores
memories in the form of mental representations. The idea that a central representation
system mediates imagery is borrowed from the symbolic learning theory declaring that
these mental representations can then be similarly accessed through actual and
imagined behavior (Holmes & Collins, 2001). From the psychoneuromuscular theory, the
functional equivalence theory borrows the idea that imagery activates small muscle
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contractions in order to strengthen cognitive skills and provoke psychophysiological
responses to images. Furthermore, the bioinformational theory provides a link to the
physiological responses (i.e., heart rate and skin conductance) to images as an
individual’s body elicits similar responses during a real or imagined experience (Hall,
2001; Holmes & Collins, 2002, 2001).
Initial evidence for this theory was found by Ingvar and Philipson (1977).
Through measuring rCBF, it was found that similar areas of the brain (i.e., premotor and
frontal regions) were activated when participants imagined clenching their hand or
actually performing the task. These results highlight that the formation of abstract
concepts can be accessible and quantified. In addition, Decety and colleagues (1994,
1990) investigated the common neural mechanisms between MI and motor preparation
finding that both activated the SMA, PMC, and M1. Subsequently, comparable results
were found by Lotze et al. (1999) examining executed and imagined movements of the
left and right hand using fMRI. For example, if a participant imagines the
planning/preparation of a movement the PMC and SMA will be activated, similar to
physically preparing the same movements (Jenkins et al., 2000). Additional experiments
in conjunction with evidence from previous studies provide strong support for the
concept that MI and ME engage many of the same neural processes (see Hall, 2001;
Murphy, Nordin, & Cumming, 2008). This suggests that MI should strengthen the mental
representations for the planning/preparation stage of a motor task, and perhaps the
generation and execution of these tasks (Abbruzzese et al., 1996). Although the
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functional equivalence theory appears to be effective in explaining imagery, especially
how MI enhances motor skills, it is not without limitations.
Overall, the functional equivalence theory provides a more socio-physiological
explanation of MI (Holmes & Collins, 2001), taking advantage of specific perceptual
experiences to produce functionally equivalent images. Because it only proposes that MI
draws on similar networks used in actual ME, especially during the planning/preparation
phase of movement, it can only explain this similarity in terms of fundamental brain
functioning. Therefore, it cannot specifically explain a similarity, in neural terms,
between the simulated state of an action and the execution state of that action. Since
MI is different than the perception of images, the introspective kinesthetic feelings of
movement (Jeannerod, 1994) are imagined. Therefore, Jeannerod (1994) suggested that
MI can be compared with movement planning/preparation, without indicating a
functional equivalence of MI and ME.
Physiological and neurological research has only started to use
neurophysiological approaches to compare imagery of complex movement tasks with
the actual execution of those tasks. Not only does previous research illustrate that MI
utilizes the PMC and basal ganglia, but it also relies on activation of the parietal and
temporal areas as well as parts of the frontal cortex (i.e., M1, SMA, and pre-SMA)
indicating that the imagery process is not localized to specific parts of the brain.
Specifically, motor control is vastly distributed throughout the CNS; therefore, many
brain areas will play a role depending on the complexity of the motor task (Jeannerod,
1995). This tendency has been found in studies using brain imaging methods to localize
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the activation sites of MI (Decety et al., 1994; Decety & Ingvar, 1990; Fox, Pardoe,
Petersen, & Raichle, 1987; Ingvar & Philipson, 1977; Posner & Raichle, 1994; Roland et
al., 1980); illustrating that MI involves a widely distributed cerebral network of
structures. In addition, this theory explains imagery when it occurs as part of motor
planning/preparation, driven by research showing that MI mostly activates similar brain
regions for these stages of movement (Decety et al., 1994; Decety et al., 1990;
Jeannerod, 1994), but not the actual movement itself. Lastly, a fundamental limitation
of the functional equivalence theory is that it has not been directly linked to applied
topics in sport psychology such as performance enhancement. To further advance the
literature supporting a central mechanism responsible for MI and ME, the simulation
theory was proposed by Jeannerod (2001) to provide insight into the covert stages of
action; specifically, that covert actions are in fact actions, except they are not executed.
Simulation Theory
Like the functional equivalence theory, the simulation theory predicts the
overlap of brain activity between MI and ME, while also addressing that motor
structures of the brain are activated in a way that resembles activity during a normal
action but does not cause any overt movements. Unlike functional equivalence,
simulation theory specifically indicates that an individual engaging in action simulation
replays past experiences in order to elicit perceptual activity (i.e., movement
information) that resembles activity that would occur if the action is actually being
performed. More recently, cognitive psychology, specifically human motor cognition
research proposed that all actions involve a covert stage. This covert stage of action is
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considered a representation of the future, including the goal of the action, the means to
achieve this goal, and the consequences it has on the individual and external
environment. According to Jeannerod (2001) the simulation theory hypothesizes that
the motor system is part of a “simulation network that is activated under a variety of
conditions in relation to action” (p. S103). This theory reinforces the idea that covert
and overt movements closely overlap (Smith & Kosslyn, 2006), demonstrating that
images are actions minus the overt movement. Movement execution and MI are both
driven by the same levels in the CNS, where MI is considered an “offline” operation of
the motor areas in the brain (Gentili, Papaxanthis, & Pozzo, 2006; Jeannerod, 2001;
Mulder, 2007). Not only does this theory include the intending actions that will be
executed in the future, but it also includes imaging actions, recognizing tools, and
learning by observation, which the functional equivalence theory was lacking. More
importantly, the simulation theory accounts for all phases of ME where the functional
equivalence theory focuses only on the overall brain areas that become active between
an image and the actual task.
The idea that certain cognitive states are linked to simulated actions is not a new
concept. Like the functional equivalence theory, the simulation theory was developed
according to evidence illustrating that imagined movements retain the same temporal
characteristics (i.e., MC of walking) as the corresponding real movement (Decety &
Jeannerod, 1996; Decety et al., 1989). This is based on Fitts’s Law (Fitts & Posner, 1967),
which governs that there is an inverse relationship between the difficulty of a
movement and the speed that it is performed. This temporal similarity becomes obvious
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with tasks such as mental reciprocal tapping on targets of various sizes (Sirigu et al.,
1995) and grasping objects placed at different orientations (Frak, Paulignan, &
Jeannerod, 2001). Recent research has supported the temporal congruence of imagined
and executed movements using difficulty as an independent variable with gross body
movement such as gait (Bakker et al., 2008; Iseki, Hanakawa, Shinozaki, Nanakaku, &
Fukuyama, 2008; la Fougere et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2009). Therefore, it is not
surprising that MI involves an individual’s “motor brain” and similar neural mechanisms
as ME (Jeannerod, 1997, 1994).
As a result of mapping brain activity and measuring cortical excitability and
activity of peripheral effectors, evidence has been provided relating to a subliminal
activation of the motor system during these cognitive states. Support provided by
mental chronometric studies show similar regularities observed in executed movements
that are also retained in their covert counterparts. Mental chronometry involves the use
of response time to infer the content, duration, and temporal sequencing of cognitive
tasks. This approach has enhanced our understanding of imagery and ME mechanisms
because it helps elucidate mechanisms underlying cognitive processing (Lotze et al.,
1999).
Additional support for the simulation theory comes from findings in the
neurophysiology research measured by neuroimaging techniques (i.e., fMRI). Jeannerod
(2001) illustrated that while activation networks partially overlap, they differ from one
simulation state to another as well as between covert and overt movements. The
activations of these networks in the motor system are considered a prerequisite for the
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simulation theory. Generally, it has been demonstrated that M1, corticospinal
pathways, basal ganglia, cerebellum, PMC, and SMA brain regions (Binkofski et al., 1999;
Buccino et al., 2001; Chao & Martin, 2000; Decety et al., 1997, 1994; Failenot, Toni,
Decety, Gregoire, & Jeannerod, 1997; Gerardin et al., 2000; Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, &
Rizzolatti, 1996; Hari et al., 1998; Lotze et al., 1999; Perani et al., 1995; Rizzolatti et al.,
1996; Stephan et al., 1995) of the motor system have been activated to varying degrees
during simulation states in the following conditions: execution, intention, imagination,
action observation, and object observation. In addition, the parietal areas caudal and
ventral to the primary parietal cortex are consistently activated during simulation states
as well as during ME (Binkofski et al., 1999; Failenot et al., 1997; Jeannerod, 2001;);
particularly during imagined grasping movements (Decety et al., 1994; Grafton et al.,
1996), perceptually based decisions and prospective action judgments (Johnson, 2000;
Parsons et al., 1995), action observation (Buccino et al., 2001; Grafton et al., 1996), and
visual presentation of graspable objects (Chao & Martin, 2000).
This pattern of results illustrates that a covert action corresponds to the central
stages of action, involving a true simulation of movements to one’s own body (de Lange
et al., 2006). On account of the continual activation of simulation states during all
aspects of action, it is logical that the following overt motor action will be facilitated.
This, in turn, helps shape the motor system by providing information concerning
potential actions, as well as the anticipation of action in the planning/preparation phase
of movement. Because of the unifying nature and the hypothesis that MI and ME are
both guided by high levels of CNS activity, the simulation theory will drive the present
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study which intends to refine the connection between self-reported aspects of imagery
ability and the overlapping neural activity that theoretically support them. To this end, it
is important to consider imagery qualities that vary within and between individuals.
Qualities of Imagery
Imagery Perspective
Internal and external perspective delineations of the imagery experience are
seminal qualities that have long been considered in both sport and neuroscience
literature. Mahoney and Avener (1977) originally argued that imagery is a special type of
mental simulation based on the visual representation, either through an internal (firstperson) or external (third-person) perspective, of a movement action to optimize the
conditions of external realization. The difference between the two is that in a thirdperson perspective an individual watches himself or herself performing the action from
an observer’s position; as if watching himself or herself on television (Hall, 2001;
Mahoney & Avener, 1977; McAvinue & Robertson, 2008). It relies more on visuospatial
processing, involving a visual representation of an action or the space in which the
action takes place (Mahoney & Avener, 1977). For this reason, external imagery is
considered a truer form of VI (Hall, Rodgers, & Barr, 1990; Janssen & Sheikh, 1994;
White & Hardy, 1995), having stronger effects on the acquisition and performance of
skills that depend on form for their successful completion (Hardy, 1997; White & Hardy,
1995). In comparison, the internal perspective involves an individual imagining himself
or herself performing a movement as if they were actually performing the movement
and looking through their own eyes (Hall, et al., 1990; Janssen & Sheikh, 1994; Mahoney
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& Avener, 1977; White & Hardy, 1995). Internal imagery refers to an experience either
inside or outside of the body that is not concerned with the sensory modalities (Denis,
1985). Therefore, it has been proposed that the internal imagery perspective is superior
for the acquisition and performance of open skills because these skills significantly
depend on perception and anticipation for their successful completion (Hall, 2001).
Research has generally shown that individuals usually prefer either an internal or
external imagery perspective when engaging in imagery (Hardy & Callow, 1999;
Mahoney & Avener, 1977; Spittle & Morris, 2007), with some specifically recommending
internal imagery (e.g., Hale, 1998). However, what we currently know about perspective
has emerged from important study design features. Early research examining the effect
of internal and external imagery perspectives on motor performance and learning have
shown equivocal results. An evaluation of the literature found that initial studies
suggested that elite athletes favored internal imagery (Hall, 2001). For example,
Mahoney and Avener (1977) completed a study on the U.S. Olympic gymnastics team
showing that those who qualified used internal imagery more than non-qualifiers.
Supporting evidence was found in a study of elite skiers (Rotella, Gansneder, Ojala, &
Billing, 1980) and elite rowers (Barr & Hall, 1992); elite athletes preferred an internal
imagery perspective. Contrary to these results, other studies have failed to support this
idea (Hall et al., 1990; Hardy, 1997; Highlen & Bennett, 1979; Meyers, Cooke, Cullen, &
Liles, 1979; Ungerleider & Golding, 1991; White & Hardy, 1995). For example, Meyers et
al. (1979) found no significant differences in imagery perspective between more or less
successful racquetball players, while Ungerleider and Golding (1991) found that
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successful U.S. track and field athletes used external imagery more than internal
imagery.
The use of objective psychophysiological measures (i.e., EMG, cardiovascular
response, metabolic responses, and perceptual responses) also differentiates imagery
perspectives supporting the construct validity of frequently using self-report measures.
For example, Shick (1970) measured electrical activity produced by the anterior deltoid
and tibialis anterior muscles during mental practice of volleyball skills. Results did not
indicate any significant EMG patterns between internal or external imagery. However,
participants did say that they used an external perspective more while imaging a
volleyball serve, but they changed their perspective to internal when total body was
mentioned during the action of volleying. A related study by Harris and Robinson (1986)
examined whether muscle innervation was specific to muscles that were needed for
performance during internal and external imagery of karate tasks. Using 36 karate
students, it was found that more EMG activity was produced during internal imagery
than external imagery. Additional analyses revealed that advanced karateists favored an
internal imagery perspective more than beginners and that they reported switching
from internal to external imagery depending on the task. Moreover, Wang and Morgan
(1991) examined the internal and external imagery of undergraduate and graduate
participants’ (n = 30) psychophysiological responses of imagery perspective during four
conditions (internal imagery, external imagery, actual exercise, and rest) of a dumbbell
curl. Although some responses to external and internal imagery were like those
occurring during actual exercise, the psychophysiological responses during internal
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imagery resembled actual exercise more than external imagery. These studies imply that
imagery does excite muscles involved in the events imagined and is greater in the
internal imagery perspective compared to the external imagery perspective, which may
be a result of internal imagery containing a large kinesthetic component (see Hall,
Schmidt, Durand, & Buckolz, 1994). However, all studies did mention that there was a
lack of control in maintaining the desired perspective with participants switching
perspectives during imagery.
On the other hand, unclear results were found in studies by Blair, Hall, and
Leyshon (1993) and White and Hardy (1995). First, Blair et al. (1993) investigated the
effect of an imagery training program on soccer performance of skilled (n = 22) and
novice (n = 22) players that were equally and randomly assigned to an experimental or
control group. Participants in the experimental group completed a six-week imagery
program that included both visual and kinesthetic imagery as well as internal and
external imagery perspectives, while the control group developed a competitive
strategy. Response time and performance accuracy measurements were collected after
the imagery training program illustrated a significant improvement for both skilled and
novice players in the imagery group for response time, but not for performance
accuracy. Additional research examining the speed of performance was completed by
White and Hardy (1995) in experiments examining the efficacy of different imagery
perspectives on a wheelchair slalom task and pseudo-gymnastic routine. Twenty-four
students were separated into an internal imagery and external imagery group in which
they completed the Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire (VMIQ), which
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measured the vividness of internal and external visual imagery. The experiment
consisted of watching an individual completing the task, then completing 3 blocks of 5
trials of the task with feedback after each and engaging in internal/external imagery
before each trial. Average participant VMIQ scores were: internal visual imagery (IVI) =
92.33 and external visual imagery (EVI) = 89.33. Mixed results were found depending on
the task; the external group focused on the speed of performance, while the internal
group focused on the accuracy of performance during the slalom task suggesting that
internal imagery is more effective at planning movements in response to changes in the
visual field. On the other hand, external imagery was more effective for both learning
and retention compared to internal imagery for the gymnastics task. These results
indicate that internal imagery may not be beneficial for learning and performing a
complex movement skill that include immediate body space compared to those based
on time. Nevertheless, perspective matters and preferences appeared to be linked to
task type.
These results generated addition research investigating the efficacy of different
imagery perspectives on form dependent tasks (Hardy & Callow, 1999). Comparing
internal imagery and external imagery, three experiments were completed with
karateists (simulating fighting forms), gymnasts (simulating a floor routine), and high
ability rock climbers (simulating boulder problems) finding that external imagery was
more effective in all studies. These experiments support the idea that external imagery
has greater effects on performance of skills that depend on form for their successful
completion. A subsequent study by Cumming and Ste-Marie (2001) examined 18 female
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skaters participating in a five-week imagery training program that concentrated on the
form of skating skills. Skaters identified their preferred perspective and were required to
use this perspective throughout the imagery training program, but results revealed that
imagery perspective had no significant effects. This indicates that self-choice of
perspective may be mismatched with task demands or that the skater’s perspective
shifted (Harris & Robinson, 1986; Shick, 1970; Wang & Morgan, 1992); skaters using
internal imagery for a form-contingent task confounded the results.
Imagery perspective distinctions have also been examined in the neuroscience
literature where delineations are further supported by the use of objective measures.
Ruby and Decety (2003) investigated the effect of perspective on the neural network
engaged during mental simulation of action. Ten males (right-handed) participated in a
PET activation protocol in which they were scanned during four conditions (two auditory
and two visual) and two control conditions (one auditory and one visual) in order to
identify the regions activated during internal and external simulation, as well as the
common areas involved with internal and external imagery perspectives. Results
showed that both internal and external perspectives activated the SMA, pre-central
gyrus, precuneus and extrastriate visual area (MT/V5). When comparing the external
perspective to the internal perspective the right inferior parietal, precuneus, posterior
cingulate and frontopolar cortex were recruited. However, when comparing the internal
to the external imagery perspective the left inferior parietal and somatosensory
cortexes were activated. It was concluded that the inferior parietal, precuneus and
somatosensory cortex are specifically involved in producing self-action (internal or first35

person) compared to those generated by others (external or third-person), but these
results only specified foci of activation (x, y, z coordinates) without indicating the depth
or breadth of activation in these brain areas. Perspective differentiation has also been
supported by neurological measures such as transcranial magnetic simulation (TMS:
noninvasive method to cause changes in the neurons of the brain) and
electroencephalography (EEG). When investigating, the corticospinal facilitation of 30
participants (18 females and 12 males) during internal and external imagery of an
observed skill, scores for both measures were largest under the external imagery
condition (Fourkas, Avenanti, Urgesi, & Aglioti, 2006). These findings continue to point
to the importance of perspective as well as controlling the task condition; tasks that are
short in duration and involve observing a skill prior to engaging in imagery are an
important consideration in designing studies.
To further uncover imagery qualities that may be important in practical contexts,
studies have considered visual and kinesthetic imagery modes concurrently with the
assessment of perspectives. For example, Callow and Hardy (2004) examined the
strength of the relationship between internal and external imagery and kinesthetic
imagery (KI), as assessed by the MIQ and VMIQ, among 56 participants (28 females and
28 males) who were educated about these delineations during a three hour imagery
workshop. A correlation analysis showed that although in the positive direction,
correlations between internal imagery and KI (r = 0.41) and external imagery and KI (r =
0.15) did not reach significance (p < 0.01), suggesting that mode and perspective were
measuring different aspects of imagery. In addition, result showed that females
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compared to males may have had a better composite imagery ability as measured by
the VMIQ (106.8 ± 24.53, 105.9 ± 25.03, respectively), and the MIQ (43.36 ± 14.78,
46.26 ± 15.29, respectively). This finding illustrates the importance of controlling for
gender in research designs and that male athletes benefit from learning more about
imagery modes and perspectives if the goal is to improve their imagery ability. In study
two, participants completed the same measures and procedure as study one, except
that the instructions were changed to make the actual participant (compared to
somebody else) the focus of the external imagery perspective. Results indicated a
significant correlation between external and kinesthetic imagery (r = 0.60, p < 0.01), but
not for internal and kinesthetic imagery (r = 0.23, p < 0.01). Therefore, external imagery
may be used in conjunction with KI, while no support was provided for internal imagery
being easier to perform with KI.
These findings prompted Calmels, Holmes, Lopez, and Naman (2006) to examine
the temporal functional equivalence of internal and external imagery and action
execution of 16 female elite gymnasts (Mean = 14.5, SD = 1.63) participating at the
national level. Participants were separated into two groups (internal group = 10 and
external group = 6) before completing the experiment (i.e., Yurchenko vault) by the
French version of the VMIQ, verbally reporting the perspective used in training, and a
sport psychologist assessment. A 2 x 3 x 2 (Perspective x Trial x Condition) ANOVA with
repeated measures did not show an interaction (F = 1.214, p = 0.31) or a main effect for
perspectives (F = 1.475, p = 0.24), trials (F = 0.417, p = 0.66), or conditions (F = 2.631, p =
0.13) for the full vault. In addition, results showed that the time taken to complete the
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vault between internal imagery (Mean = 4.91, SD = 1.95) and physical performance
(Mean = 5.84, SD = 0.40), and external imagery (Mean = 5.65, SD = 1.49) and physical
performance (Mean = 6.29, SD = 0.40) both did not significantly differ. However, when
the action was divided into segments there was a significant difference between the
imagery conditions compared to the physical condition. Thus, if the purpose of the study
is to examine perspective differences, the time it takes to complete the task and
imagery of that task may confound the results; therefore, a shorter and simpler task
may be beneficial in some cases.
Recently, Callow, Roberts, Hardy, Jiang, and Edwards (2013) completed three
experiments using three different slalom tasks (driving-simulation, downhill running,
and downhill ski) in a virtual reality setting to determine which imagery perspective
indicated better performance. For all three studies, measures of response time and
imagery ability (determined by the VMIQ-2) were completed where internal
consistencies for perspective and imagery mode scales were 0.86 for EVI, 0.90 for IVI,
and 0.84 for KI. Experiment one separated 45 right-handed male participants (Mean =
21.35 years, SD = 3.12 years) into three groups (IVI, EVI, and KI) and examined the
response time of completing a driving-simulation slalom task. Preliminary analyses of
the VMIQ-2 data revealed no differences between groups for IVI ability F (2, 42) = 0.42,
p = 0.66, η2 = 0.02, 1-β = 0.11, and KI ability F (2, 42) = 1.32, p = 0.28, η2 = 0.01, 1-β =
0.27. However, significant differences were found between groups for EVI, F (2, 42) =
7.48, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.26, 1-β = 0.93, showing better EVI ability than the IVI group (p =
0.003) and control group (p = 0.009). A mixed-model ANOVA for performance (i.e.,
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response time) indicated that the IVI group performed significantly better (i.e., quicker
response times) than the EVI group (p < 0.05). Experiment two consisted of 22 sports
science students (Mean = 22.5 years, SD = 3.08 years; 18 males and four females) with
no significant difference in imagery ability across perspectives (p = 0.31). Results
revealed that the movement task (i.e., downhill running slalom task) was completed
significantly quicker using IVI than EVI (p = 0.008), but no differences were found for
accuracy. Finally, 30 recreational skiers (Mean = 24.79 years, SD = 4.77 years; 23 males
and seven females) were separated into an IVI, EVI, or control group and completed a
slalom skiing task in experiment three. Results from single factor ANOVAs revealed a
significant difference for accuracy (F (2, 23) = 3.59, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.24, 1-β = 0.61); the
IVI group was more accurate than the control group. However, no differences were
found between groups for response time (F (2, 23) = 1.22, p = 0.32, η2 = 0.10, 1-β =
0.24). Although these results support the beneficial effect of IVI on slalom tasks, KI was
not included as its own condition and was not controlled during the other conditions.
Nevertheless, this study illustrated the importance of task characteristics, employing
specific imagery ability criteria, and the use of three different but linked tasks across the
different experiments further advancing the imagery perspective literature.
Within the sport psychology literature, research regarding perspective has
helped refine researchers’ choices of design details in order to provide support for what
imagery perspective is more beneficial for motor performance. Within these studies, the
type of task is important to consider (e.g., complex vs. simple, short vs. long, form-based
vs. task-based) because of how they influence each perspective differently and limit the
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findings of these tasks (Hardy, 1997; Hardy & Callow, 1999; White & Hardy, 1995). In
addition, the instructions provided to participants concerning the task and the nature of
the study have led to confusion between the two perspectives. Situation dependent,
individuals choose to use either an internal or external perspective through a visual or
kinesthetic modality (Mahoney & Avener, 1977). Therefore, the imagery perspective
needs to be explicitly communicated to participants or asked after engaging in imagery
(i.e., “debriefing”) so that results are reliable and valid. Also, depending on the
dependent measure examined (i.e., response time, accuracy, and/or questionnaire
score) results may vary between the effectiveness of internal and external imagery for
the task (Blair et al., 1993). Despite the details concerning experimental design that
have emerged from the imagery perspective research, the neurological activation
between internal and external imagery remains unknown, especially when participants
are instructed to only engage in one perspective. In addition to perspective, imagery
modality is important because it can provide discrete information relating to the
purpose of imagery or the type of sport skill being learned or performed.
Imagery Modalities
Imagery modality refers to perceptual experiences tied to the five senses: visual,
kinesthetic, olfactory, auditory and tactile with the first two being most relevant to
motor tasks. The visual and kinesthetic systems are involved not only when watching
examples of movements (Darling & Miller, 1993; Guillot et al., 2009; Neuper, Scherer,
Reiner, & Pfurtscheller, 2005), but when perceiving what a movement would look like
and feel like when based in instructions (Annett, 1995; Lotze & Halsband, 2006). It is not
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surprising that regardless of task experience, athletes often report using visual and
kinesthetic imagery, often to the same extent (Murphy et al., 2008). Even though visual
and kinesthetic imagery are used equally, neurophysiological data support the
distinction between these modalities with the brain activating visual neural patterns
during VI and motor neural patterns during KI (Annett, 1996; Berthoz, 1996; Decety,
1996; Farah, 1989; Holmes & Collins, 2001). Because of their use and subsequent
neurological distinction, both visual and kinesthetic imagery have streamlined to the
forefront of practical applications used in a variety of contexts including athletics, dance,
medical, and aviation education.
In athletics, some report the ability to “see” with the “mind’s eye;” referring to
“seeing” a movement (Morris, Spittle, & Watt, 2005). Conceptually, viewing images as
“pictures” of the mind possess quasi-sensations which are experienced, evaluated,
reacted to, and committed to memory similar to any other perceptual event. As
illustrated by Posner (1978) and Hubel and Wiesel (1977), there are levels of
equivalence between VI and perception. Specifically, Posner (1978) initially used a series
of letter-matching studies to measure the mental processing time of several tasks (i.e.,
physical match, name match, and rule match) associated with the recognition of a pair
of letters. Using the subtraction method, the time it took for participants to perform
each cognitive process was associated with each physical task, indicating that high levels
of the visual system are significantly influenced by one’s knowledge about objects and
expectations. In contrast, lower visual levels are determined by the structure and
function of the processing mechanisms (Marr, 1976). Since visual perception involves
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the activation of information processing mechanisms at many levels of the visual
system, it is proposed that imagery also involves these same visual neural patterns.
Neuroscience researchers have found that many of the same neural patterns
activated during visual perception are also found to be activated in VI (Farah, 1988;
Finke, 1989; Kosslyn, 1994). Specifically, the middle occipital gyrus (Platel et al., 1997),
middle temporal gyrus (Deutschlander et al., 2002; Rizzolatti et al., 1996), inferior
occipital gyrus (Platel et al., 1997), posterior inferior temporal gyrus and fusiform gyrus
(Deutschlander et al., 2002), supramarginal gyrus (Dupont, Orban, de Bruyn,
Verbruggen, & Mortelmans, 1994), and inferior temporal gyrus (Kosslyn et al., 1994;
Sergetn, Ohta, & MacDonald, 1992) showed activation in studies focusing on visual
imagery and visual processing that instructed individuals to reconstruct mental images
without direct visual stimuli.
Research involving neuroimaging techniques (i.e., PET and fMRI) typically
examine similarities between brain activity of perception and VI while participants
perform different VI tasks, showing deficits in imagery that are equivalent to visual
neural pattern deficits in brain areas previously discussed (Farah, 1988; Kosslyn, 1994;
Kosslyn & Koenig, 1995). However, it has also been shown by Behrmann, Winocur, and
Moscovitch (1992) and Jankowiak, Kinsbourne, Shalev, and Bachman (1992) that
patients who have disrupted perception can retain undamaged imagery processes to
some extent. Although this is counterintuitive to imagery being equivalent to visual
perception, these findings inform on the practical significance of imagery in
rehabilitative contexts. Additional research examining normal patients has shown that
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nearly 65% of all brain areas activated between VI and visual perception are the same
(Farah, Peronnet, Gonon, & Girard, 1988; Kosslyn et al., 2002, 1997; Kosslyn &
Thompson, 2003; Mellet, Petit, Mazoyer, Denis, & Tzourio, 1998). Overall, Kosslyn
(2005) concluded that the “bulk of evidence supports the claim that VI not only draws
on many of the same mechanisms of visual perception, but also that topographically
organized early visual areas play a functional role in imagery” (p. 342).
Although VI is important for learning and refining skills in a variety of contexts, KI
is also involved in motor skill learning. Referring to internal and external information
from receptors throughout the body, KI pertains to a sensory experience regarding
body-part location and movement, the nature of objects coming into contact with the
body, and the specific movements of the body (Schmidt & Wrisberg, 2004). Callow and
Waters (2005) contend that KI involves the sensation of how a movement feels when
performing an action, including force, effort, balance, spatial location, and movement
time. The sensations that an individual experiences can either pertain to a body part or
a piece of equipment that is being manipulated. For example, an individual could be
asked to perceive the bodily sensation of a finger tapping sequence or the force of
fingers pushing a basketball while dribbling without producing any movement. In the
literature, however, KI has been difficult to separate from IVI, which is considered to
contain a large kinesthetic component (McAvinue & Robertson, 2008).
Support for the independence of the kinesthetic modality is apparent from
several studies in the physiology, psychophysiology, and cognitive brain research. Early
EEG research completed by Davidson and Schwartz (1977) examined the pattern of
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occipital and sensorimotor activation of 20 right-handed female participants during selfgenerated VI and KI of three tasks (i.e., flashing light, tapping sensation on the right
forearm, and both the light and tapping together). EEG was recorded from the left
occipital and left sensorimotor regions showing that the visual task elicited greater
visual neural patterns and the movement task elicited greater motor neural patterns,
while the combined condition equally activated both areas. The difference between
visual and kinesthetic imagery suggests that different imagery modalities elicit specific
changes in the brain regions responsible for processing information in the relevant
modalities (Davidson & Schwartz, 1977). However, this study may have been a result of
alternate accounts: eye movements causing artifacts in the data, participants altering
their performance to comply with the hypothesis of the experimenter, and task-induced
demand characteristics (Berger & Gaunitz, 1979; Finke, 1985).
More recently, Guillot, Collet, and Dittmar (2004) also investigated the
relationship between visual and kinesthetic imagery for a complex motor skill. Ten
gymnasts (five females and five males) and 10 tennis players (five females and five
males) completed embedded figure tests as well as a MI experiment that asked them to
imagine a series of complex skills. Data involving mean group embedded figure test
scores and skin conductance (i.e., skin resistance response patterns) indicated that
gymnasts were equally able to perform visual and kinesthetic imagery, while the tennis
players showed a more effective pattern only for VI (n = 5) or KI (n = 5). These results
were supported by Farahat, Ille, and Thon (2004) indicating that MI may be relatively
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dependent on task requirements, which elicit changes in the brain that are responsible
for processing information in the relevant modality.
Subsequent work by Neuper et al. (2005) compared EEG patterns of 14 righthanded participants during four different conditions involving a hand movement: KI, VI,
motor execution and observation. Results indicated that EEG activity during motor
execution and observation mapped onto appropriate areas with 80% accuracy and that
the accuracy during KI was stronger (67%) than during the VI condition (57%). A
subsequent study explored the changes in corticomotor excitability during kinesthetic
and visual imagery of the same motor task (i.e., hand movement) in which 10 righthanded participants (six females and four males) completed a TMS experiment and 10
right-handed participants (seven females and three males) participated in an F-wave
(applying a strong electrical stimulus to the skin surface to stimulate nerve impulses)
experiment during four experimental conditions (rest, VI, MI, and KI) (Stinear, Byblow,
Steyvers, Levin, & Swinnen, 2006). Findings indicated that KI and VI strategies have
different effects on corticospinal excitability with KI being the only modality found to
modulate the corticospinal excitability, including muscle-specific and temporally
modulated facilitation, further supporting neurological differentiation between KI and
VI.
Contradictory results, highlighting the inability to determine which imagery
modality is being used based on corticospinal excitability, were found in a subsequent
TMS study by Fourkas, Ionta, and Aglioti (2006) who examined the corticospinal
excitability during MI of a thumb-palm opposition movement. Surface electrodes were
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placed over the opponens pollicis and abductor digiti minimi on the right hand of 13
healthy participants (five females and eight males), and focal TMS was performed over
the left M1 during four motor imagery blocks (two KI and two VI). Results of paired ttests indicated no overall difference between imagery modality, suggesting that the
effects of VI and KI are similar. In addition, Taktek, Zinsser, and St-John (2008)
attempted to determine the modality that is most efficient for the retention and
transfer of a closed motor skill. Right-handed male and female participants (n = 96)
completed a French version of the VMIQ (Fournier, le Cren, Monnier, & Halliwell, 1994)
before being divided into two groups (boys and girls) that ranged from good imagers to
poor imagers, for each group, based on their imagery ability score. Participants were
further divided into six experimental groups (VI combined with physical practice, KI
combined with physical practice, EVI, IVI, KI, and specific physical practice) composed of
eight girls and eight boys to maintain a homogenous imagery ability between the
groups, and then were asked to complete an underarm throw of a ball toward a target.
Overall, KI and VI did not allow for the achievement of equivalent or superior results to
those in the specific physical practice group during the initial trials; however, equivalent
results were produced between all experimental groups from pre-test to post-test and
retention phases. These results fail to show any differences between visual and
kinesthetic imagery conditions, indicating that one modality may not be superior to the
other and that they may be neurologically similar. Possible explanations offered for
these equivocal findings include: not controlling for imagery ability at pre-test (e.g.,
holding imagery ability of the participants constant as a covariate), task unfamiliarity
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(Hardy & Callow, 1999), the modality of an image being less important than its purpose
(Fourkas et al., 2006), and the similarity of behavioral, central and peripheral evidences
shared by mental and physical practice (Holmes & Collins, 2001).
Examinations of the specialized neural systems activated during visual and
kinesthetic imagery modalities are rare. Guillot et al. (2009) directly compared brain
activity during visual and kinesthetic imagery of 13 volunteers (seven females and six
males), rated as good to excellent imagers (as defined by at least one standard deviation
above a mean global imagery score: ANS score, MIQ-R score, auto-estimation score, and
MC score), completing a finger sequence task in four conditions (physical execution, VI,
KI, and perceptual control). Results showed the involvement of the primary visual area,
prestriate cortex, and visual pathways (i.e., superior parietal structures and precuneus)
during VI, confirming the neuroactivity accuracy results during VI of previous
neuroimaging studies (Jackson, Lafleur, Malouin, Richards, & Doyon, 2000; Mellet et al.,
1998; Solodkin, Hlustik, Chen, & Small, 2004; Thompson & Kosslyn, 2000; Zacks,
Ollinger, Sheridan, & Tversky, 2002). In addition, only KI was found to bilaterally activate
the inferior parietal lobe, which is crucial for MI (Decety et al., 1994; Gerardin et al.,
2000; Nair, Purcott, Fuchs, Steinberg, & Kelso, 2003; Stephan et al., 1995; Suchan et al.,
2002). Findings from Guillot et al.’s (2009) study point to different neural processing in
VI compared to KI conditions. Specifically, VI has increased visual neural patterns in the
brain areas responsible for generating mental images and KI corresponds to increased
activity in the motor neural areas that produce movement. In studies like this, it is
important to control participant compliance to instructions because it is often difficult
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to dissociate VI from KI. However, this study is limited by only using good imagers,
selected using a global imagery score [(ANS score + MIQ-R score + auto estimation
score) – (MC score)] as well as varying task difficulty, causing participants to rely less on
motor simulation than on memory retrieval.
Gabbard, Ammar, and Cordova (2009) tested the distinctiveness of VI and MI in
an interference tactic research paradigm to explore if the two imagery modes possess
distinctive processing properties. Twenty-nine right-handed male and female
participants completed two reaching tasks in both imagery conditions. Greater accuracy
in MI compared to VI for judgments of estimation was found, as well as significant
differences in total error data in which participants engaging in MI committed fewer
errors. Additional support for modality distinction comes from Stecklow, Infantosi, and
Cagy (2010) who investigated the changes in EEG alpha power during sequences of
visual and kinesthetic MI. EEG signals of the occipital and parietal regions were acquired
from 15 elite volleyball players and 18 novices (no volleyball experience) during
sequences of MI of a volleyball spike in kinesthetic or visual modalities. Results indicated
that there were significant differences between modalities, where KI was significantly
stronger than VI, with athletes more easily imaging than non-athletes. Furthermore,
Giron, McIsaac, and Nilsen (2012) compared the effects of EVI and KI on pelvis and hip
kinematics during two dance movements, plié and sauté, in a pilot study. Three female
dancers were assigned to one of three groups (VI, KI, or no imagery). Peak external hip
rotation varied in both modality and task, indicating that different imagery modalities
are task specific by comparing the effects of VI and KI.
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With the evolution of this research, it is becoming apparent that
neurophysiological data support the distinction between VI and KI, thus, indicating that
VI activates visual neural pathways and KI activates motor neural pathways (Annett,
1996; Berthoz, 1996; Decety, 1996; Farah, 1989; Holmes & Collins, 2001). However,
most of these studies did not account for imagery ability which is a key component of
MI, where those with higher imagery ability are believed to benefit more from using
imagery compared to those with lower imagery ability. In studies where participants
were selected and/or separated based on imagery ability, it was done using a composite
score of the conditions on a self-report imagery questionnaire or another composite
score using multiple measurement techniques (i.e., global imagery score). This is a major
flaw of measuring imagery ability in these studies, especially using a composite score
because the questionnaires (i.e., MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2) are formatted to measure each
modality and perspective separately. The combination of all imagery conditions in a
single score contradicts the sensitivity of capturing perspective and modality differences
the questionnaires were designed to measure; consequently, the ability to effectively
separate good imagers from poor imagers is diminished.
Imagery Ability
Imagery ability is generally described as an individual’s capacity to form and
control images that are created, as well as how vivid and realistic these representations
of movements are, in the sense that they can describe the characteristics of the motor
task (Guillot & Collet, 2005; Martin, Moritz, & Hall, 1999). According to Paivio (1985)
imagery is an ability that improves with practice where those with a higher capacity to
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generate images are proposed to benefit more from mental practice efforts. Further,
imagery ability is a product of experience and genetic variability with the latter being
the limiting factor of its effectiveness. Originally hypothesized by Paivio (1985), some
variations in imagery ability are attributed to brain differences. At the time, however,
the difference in imagery ability as a result of variability in the brain was nothing more
than speculation given that no empirical evidence was provided to support this claim. In
the cognitive neuroscience literature of that time, imagery was proposed to have a role
in memory (Paivio, 1985) and research paradigms were predominantly behavioral
experiments involving electrophysiological measurements (see Farah, 1988; Farah,
Peronnet, Gonon, & Giard, 1988; Farah, Weisberg, Monheit, & Peronnet, 1989). With
the advent of brain imaging techniques in the 1980s (i.e., PET, fMRI) converging
evidence continued to indicate that brain differences separated good and poor imagery
abilities (Kosslyn, 1996; Kosslyn, Margolis, Barrett, Goldknopf, & Daly, 1990).
Findings in cognitive neuroscience note that imagery ability is one of the most
variable moderating factors of neural activity and that it is a more complex topic that
goes beyond the vividness of an image (Guillot et al., 2008). Imagery ability has been
shown to distinguish between successful and less successful performance (Murphy,
1994), as well as impact the effectiveness of an imagery intervention (Hall, Buckolz, &
Fishburne, 1992). For example, Goss, Hall, Buckolz, and Fishburne (1986) examined the
relationship between imagery ability and the acquisition, retention, and reacquisition of
movements. Thirty participants completed four movement patterns after being
separated into the following imagery groups as measured by the MIQ: good visual/good
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kinesthetic (n = 10), good visual/poor kinesthetic (n = 10), and poor visual/poor
kinesthetic (n = 10). Results for the acquisition and reacquisition of movements showed
that the good visual/good kinesthetic group acquired the movements in the least
number of trials, while the poor visual/poor kinesthetic required the greatest number of
trials. A similar study by Robin et al. (2007) examined how imagery ability affected
motor improvement on tennis service return accuracy of 80 skilled tennis players who
were divided into three groups according to their MIQ scores (good imager, poor
imager, and control group). Absolute and variable error analyses were used to compare
pre- and post-test performance of service returns showing that good imagers performed
significantly better than poor imagers for amplitude and accuracy. Both of these studies
indicate that good imagery ability impacts MI practice on motor performance, especially
facilitating the acquisition of movements.
In a related study, Lawrence, Callow, and Roberts (2013) explored the role of
imagery ability in the effectiveness of observationally learning a gymnastics floor routine
of 40 participants assigned to one of four groups (i.e., good imagery ability and
observational learning, poor imagery ability and observational learning, good imagery
ability control, and poor imagery ability control). A significant experimental phase x
group interaction was found (F (3, 36) = 56.62, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.83). Specifically, the good
imagery ability and observational learning group (Mean = 6.22 ± 1.71) performed
significantly better than the poor imagery ability and observational learning group
(Mean = 4.48 ± 1.65). This suggests that imagery ability moderates the effectiveness of
observational learning on acquiring a motor sequence, which may be caused by an
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increase in brain activation in areas (e.g., SMA) important for movement pattern
acquisition.
Two dimensions of evaluating the quality of an image include vividness and
controllability (Denis, 1985; Gould & Damarjian, 1996; Lequerica, Rapport, Axelrod,
Telmet, & Whitman, 2002). An individual’s capacity to form these types of images (i.e.,
good or poor imagery ability) is inferred from both subjective and objective measures.
Subjective reports of imagery vividness are one of the most frequently examined
aspects of imagery ability (Cui, Jeter, Yang, Montague, & Eagleman, 2007; DeschaumesMolinaro, Dittmar, & Vernet-Maury, 1991; Hishitani & Murakami, 1992). Vividness
refers to how clear and real an image appears (Roberts, Callow, Hardy, Markland, &
Bringer, 2008). In addition, vividness is thought to be related to the level of interest,
meaningfulness, and affect associated with the image generated (Kaufman, 1981). In
other words, vivid MI should consist of mental representations using detailed sensory
cues, typically those from previous perceptual experiences. Findings from sport
psychology support this idea by examining how to improve sport performance, showing
that both physical practice and imagery groups equally improve significantly compared
to control groups (Holmes & Collins, 2001; Wakefield & Smith, 2012). The vividness of
an image is important in order to create or re-create the actual experience within an
individual’s mind. Specifically, effective images (i.e., ones more likely to produce real-life
experiences) are said to include several key components (i.e., physical, environment,
task, timing, learning, emotion, and perspective) (Holmes & Collins, 2001). In order to
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produce effective images, an individual has to be able to generate and continually
inspect the vividness of the image he or she produces.
Controllability, another important feature of imagery ability, refers to the ease
and accuracy that image content can be manipulated and transformed (Guillot & Collet,
2010; Moran, 1993; Roberts et al., 2008). Having control of an image allows for its
maintenance over a certain period of time (Denis, 1985) and provides an individual the
capacity to influence the image content (Murphy, 1994). This dimension is important in
understanding one’s imagery ability in the physical and sport contexts, particularly when
participants have to mentally rotate a perceptual stimulus or manipulate an object in
space (i.e., ball juggling in soccer, body rotation in gymnastics, and stroke
rehabilitation). Proficiency in the ability to control one’s image facilitates the individual’s
ability to visualize the intended accomplishments or goal of the task, instead of making
possible errors. To illustrate this, 50 male college students were randomly assigned to
an experimental condition that either imaged or did not image the physical movements
associated in successfully completing a golf putt (Cho, 2009). Participants in the imagery
groups were provided with standard images to use and then asked to complete an
imagery questionnaire after each image. Results showed that participants who were
able to control the outcome of an image prior to performing that activity had greater
influence on subsequent performance than did imagery of the motor movements that
make up the task itself.
In addition, literature reviews indicate that differences in the characteristics that
an individual uses when mentally practicing a task can influence the transferability to
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actual performance of other tasks (see Robertson, 2002). This was examined in a
neuroscience study involving 16 right-handed males completing two mental rotation
tasks, one involving an object and the other a hand (Wraga et al., 2003). Utilizing PET
rCBF was found to be greater in the mental rotation hand task in the pre-motor and
primary motor areas of the brain. It was concluded that motor activation from an
imagined hand rotation task can be transferred to other mental rotation tasks, and that
a participant’s ability to transform objects in their mind similarly to physical practice
may be related to mental rotation being an incremental process. These studies illustrate
that the closer the image is to the real performance, in terms of vividness and
controllability, the easier it will be to transfer the skill correctly.
Evidence regarding imagery ability indicates that even though individuals can be
categorized by self-report questionnaires as vivid imagers, if they do not have control of
their image their overall performance can still be poor (Epstein, 1980). Isaac (1992)
conducted a study to test the hypothesis that individuals who produce better images
and have control over them will elicit better performance. Novice and experienced
trampolinists (n = 78) identified as good or poor imagers were randomly assigned to an
experimental (i.e., mental practice) or a control condition and completed a six-week
training period. Post-training performance measures presented a significant difference
between good and poor imagers with good imagers improving more than poor imagers.
This also illustrates that there is a link between an individual’s imagery ability assessed
by self-report questionnaires and their physical performance. In addition, MacIntyre,
Moran, and Jennings (2002) investigated the relationship between imagery (i.e.,
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controllability) with canoe-slalom performance in elite (n = 19) and intermediate (n =
12) athletes. It was reported that canoe-slalom performance can be predicted using an
objective imagery ability measure (i.e., mental rotation test) between elite and
intermediate athletes. In a series of studies examining performance (i.e., flexibility and
learning a forearm pass in volleyball) and self-reported imagery ability, performance
gains were found between the experimental groups and a control group after
completing a training program (Ay, Halaweh, & Al-Taieb, 2013; Guillot, Tolleron, &
Collet, 2010). Overall, studies examining vividness and controllability conclude that
individuals who self-report more vividness and are able to control these images will
further benefit from imagery interventions. What remains unknown is if these results
are directly related to imagery or confounded by other factors (e.g., better technical
execution, improved information processing), and if objective measures (i.e., fMRI) can
support a direct link between participant variability self-report imagery ability and
performance.
In an attempt to increase our understanding and expand imagery research, the
functional equivalence and simulation theories extend the common theoretical
underpinnings of imagery by incorporating cognitive neuroscience research in an
attempt to increase our understanding of how to measure imagery ability. In a study by
Roure et al. (1999) performance improvement with imagery quality estimated during
ANS recording (i.e., skin potential and resistance, skin blood flow and skin temperature,
and instantaneous heart rate and respiratory frequency) of volleyball training
(“receiving serve”) was evaluated from the accuracy of a pass to a targeted teammate.
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Pre- and post-tests were completed on 12 participants (gender not indicated) separated
into two groups (imagers and controls), according to self-reported imagery ability scores
(i.e., MIQ), to measure real-time monitoring during imagery sessions. Correlations
between imagery quality and performance showed that performance was strongly
correlated with ANS response (r = 0.79, p = 0.0019). Furthermore, this correlation
between participants with a “high” (grade = +20) and a “poor” (grade = -4) ANS
response and performance improvement suggests that an objective evaluation of an
individual’s imagery ability can be obtained.
Most recently, van der Meulen, Allali, Rieger, Assal, and Vuilleumier (2012)
investigated imagery ability differences on the correlates of gait control with 20 healthy
participants separated into two groups (good and poor imagers) based on their
performance on two MC tests. Using fMRI, three different tasks (MI, VI, and control)
were able to identify good imagers from poor imagers; good imagers showing increased
activation in the right M1, left prefrontal cortex, right thalamus, and bilateral
cerebellum compared to poor imagers. Although the capacity for good imagers to
recruit motor areas during MI was found, the two groups (i.e., good and poor imagers)
did not differ on vividness ratings of an imagery ability questionnaire suggesting that
self-report questionnaires may not be a valid method to measure imagery ability.
However, the task used did not only involve gait, it also required participants to
complete other cognitive functions (i.e., goal-directed behavior, spatial orientation, and
time estimation) which may have caused less cortical and more subcortical, brainstem
and cerebellar activation (Jahn et al., 2008). Although van der Meulen et al. (2012) were
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able to demonstrate better gait control among good imagers as classified by MC,
imagery ability scores did not correctly classify IA groups. Therefore, future studies
should continue to examine validated imagery ability questionnaires and their capability
to separate participants into good and poor imager groups.
Despite the emerging neuroscience evidence in support of imagery, respective
neurological convergent validity evidence supporting common imagery ability
assessments is necessary to establish the efficacy of using these self-report instruments.
This is important because it is common for researchers to measure imagery ability as
inclusion criteria (see Collet, Guillot, Lebon, MacIntyre, & Moran, 2011; Guillot & Collet,
2010; Guillot et al., 2008, 2009; Lebon, Byblow, Collet, Guillot, & Stinear, 2012; Roure et
al., 1999; van der Meulen et al., 2012) or as a means of separating participants in to
experimental groups when testing the effectiveness of imagery interventions focused on
varying mode or perspective (see Cho; 2009; Cumming & Ramsey, 2008; Rodgers, Hall, &
Buckolz, 1991 Roure et al., 1999). Although a substantial amount of literature in both
sport and neuroscience has increased our understanding of how MI differs from actual
physical movement and what brain areas are activated during MI and ME (see Table
1.1), imagery remains a complex, internal experience, which can never be explicitly
measured. The body of imagery literature and thereby practice, stand to benefit from
more systematic inquiry determining if, and to what extent neurological activity
converges with self-reported imagery ability characteristics as measured when
participants are instructed to engage in specific modes and perspectives. To this end,
self-report imagery ability measures will be discussed next.
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Measurement of Motor Imagery Ability
Measuring motor imagery continues to be an area of focus across many fields
(i.e., sport psychology, physical education, and neuropsychology), with most studies
relying on various subjective, self-report, and objective measures. Initially, Hall et al.
(1985) reviewed data examining imagery ability to determine the appropriate tests to
measure individual differences revealing: (1) subjective and objective measures tend to
be uncorrelated and, thus, do not measure the same underlying ability, (2) there is
limited support for the relationship between imagery ability and motor skill
performance, and (3) that tests have not been specifically designed to measure imagery
of movement. In order to target these limitations, self-report questionnaires were
developed to show consistent relationships of measuring visual and kinesthetic
movement imagery. The bulk of what is known about imagery measurement, especially
in the sport science literature, rests on various psychometric iterations of two selfreport inventories: the MIQ and VMIQ. Through psychometric validation processes the
VMIQ-2 (Roberts et al., 2008) and MIQ-3 (Williams et al., 2012) are the most current
versions available, both offering an efficient way of measuring imagery ability using
three subscales (EVI, IVI, and KI) confirmed in factor analyses. Interestingly, these
questionnaires have been adopted in neuroscience for screening purposes (e.g., Guillot
et al., 2009) and testing intervention effects (Guillot et al., 2008; Roure et al., 1999), but
still cannot be used interchangeably because the possibility of potential flaws and
erroneous findings (Lequerica et al., 2002).
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To this end, the utility of novel motor imagery indexes have been established
using a combination of qualitative, psychometric, chronometric, and
psychophysiological approaches to more accurately measure MI ability. However, the
fundamental limitation of these rests on incorporating the VMIQ and MIQ because it is
not currently known to what extent blood oxygenation reflects different types of
mode/perspective specific to imagery ability. Despite the use of objective measures in
neuroscience, it is currently unknown if these measures support the construct validity of
the self-report imagery ability measures, which is essential to inform researchers about
for the efficacy and continued use of the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2. If self-report measures can
correctly screen imagery ability then areas of the brain that are thought to be active
during visual or kinesthetic imagery should be more active while individuals engage in
the respective imagery mode to provide convergent validity between like scales as well
as discriminant validity between different scales.
The following sections will review the methods utilized for measuring imagery
ability, considering the associated findings, psychometric properties, and limitations.
First, subjective methods of measuring imagery ability will be discussed, including
mental chronometry and self-report imagery questionnaires (i.e., MIQ and VMIQ),
followed by an in-depth analysis of objective measurements (i.e., TMS, PET, and fMRI)
used in the neuroscience literature.
Subjective Measures
Mental chronometry. Mental chronometry is the measurement of cognitive
speed, or the actual time taken to process information of different types and degrees of
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complexity. The basic measurement for chronometric studies is response time,
represented as the minutes and seconds, to a stimulus that calls for a decision to be
made by an individual. Having response time as the unit of measure may be confusing
given the unit of measure but despite being quantifiable, response times are based on
the subjective decision to stop a timer or report the number of times a movement was
imaged compared to physical execution in a given time period. Mental chronometry
measures imply imagery ability to control or manipulate an image and have been
routinely utilized with visuospatial tasks such as mental rotation (Lequerica et al., 2002).
These chronometric, or “time-measuring,” studies provide more accurate information of
imagery than can be obtained with simple questionnaires by allowing researchers to ask
individuals what information is and is not prominent in an image (i.e., image-scanning
task). Studies using MC link performance to cognitive ability include: participants
recalling if a number was in the previous set of digits or not (Sternberg, 1966),
determining whether a pair of three-dimensional shapes was identical or mirror-image
versions (Shepard & Metzler, 1971), and identifying whether two letters were the same
or not (Posner, 1978). This information can be used as a basis for asking how “picturelike” images are (Reisberg, 2006), which can also be transferred to the motor domain in
asking how “performance-like” images are. The accuracy and speed of responses as
measured in chronometric studies infer hypotheses concerning the vividness,
controllability, and exactness of reference of imagery (Reisberg, 2006). From a practical
standpoint, when learners in movement contexts engage in mentally rehearsing a motor
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skill sequence in real-time speed, evidence suggests psychoneuromuscular pathways
strengthen and enhance physical performance (O & Hall, 2009).
Researchers have realized that the speed at which an individual images is closely
linked to actual ME (Nideffer, 1985), which follow the biomechanical constraints of the
movement (Johnson, 2000). The use of real-time speed of imagery was highlighted by
Holmes and Collins (2001), but image-speed interventions using different speeds have
also been administered to examine learning/practicing motor skills (Louis, Guillot,
Maton, Doyon, & Collet, 2008; O & Munroe-Chandler, 2008). In two experiments, Louis
et al., (2008) examined the effect of imagined movement speed on subsequent motor
performance over a training period. In experiment one, 24 student participants (15
males and nine females; Mean age = 27.2 ± 3.6 years) were separated into three groups
(i.e., fast, slow, and control) and completed the MIQ-R followed by imaging two series of
body movements (i.e., upper body and lower body, each with seven different steps)
using IVI in a three week training protocol. Participants’ imagery ability assessment
indicated no significant differences between group (fast = 44.3 ± 6.4; slow = 44.6 ± 5.13;
control = 44.4 ± 4.7, p > 0.05), gender (males = 42.8 ± 4.2; females = 45.4 ± 5.7, p > 0.05),
or imagery condition (fast VI = 22.6 ± 3.1 and fast KI = 21.6 ± 4.2; slow VI = 24.6 ± 3.5
and slow KI = 20 ± 3.6; control VI = 24.3 ± 2.6 and control KI = 20.2 ± 3.1, p > 0.05). The
effect of imagined movement speed for both upper body and lower body sequences
revealed a significant difference in the fast MI group for sequence time (upper body:
pre-test = 7.49 ± 2.2 s and post-test = 6.95 ± 2.4 s; lower body: pre-test = 5.54 ± 1.3 s
and post-test = 5.52 ± 1.91 s, p < 0.01), but not in the slow MI group (upper body: pre61

test = 13.46 ± 3.5 s and post-test = 8.70 ± 3.60 s; lower body: pre-test = 10.13 ± 2.1 s and
post-test = 6.51 ± 2.22 s) or the control group (upper body: pre-test = 10.29 ± 2.4 s and
post-test = 10.21 ± 2.91 s; lower body: pre-test = 7.27 ± 1.3 s and post-test = 7.57 ± 2.18
s) (p > 0.05) indicating a change in participants’ ME duration when increasing the speed
of imagery. Experiment two participants included 21 skilled athletes (12 males and nine
females; Mean age = 16 ± 0.25 years) that completed the same procedure as
experiment one over a four-week period using a judoka movement. Participants’
imagery ability assessment indicated no significant differences between group (fast =
46.6 ± 9.5; slow = 41.7 ± 5.75; control = 43.6 ± 6.99), gender (males = 45.3 ± 7.76;
females = 42 ± 7.35), or imagery condition (fast VI = 23.6 ±5.4 and fast KI = 23 ± 4.7; slow
VI = 21.4 ± 2.7 and slow KI = 20.5 ± 3.6; control VI = 22.8 ± 2.4 and control KI = 20.4 ±
4.2, p > 0.05). When examining movement times, all movement durations were
significantly different (fast: pre-test = 37.3 ± 1.2 s and post-test = 34 ± 1.5 s; slow: pretest: 42.4 ± 0.9 s and post-test = 48.9 ± 1.0 s; control: pre-test = 40.5 ± 1.6 s and posttest = 39.2 ± 0.45 s, p < 0.001), with the fast MI group’s time shorter in duration, the
control group’s time decreasing slightly and the slow MI group’s time increasing from
pre-test to post-test. When comparing the physical completion of the task with each
imagery condition it was shown that changing MI speed can modify the actual speed of
well-learned motor tasks. Overall, both experiments indicate that voluntary increases in
MI speed increases the actual speed of ME, while decreases in MI speed slows ME.
Studies by O and colleagues (2008, 2009) further examined the effect of speed
on the performance of a soccer task, as well as the intentional use of slow motion, real62

time and fast motion images. For example, a sample of 97 university-aged participants
(32 males and 65 females; Mean age = 18.1 ± 1.88) completed the MIQ-R and were
separated into three imagery practice conditions (i.e., real-time, slow motion, slow
motion concluded with real-time), a physical practice condition, or a control condition
to examine the performance of a soccer dribbling task over seven trials (O & MunroeChandler, 2008). Results revealed that the MIQ-R scores of the five groups did not
significantly differ (visual = 23.36 ± 3.43; kinesthetic = 21.79 ± 4.50, p > 0.05), but the
intervention resulted in significantly decreased performance times (p < 0.01 for all
groups) and significantly improved error performance (p < 0.01 for all groups except the
control condition) from pre- to post-intervention. Findings indicate that image speed did
not have an effect on subsequent soccer dribbling performance which is contradictory
to the aforementioned Louis et al. (2008) study.
In addition, O and Hall (2009) quantitatively analyzed athlete’s voluntary use of
slow motion, real-time and fast motion images, as well as the influence of gender and
competitive level on reported voluntary image speed use. Participants included 604
athletes (298 males and 306 females; Mean age = 21.73 ± 4.54 years) that completed
the image speed questionnaire (ISQ) which assesses athlete’s relative use of voluntary
slow motion, real-time, and fast motion images. Within-ISQ item analyses for gender
indicated that females reported employing significantly more slow motion images than
males (F (1, 519) = 10.56, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.02) and males reported using significantly
more real-time (F (1, 519) = 3.99, p = 0.005, η2 = 0.01) and fast motion (F (1, 519) = 5.31,
p = 0.002, η2 = 0.01) images than females, while the competitive level analyses had no
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significant effect on reported image speed use (p > 0.006 for all). Between-ISQ item
analyses for both gender (p > 0.02) and competitive level (p > 0.02) failed to reveal a
significant effect on athletes reported use of different imagery speeds. Overall, athletes
were found to utilize all three image speeds to varying degrees depending on the
function of imagery being employed. Specifically, real-time images were used most
often regardless of the function or stage of learning, while slow motion images were
most often used when learning or developing a skill/strategy and fast motion images
were most often used for imaging skills/strategies that had been mastered. Overall, the
speed at which one images can affect the timing of physically executing the same task
and should be considered when examining the effect of MI on performance, especially
within MC paradigms.
The use of MC paradigms indicates that the duration of an imagined movement
is similar to the time required to physically perform it (Bakker et al., 2008; Calmels,
Lopez, Holmes, & Namen, 2006; Guillot & Collet, 2005; Jeannerod, 1997). Bakker et al.
(2008) used MC during fMRI scanning to examine whether imagery time conformed to
Fitts’s Law for each task (i.e., walking a broad path or walking a narrow path). Results
showed that a narrower path resulted in longer imagery times during the MI task, F (1,
14) = 37.0, p < 0.001. Not only did this study further confirm the inverse relationship
between movement difficulty and imagined movement times, it demonstrated that an
fMRI environment may not affect results obtained during MI procedures because the
inverse relationship observed with the physical task continued to be present during the
MI task. Furthermore, task difficulty and stability to image affects both the actual and
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imagined amount of time necessary to complete a task (Decety, 1991; Decety &
Jeannerod, 1996). Studies have supported Fitts’s Law (Fitts & Posner, 1967; Fitts, 1954)
showing that a linear relationship exists between response time for a correct response
and the degree of task complexity; consequently, supporting the notion that more
difficult tasks take more time to execute than easier ones even with MI (Decety, 1991;
Decety & Jeannerod, 1996; Maruff et al., 1999). From this information, it can be implied
that individuals who take longer to physically perform the same, especially simple tasks,
have poor imagery ability (Hall, et al., 1985).
Lequerica et al. (2002) reasoned that MC data could also provide a means of
construct validity for self-report imagery questionnaires. Although imagined and actual
movement times are considered to be similar, participants are still required to
subjectively report image frequency or stop a timer once the image is completed to
compare actual and imagined movement times and infer imagery ability. Although such
comparisons provide important information about an individual’s imagery experience,
this paradigm does not provide information about an individual’s capacity to form vivid
and accurate images (Guillot & Collet, 2010). Since MI is considered a personal
experience, with only the individual knowing what is actually being imaged, equating
the results from these measures to their imagery ability may be inappropriate given that
several other methods (i.e., social desirability, response bias) may be used to complete
the task (Richardson, 1977). In addition, the interpretation of mental chronometric
measures are not always straightforward because several extraneous factors need to be
considered (i.e., temporal constraints, movement experience, gender, and level of
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arousal) before drawing a conclusion about imagery ability. Because of these limitations,
accounting for mental chronometric measures concurrently with other imagery
measures is an important study design feature when embarking on validating
movement imagery assessments.
Self-report questionnaires. Psychometrically validated self-report
questionnaires designed to measure individual differences in imagery content and
function (i.e., motivation, practicing skills, and arousal control) and ability (i.e., ease of
generating an image, vividness, and controllability) (Moran, 1993) remain prominent in
the sport sciences. The choice of which questionnaire to use should be based on the
study population, the purpose of the questionnaire and study, practical considerations
(e.g., ease of scoring and data collection efficiency), and its psychometric properties.
Both vividness and ease of generating an image have been used to examine the use of
MI in relation to performance (MacIntyre & Moran, 1996), the effect of MI on learning
sports skills (Roure et al., 1999), and the controllability of an image using mental
rotation tests (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978), all indicating better performance on tasks
when having good imagery ability. However, because it is difficult to create tasks that
objectively assess imagery ability of movements, self-report measures of imagery
vividness and controllability are commonly used in the measurement of MI ability (i.e.,
VMIQ-2: Roberts, Callow, Hardy, Markland, & Bringer, 2008; MIQ-3: Williams, Cumming,
& Edwards, 2011). Unfortunately, few studies exist examining the psychometric qualities
of these questionnaires, and even less studies geared at validation in conjunction with
contemporary objective measures (i.e., fMRI, PET, and EEG).
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Establishing the psychometric properties, especially convergent and discriminant
validity, is essential to the structure of instruments and procedures for measurement
and the development and refinement of theoretical approaches to measuring imagery
and its dimensions. Convergent validity (using two different measurements and
research methods (i.e., self-report questionnaire and fMRI) to collect data concerning
construct and discriminant validity (demonstrating that the construct (i.e., imagery) is
different from others that may be present (i.e., rehearsal or modeling)) are ways to help
establish construct validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Often times, concurrent validity
(correlating a new measure with a “gold standard” at the same time) is used
interchangeably with convergent validity, but what convergent validity emphasizes that
concurrent validity does not, is using different measurement methods that are linked by
theory.
Self-report questionnaires require participants to engage in a task and rate their
imagery experience on a Likert scale. This type of scale is ordinal in nature causing the
distance between two scores to be unequal, which may limit individual differences or
similarities. This plays a role in how the information from self-report questionnaires is
interpreted because what a participant may experience as easy or vivid may not be what
another participant experiences who reports the same score for ease or vividness. Many
of these questionnaires involve individuals imaging a specific movement and rating the
ease or difficulty (e.g., MIQ: Hall et al., 1985) or vividness (VMIQ: Isaac, Marks & Russell,
1986) of generating that image. This process involves retrieving experiences from
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memory, with the degree of ability to image the movement being contingent on how
often as well as how recently it might have been viewed.
Vividness of movement imagery questionnaire-2 (VMIQ-2). The VMIQ-2 is a
frequently used instrument that involves vividness ratings of previously experienced
movements; variability of when the movements were last performed (i.e., temporal
experience with the movement) is highly variable. Originally developed as the VMIQ,
this questionnaire was constructed to answer questions relating movement imagery to
motor performance. Specifically, the vividness of visual and kinesthetic MI is assessed
(McAvinue & Robertson, 2008) on a 24-item questionnaire; each item is a description of
a common movement, from basic movements (e.g., walking) to those that are more
demanding in nature (e.g., riding a bike or kicking a ball in the air). Participants are
instructed to imagine each item, first with respect to somebody else completing the
movement and then themselves completing the movement. After completing the task,
individuals rate the vividness of the image on a 5-point Likert scale (5 = “no image at all,
you only know that you are thinking of the skill” to 1 = “perfectly clear and as vivid as
normal vision”) (Isaac, Marks, & Russell, 1986). The visual and kinesthetic modalities are
captured by summing the scores of all of the items, ranging from 24-120 for each
modality. Two limitations of the VMIQ are: 1) the counter intuitive scale anchors where
a low score delineates better imagery ability, and 2) memory decay; time since
experiencing the movements specified in each item may vary between participants
confounding self-reports of imagery ability.
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Despite the VMIQ being limited by memory decay, it was deemed reliable and
stable by Isaac et al. (1986); the three-week test-retest reliability with a group of
physical education students was acceptable (r = 0.76). In addition, it was found that
there were no significant differences within the questionnaire when administered over a
six-month time period, illustrating stability. The VMIQ also demonstrated adequate
concurrent validity with the VVIQ with novice (r = 0.75), experienced (r = 0.45), and elite
(r = 0.65) trampolinists, as well as a high positive correlation with the VVIQ (r = 0.81)
indicating convergent validity (Isaac et al., 1986). Furthermore, Eton, Gilner, and Munz
(1998) suggested that athletes could be differentiated on the basis of their VMIQ “self”
(participants image themselves moving) scores. Eton et al.’s (1998) study also
established good internal consistency (α = 0.97) and acceptable two-week test-retest
reliability for the “self” scale (r = 0.80) but not for the “other” (when participants
imagined somebody else moving) scale (r = 0.64).
Like all self-report questionnaires, the VMIQ is not without limitations. A main
concern with the initial version of the questionnaire is its ability to differentiate KI from
VI because participant instructions appeared to be vague. Furthermore, the directions of
the first version did not delineate between using an internal or external imagery
perspective; participant’s perspective preference may have confounded scores.
In line with current conceptualizations of the internal and external imagery
perspectives, the VMIQ was revised (Roberts et al., 2008). This revision captures three
different imagery types; EVI was defined as third-person imagery of the self, IVI was
defined as first-person VI, and KI was defined as imagery of the feel of the movement.
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Participants rate each item of the three scales on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 =
“perfectly clear, vivid image” and 5 = “no image at all.” Scores are summed for each
scale, range from 3 to 15, and represent a vividness subscale; counterintuitively, lower
scores represent better imagery ability. Some researchers stipulate a three-scale
composite scoring criteria of less than 72 as adequate imagery ability (Hardy & Callow,
1999; Smith & Holmes, 2004). However, the practice of composite scoring is also
counterintuitive in that it negates contemporary conceptualization of imagery which the
questionnaire was designed to capture.
In a psychometric validation study, Roberts et al. (2008) completed a multi-trait
multi-method (MTMM) approach to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using a
correlated traits/correlated uniqueness (CTCU) model to examine the factorial structure
of the 24 item VMIQ-2. Results illustrated a three factor CTCU analysis performed on the
12 item questionnaire revealing an acceptable fit (Satorr-Bentler χ2 (555) = 840.65, p <
0.001; RMSEA = 0.08, p = 1.00; CFI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.004, NNFI = 0.97, with factor
loadings ranging from 0.60 to 0.78. According to the three factor CTCU analysis, the
number of items on the VMIQ-2 was decreased from 24 to 12, in which IVI and KI should
be treated as separated modalities.
Further psychometric analyses assessed the concurrent and construct validity of
the VMIQ-2 (Roberts et al., 2008) in relation to another commonly used instrument, the
revised Movement Imagery Questionnaire (MIQ-R: Hall & Martin, 1997). Internal
consistency of the VMIQ-2 was high: EVI = 0.95, IVI = 0.95 and KI = 0.93. Concurrent
validity analysis with the MIQ-R showed that both internal and external visual imagery
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factors of the VMIQ-2 were significantly correlated with the visual factor of the MIQ-R
(IVI and VI, r = -0.342, p < 0.05 and EVI and VI, r = -0.647, p < 0.01), and the kinesthetic
factors were both significantly correlated (r = -0.736, p < 0.01). In addition, construct
validity was revealed by significant differences between good- and poor-level athletes
for each variable: EVI, t (196) = -2.55, p < 0.01 d = 0.36; IVI, t (181.66) = -2.56, p < 0.01 d
= 0.36; and KI, t (186.49) = -2.87, p < 0.005 d = 0.40. Overall it is evident that the VMIQ-2
is a valid measure as illustrated by a three-factor structure, concurrent validity, and
construct validity. However, memory decay remains an inherent limitation tied to its
retrospective movement experience protocol.
Movement imagery questionnaire-3 (MIQ-3). In contrast, the unique protocol of
the MIQ accounts for memory decay, by including physical movement prior to engaging
in an imagery task. The original MIQ (Hall, Pongrac, & Buckolz, 1985) was developed to
address inconsistent results from inadequate measurements and equivocal findings
questioning whether imagery ability influences performance gains. The original version
of the MIQ consisted of 18 items that entailed physically performing nine movements
(e.g., raising and lowering the right knee, performing a front roll on a mat and finishing
in a standing position), then visually and kinesthetically imaging those movements
before rating the ease or difficulty of generating those self-images on a seven-point
Likert scale (1 = easy to 7 = difficult). Acceptable reliability as internal-consistency
coefficients ranged from 0.87 to 0.89 (visual) and 0.86 to 0.91 (kinesthetic). Hall et al.
(1985) also showed test-retest reliability of 0.83 for a one-week interval and the bifactorial (visual and kinesthetic) structure of the questionnaire with the visual and
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kinesthetic subscales being separate, but related constructs (r = 0.58). Other studies
support these psychometric properties of the MIQ (e.g., Atienza, Balaguer, & GarciaMarita, 1994).
To create a simpler and shortened version, Hall and Martin (1997) modified the
MIQ in order to reduce administration time, improve the efficiency of its administration,
and eliminate tasks that were often omitted because of difficulty (i.e., front roll) and
redundant movements. In addition, in Hall and Martin’s (1997) revision of the MIQ
(MIQ-R) the rating scale was reversed so that higher scores reflect better imagery ability
and lower scores reflected poorer imagery ability, addressing noted counterintuitive
weakness of the MIQ and the VMIQ-2. As a result, the MIQ-R assess the ability to
mentally see and feel four movements (e.g., knee lift, jump, arm movement, and waist
bend) that are individually summed to represent total visual (4-28) and total kinesthetic
(4-28) movement imagery ability. Similar to the VMIQ-2, some studies used a composite
MIQ-R score where at least a 16 on the visual and 16 on the kinesthetic subscales
indicates adequate imagery ability (Callow et al., 2006); others have used a more
stringent scoring criteria of at least 20 (Short & Short, 2005).
Psychometric properties of the MIQ and MIQ-R include significant correlations
between the two questionnaires (r = -0.77, n = 50, p < 0.01, for each scale) (Hall &
Martin, 1997), indicating that the MIQ-R is an acceptable revision of the original MIQ.
Additional analyses showed consistent Cronbach alpha coefficients above 0.79 for both
visual and kinesthetic scales (Abma, Fry, Li, & Relyea, 2002; Atienza et al., 1994; Hall et
al., 1985; Vadocz, Hall, & Moritz, 1997), and test-retest reliability coefficients of 0.80 (VI)
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and 0.81 (KI) (Monsma, Short, Hall, Gregg, & Sullivan, 2009). Further, an MTMM
approach to CFA was completed to examine if it provided a better model than a firstorder CFA. Results illustrated that a CTCU model provided the best fit to the data, χ2 (15)
= 25.99, p < 0.01; RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.99; SRMR = 0.03, with factor loadings ranging
between 0.70 and 0.84 (r = 0.23) (Williams et al., 2012).
Despite good psychometric properties, the MIQ-R did not distinguish between
imagery perspectives (Roberts et al., 2008), whether the image is seen from an IVI
perspective or an EVI perspective. Using the VMIQ-2 as a model, this prompted Williams
et al. (2012) to develop the MIQ-3, which includes three subscales assessing EVI (“when
you watch yourself performing the movement from an outside point of view or third
person perspective”), IVI (“when you watch yourself performing the movement from an
inside point of view or first person perspective”), and KI (“the feelings and sensations
experienced if you were actually producing the movement”). The four movements from
the MIQ-R are imagined three times; one for each subscale, and the seven-point Likert
scale was retained ranging from one (“very hard to see/feel”) to seven (“very easy to
see/feel”). The MIQ-3 consists of 12 items in order to provide an assessment of the
inter- and intra-subject differences between the imagery conditions. Higher scores on a
MIQ-3 scale represent a better ability to perform visual or kinesthetic imagery; scores
ranging from 4-28 for each imagery condition.
Williams et al. (2012) illustrated that all three subscales of the MIQ-3 displayed
adequate internal reliability (α > 0.69). Further psychometric analysis of the MIQ-3
showed that a three factor CTCU model provided the best fit to the data, χ2(39) = 75.12,
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p < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.04, with standardized factor loadings
ranging between 0.64 and 0.81, p < 0.001. The concurrent validity between the MIQ-3
and VMIQ-2 was also examined showing the covariances to be significantly correlated
between all VMIQ-2 and MIQ-3 subscales: EVI, r = 0.679; IVI, r = 0.328; KI, r = 0.706 (p <
0.001), indicating that the subscales for each questionnaire are separate, but related
constructs, providing a comprehensive assessment of MI ability. Moreover, support for
the MIQ-3’s concurrent validity was examined with the correlations between the VMIQ2 and MIQ-3 subscales. Data revealed significantly higher correlations between
respective subscales (EVI, t = -2.40, p < 0.05; IVI, t = -5.92, p < 0.01; and KI, t = -4.06, p <
0.01) compared to correlations with other types of imagery (Williams et al., 2012).
In general, both the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2 measure the imagery ability of an
individual, but they do so by using two different approaches to imagery ability. The MIQ3 includes specific instructions asking participants to focus on the level of ease in
generating the image. In addition, it takes the unique approach of having the participant
physically perform each movement before subsequently imaging the movement in the
specific modality. Two drawbacks of the VMIQ-2 are addressed by the MIQ-3. First, it
eliminates any potential recency effects by having the participant practice the
movement before engaging in imagery compared to the VMIQ-2 relying on recalling the
movement from long term memory. Because previous literature has shown that how
easily a movement is imagined may be affected by whether this movement was
performed recently or frequently (Lequerica et al., 2002), the MIQ-3 instructions involve
participants completing the movement physically before imaging the movement. The
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MIQ-3 protocol also serves as a manipulation check of the participant’s ability to do the
movement, with scores more likely to be an accurate reflection of the participant’s
actual imagery ability rather than whether, or how recently the movement was
physically performed. On the other hand, the VMIQ-2 instructions only present the
imagery movement in a written form forcing participants to recall information about the
task from long-term memory in order to generate the required image (Munzert &
Zentgraf, 2009). This may produce varying images of the movement from person to
person depending on personal experience and how they interpret the instructions or
whether they are capable of doing the movements. Furthermore, by having participants
perform the movement physically before engaging in imagery, the MIQ-3 provides the
opportunity to visually confirm whether participants correctly understand the desired
movement before it is imaged. Through this process, physically performing the
movement will prime the brain regions that will later be utilized when the individual
engages in imagery. In addition, the MIQ-3 instructs participants to mentally perform all
of the movements from a starting position when physically performing the movements.
This will likely increase the functional equivalence at the neural level between MI and
ME and provide a more accurate assessment of a participant’s imagery ability compared
with a seated position for the VMIQ-2 protocol. Some researchers contend that
measurement attributes of the MIQ-3 are likely to enhance the ease of imaging the
movement perhaps inflating imagery ability scores (Williams et al., 2011).
Limitations. On their own, subjective questionnaires, especially those involving
movement are limited in several ways. First, scores may not be distinguished between
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assessments of imagery ability or the ability to execute movements. Second,
determining an individual’s imagery ability on an ordinal rating scale involves
inconsistencies between two given rating scores; a rating of a four may not be twice as
easy as a rating of a two. Moreover, one individual’s rating of a four may be quantifiably
different in neuroactivity compared to another individual’s same rating. Although there
is an increased reliability with more scale points (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), the scales
used for some of these questionnaires have inverse anchors (i.e., VMIQ-2: 1 = good and
5 = poor) which is contradictory to what most individuals understand as a higher
number being better. Third, some self-report questionnaires lack a firm and objective
frame of reference; consequently, their use is ambiguous and leaves room for subjective
interpretations. Kaufmann (1981) argued that it can be difficult for individuals to rate
their imagery experience on a Likert scale because similar mental experiences may be
given highly varying values by different participants. Furthermore, memory decay
involved in the retrospective recall of movement experiences can alter participant’s
response caused by how recent they completed this movement. While, the MIQ
protocol reduces the time between ME and imagery of the movement, current
neurological measures can improve this limitation because they enable the assessment
of imagery concurrently with the reported experience.
Fourth, the use of self-report measures has been shown to cause participants to
be subconsciously susceptible to response sets (Mischel, 1968). As with self-report
questionnaires in psychology, a response set is the tendency of an individual to present
a particular pattern of responses independent of what the question is asking (Peer &
76

Gamliel, 2011). Participants may provide response patterns that are in line with the
study’s goal, or as a way to make a good impression or to put oneself in a favorable
light. For example, a response set might be to favor one of the numbers of the scale
such as choice “3” or “somewhat hard to see” on the MIQ-3 because of the central
tendency of participants to avoid the extreme ends of scales and choose the responses
in the middle. Even if numbers are not present on a questionnaire, participants may
continue to follow a response pattern, which introduces a difficult interpretation of the
scores based on content (Cronbach, 1946). Therefore, any relationship between
performance outcome and self-reported imagery ability may merely reflect the
underlying response set that guides the score. To overcome this limitation, researchers
can psychometrically evaluate the validity of questionnaire items used to measure the
construct utilizing multiple factors to control method variance (i.e., MTMM model)
(Campbell & Friske, 1959) or a CFA, as well as providing verbal labels for the mid-points
of the scale instead of numerical values (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000) and writing
items that are clear and simple.
Lastly, self-report questionnaires are also criticized on the grounds of validity,
reliability, and generalizability (Campos & Perez, 1990; Hall et al., 1985; Williams,
Rippon, Stone, & Annett, 1995), often yielding discrepant results across samples and
studies. Studies usually show adequate reliability as well as construct and concurrent
validity but most often with other sources of subjective data. Specifically, an argument
that continues to resonate was first proposed by Katz (1983) stating that questionnaires
fail to meet the level of complexity found in the area of mental test construction.
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Therefore, current researchers need to consider how a questionnaire was originally
developed. More importantly, how individual items used to infer imagery were devised
should be carefully considered in order to ensure the most appropriate distribution of
item scores. Results need to be individually analyzed at the item level, especially
according to each condition or scale. These previously mentioned limitations may
influence the overall use of self-report questionnaires and explain why equivocal results
are often found when studying individual differences (Kaufmann, 1981). Only when
researchers can demonstrate the convergent validity of self-report imagery ability
questionnaires with an objective measure (i.e., fMRI) will it be appropriate to draw
suitable conclusions based on the evidence they generate.
Objective Measures
Several studies using objective measures have provided information about the
nature of imagery. The measurement of psychophysiological responses in these
measures can be regarded as a “window” into the brain during imagery (Hugdahl, 1995).
Trying to understand the relationship between mental and physiological processes,
researchers have developed various psychophysiological measures (i.e., peripheral:
measures related to the peripheral nervous system; and central: measures related to
CNS responses, including the brain) making research on aspects of MI easier to collect.
Imaging an action can have very similar physiological effects to those that occur
during actual performance of that same action (Jeannerod, 1997), and can be recorded
during MI. Common psychophysiological measures used in imagery research include
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), positron emission tomography (PET),
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functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and
magnetoencephalography (MEG). Although these measures produce converging
evidence of the neural networks that mediate perception and the imagery experience
(Kosslyn et al., 2001), they differ in their spatial and temporal resolutions, but still
supplement our understanding of neural networks that mediate the MI experience
(Guillot & Collet, 2010).
Transcranial magnetic stimulation is a noninvasive method that uses
electromagnetic induction to induce weak currents in a rapidly changing magnetic field,
and measures the consequences on inducing this electrical current in terms of motor
excitability. Positron emission tomography is an invasive nuclear medical imaging
technique that produces three-dimensional images of functional processes in the body
and records positrons (atomic particles) emitted by radioactive isotopes injected into
the blood. Functional MRI is a noninvasive functional neuroimaging procedure that
maps the structures of the brain by detecting associated changes in blood flow following
the excitation of atoms through radio waves. It is capable of detecting hemodynamic
changes throughout the brain through the BOLD effect. Both fMRI and PET have good
spatial resolution, but poor temporal resolution. In contrast, EEG is the recording of
electrical activity of the brain using electrodes placed on the scalp and MEG is a
neuroimaging technique that records magnetic fields produced by electrical currents
that are naturally occurring in the brain. Although both of these techniques have good
temporal resolution, they have less spatial resolution so they will not be included in this
review.
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Brain imaging techniques have been most significant in advancing our
understanding about the gross structures of the brain and how living systems function
(Tancredi & Brodie, 2007). Given its complex nature, imagery depends on various
mechanisms located in different regions of the brain rather than single “brain centers”
(Erlichman & Barrett, 1983; Farah, 1984; Kosslyn, 1994, 1987). Built around a cognitive
and affective neuroscience perspective, studies using brain mapping techniques have
allowed researchers to begin to understand the neurobiology underlying higher order
mental processes such as mental imagery. More importantly, these techniques can also
begin to provide evidence that can validate imagery questionnaires at the item level.
Therefore, the following sections will review the most relevant methodologies in the
neuroscience research as it applies to imagery, particularly fMRI.
Several functional neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that MI is
associated with the specific activation of the neural circuits involved in the early stages
of motor control (i.e., motor programming and movement preparation). Recent studies
utilizing fMRI have indicated that executed and imagined movements produce similar
brain activity (Jeannerod, 2001; Gerardin et al., 2000; Guillot et al., 2008; Higuchi,
Imamizu, & Kawato, 2007; Imazu, Sugui, Tanaka, & Inui, 2007; Lacourse, Orr, Cramer, &
Cohen, 2005; Lotze et al., 1999; Nair et al., 2003; Szameitat, Shen, Conforta, & Sterr,
2012). The neural circuits involved include the SMA, M1, PMC, inferior parietal cortex,
basal ganglia, and cerebellum (Decety et al., 1994; Roth et al., 1996). Although some
studies have used self-report imagery ability questionnaires as a screening tool to
separate participants into good and poor imagery groups based on ability level (Amedi
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et al., 2005; Belardinelli et al., 2009; Cui et al., 2007; Guillot et al., 2008; Lacourse et al.,
2005), it is still unclear whether these measures can differentiate between good and
poor imagers and truly tap the construct of movement imagery ability. The following
sections provide a summary of the extant literature examining the association of similar
brain activity produced by physically executing and imaging movements using functional
neuroimaging techniques, and will be organized according to movement type (i.e., nonfunctional and functional), providing a general introduction followed by associated
research as well as its advantages and limitations.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation. Transcranial magnetic stimulation is
performed by using electromagnetic induction to stimulate weak electrical currents into
the brain in order to cause the depolarization or hyperpolarization in the neurons of the
brain. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) are recorded in response to the excitability of
corticospinal neurons; the higher the excitability, the larger the MEP amplitude.
Using TMS, it has been shown that the MEP amplitude of the flexor carpi radialis
muscle increased during imagery of wrist flexion demonstrating that MI can raise the
corticospinal excitability above the resting excitability level (Kasai, Kawai, Kawanishi, &
Yahagi, 1997). Subsequent studies confirmed this phenomenon (Fadiga et al., 1999;
Fadiga et al., 1995; Hashimoto & Rothwell, 1999; Li, Latash, & Zatsiorsky, 2004). For
example, Fadiga et al. (1995) examined MEPs of 12 participants (gender not provided)
by stimulating the left motor cortex during four experimental conditions: (1) grasping
observation, (2) object observation, (3) arm movement observation, and (4) dimming
detection. The results showed that the motor system increased in excitation when a
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participant observes another individual performing the action (both grasping and arm
movement tasks). Moreover, the pattern of muscle contraction during observation was
found to be similar to the pattern of muscle contraction present during ME of the same
action. Using a similar TMS protocol, Fadiga et al. (1999) investigated whether
corticospinal activity is specifically affected by MI by recording MEPs from six righthanded participants (two males and four females) during MI of flexion/extension
movements of the right hand and wrist muscles. Increased corticospinal excitability of
the left primary motor cortex during imagined ipsilateral and contralateral hand
movements was found, as well as a facilitatory effect induced by imagery of
contralateral hand movements of the right primary motor cortex. These results confirm
that the mental simulation of movements involve the same neural substrates that are
addressed during ME, and that MI manifests itself in the activation of the same cortical
circuits that are normally involved in actual movement. Similar to the MIQ protocol,
movement observation prior to imagery in this study also served as a manipulation
check to control for temporal movement experience variability, helping standardize
participant’s experience.
In two more recent studies, Mizuguchi et al. (2009, 2012) investigated the
influence of external sensory input (i.e., engaging in ball squeezing) on corticospinal
excitability in conjunction with MI. Their initial study (2009) analyzed the corticospinal
excitability of participants imaging the squeezing of a ball both with and without holding
the ball in two experiments: TMS (16 males) and somatosensory evoked potentials
(SEPs) (10 males). The TMS experiment included four conditions: (1) control condition,
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(2) holding condition, (3) MI condition, and (4) MI and holding condition, while the SEP
experiment included five conditions: (1) control condition, (2) holding condition, (3) MI
condition, (4) MI and holding condition, and (5) execution condition. Overall, the TMS
experiment indicated that during imaging the ball squeezing MEP amplitude increased
compared to when the ball was passively held. However, the SEP experiment did not
show a difference in amplitude when imaging the action or holding the ball. It was
concluded that corticospinal excitability can be enhanced when holding an object, but
not by changing stimuli along the afferent pathway to the primary sensorimotor cortex.
Their follow-up study (Mizuguchi et al., 2012) investigated whether corticospinal
excitability when imaging squeezing a ball is affected differently by holding a ball on the
ipsilateral versus contralateral side to the imagined action. This study consisted of two
experiments with 10 right-handed individuals (no gender provided) participating in
each. In the first experiment, participants imagined squeezing a ball with the right hand
using three conditions: (1) null condition, (2) right condition, and (3) left condition. In
the second experiment, the participants imagined squeezing the ball with the left hand
while completing the same conditions as experiment one. While completing each
condition, TMS was delivered, as well as simultaneous EMG from four hand and forearm
muscles on both sides. Both experiments confirmed the previous finding that MEP
amplitude during imagery tasks was increased by passively holding a ball in the same
hand that one was imaging, and no significant effect occurred when holding a ball with
the opposite hand of imagery. Therefore, these studies suggest that only somatosensory
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signals from the ipsilateral hand that is being imagined is integrated in the process of
MI.
External sensory input, especially its maintenance during imagery and imaging
movement in the dominant side without varying the side are important design features
gleaned from these studies. The major advantage of TMS is its ability to stimulate the
brain and deep peripheral nerves without causing harm and discomfort to the
participant. It is particularly useful in studying the precision of timing of effect of cortical
function. However, the precision of defining the site of mental stimulation effects is
currently inferior to that achieved with other techniques such as PET and fMRI.
Positron emission tomography. Positron emission tomography is a functional
imaging technique performed by introducing a radioactive material (i.e., tracer) into the
body in order to show the size, shape, and position of organs and tissues as well as how
they are functioning. Pairs of gamma rays emitted indirectly by the tracer are detected
to produce three-dimensional images of tracer concentration within the body
constructed by computer analysis.
Previous research (Yue & Cole, 1992) using PET suggests that MI is functionally
close to the preparatory and executive processes of ME. Initial studies (e.g., Ingvar &
Philipson, 1977) found that similar areas of the brain were activated when participants
completed a physical task or when they imaged the same task, showing similar increases
in the premotor and frontal regions of the brain. Additional research was completed to
map motor representations regarding hand movement tasks (Decety et al., 1994). Using
PET, cerebral brain activity was mapped in six right-handed male participants that
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completed two activation conditions (movement observation and MI) and one control
condition (visual inspection) while changes in rCBF were measured. The results of this
study provided additional insight into the mechanisms operating during the
representation of motor activations. Particularly, it was found that consciously
representing an action involves a pattern of cortical and subcortical activation that is
similar to that of an executed action in the cognitive stages of motor control.
Subsequent research established that individuals can experience vivid MI
primarily involving a kinesthetic representation of actions (Lotze et al., 1999) leading to
the proposal that MI may contain kinesthetic sensations as well. In order to test this
hypothesis, Naito et al. (2002) evaluated the effect of MI during palmar flexion of the
right wrist. Ten healthy, right-handed males were selected and trained for
approximately two weeks to imagine slow wrist movements of alternating palmar
flexion and dorsiflexion, after which rCBF of each participant was measured when
completing the above tasks. Areas in the left cingulate motor area, SMA, dorsal PMC,
and the right cerebellum were activated during MI. These results support the claim that
imagery reflects the predicted sensory effects of one’s actions on sensory processing
areas without the actual sensory input. In other words, internally simulated movement
sensations are activated during MI through the recruitment of multiple motor areas and
the cerebellum, without the maintenance of external stimulation as in Mizuguchi et al.
(2009, 2012).
Unlike other neuroimaging techniques, PET can measure metabolic changes that
occur at the cellular level in an organ or tissue indicating blood flow as well as oxygen
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and glucose metabolism in working brain tissues. Although small movements that occur
during the scanning process do not result in artifacts, the image produced by PET is not
as clear as other techniques (i.e., fMRI). Furthermore, because PET introduces a shortlived and rapidly decaying radionuclide into the body, it is limited in that it only allows
for the examination of brain activity resulting from brief tasks. The generalizability of
tasks longer duration such as gross motor movements common in MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2
are thus limited.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging. The evolution of brain mapping
techniques in cognitive psychology and related disciplines has begun to rely on fMRI as a
powerful method to measure brain responses to cognitive tasks, providing greater detail
and resolution than other methods (i.e., PET and EEG). Functional MRI is a tool that
allows for the integration of anatomical, neural, and molecular information in a single
session (Amaro & Barker, 2006; Porro et al., 1996; Tancredi & Brodie, 2007; Vaghela,
Kesvadas, & Thomas, 2010). These benefits allow fMRI researchers to evaluate the
activation and effective connectivity of the neural networks involved during different
tasks in relation to MI and ME. Merging imagery with neuroimaging measurement
paradigms, especially fMRI, has the potential to provide further neural network activity
support for the simulation theory (Jeannerod, 2001) specifically when validated against
the real-time imagery simulation states that are part of the MIQ-3. The practical essence
of measuring “real-time” imagery with fMRI technology is also important to support the
continued use of questionnaire-based imagery assessments frequently used in the field.
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Understanding the neural correlates that pertain to physically performing upper
and lower extremity movement tasks and how they relate to imaging these same tasks
can be beneficial in the development of research designs and provide insight regarding
the mechanisms that facilitate imagery ability. However, this is difficult because of the
distributed nature of the neural networks used in brain processing, in which multiple
regions are involved for a single task. As previously described, the brain is functionally
organized in which specific regions are responsible for movement planning/preparation
(i.e., SMA, parietal cortex, insular cortex, cingular gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, and
PMC) and ME (i.e., precentral gyrus, superior parietal lobule, SMA, cingular gyrus,
inferior parietal lobule, and M1). Many studies utilizing fMRI that report activation of
motor regions have been limited to using movements which are non-functional or
require minimal effort, including sequential finger movement tasks (Mayka, Corcos,
Leurgans, & Vaillancourt, 2006). Such tasks do not represent functional or skilled
movements (e.g., reaching and grasping, tool-use, and gait) as would be used in
activities of daily living. Therefore, the neural correlates shared between ME and MI will
be illustrated according to non-functional and functional movement tasks.
Non-functional movement tasks. Early neuroimaging research typically relied on
non-functional movement task paradigms (i.e., finger-tapping and sequential finger
tasks) to study the human motor system. Non-functional movement tasks usually
require participants to perform movements using fingers two through five on a four-key
response device or using one finger to tap a specific sequence. In order to associate MI
and ME these tasks are assessed on the accuracy and movement time of the performed
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task. Specifically, Roa et al. (1996) indicated that a positive linear relationship exists
between movement rate and fMRI signal change, as well as a similar number of voxels
significantly increasing demonstrating functional equivalence during tasks. These tasks
have the advantage of being simple to use with both normal participants and patients
with neurological disorders that affect the motor system, being flexible to accommodate
various modifications (i.e., pacing and complexity), and the ability to complete these
tasks inside and outside of the scanner. However, results can be divergent because of
variations in the experimental paradigms used making them difficult to interpret and
generalize across studies (Witt, Laird, & Meyerand, 2008).
Studying the overall activated brain areas using non-functional movement tasks,
Porro et al. (1996) completed a study examining the primary motor and sensory cortex
during motor performance and MI. Fourteen right-handed participants (four males and
10 females) completed a self-paced finger-to-thumb opposition movement task of the
dominant hand in order to investigate the activated foci during MI and ME in the
postcentral gyrus as well as the anterior and posterior portions of the precentral gyrus.
Results indicated an increase in the overlapping neural networks in the primary motor
and sensory cortex areas (i.e., precentral and postcentral gyri) during both motor
performance (mean percentage increase, 1.7%) and MI (0.6%), although the intensity of
activation is lower than during actual ME. Although results suggest that the primary
motor cortex is involved during MI, this may have been observed because gradient-echo
fMRI sequences are sensitive to inflow and large vessel effects causing the effective
spatial resolving power to be hampered producing unrelated brain activity. In addition,
88

since fMRI has poor temporal resolution, fast hemodynamic changes could not be
detected because of the quick rate of the movement task.
This work was followed by Lotze et al. (1999) investigating the activation in the
primary and secondary motor areas during ME and imagery of the dominant and nondominant hand of 10 right-handed participants (five males and five females). During
high spatial fMRI, participants were instructed to make a fist and then imagine making a
fist at a specific rate, first with the right-hand and then with the left-hand. Prior to
image acquisition, participants were trained with low EMG activity of the flexor
digitorum superficialis muscle and high vividness of the imagined movement. A region of
interest analysis of activated voxels above a t-value of 2.45 (p < 0.01) showed that the
same cortical regions were active during ME and MI (i.e., SMA, PMC, and M1) as well as
the cerebellum, but to a lesser degree. In addition, the somatosensory cortex was
significantly activated but only during ME. The cortical activity recorded in this study
demonstrates support for the hypothesis that MI and ME share similar neural substrates
(Jeannerod, 1994).
This prompted Gerardin et al. (2000) to compare MI and ME of simple
(simultaneous flexion/extension of the fingers) and complex (selective flexion/extension
of the index and little finger) finger movements. Prior to imaging or executing auditorycued finger movements, participants (right-handed, five males and three females, Mean
age = 26.6 years, Range = 21-35 years) completed the MIQ-3 to determine if they were
good (Score Range = 8-32) or poor (Score Range = 33-56) imagers. Analysis of the MIQ-R
showed that participants had a mean visual vividness score of 16 ± 5.4 (Range = 10-22)
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and a mean kinesthetic vividness score of 17.9 ± 7.2 (Range = 9-26). Group analysis for
the direct comparison between executed and imagined movement showed a significant
activated network centered on the central sulcus (i.e., bilateral sensorimotor cortex,
lateral PMC, post-SMA, anterior cingulate cortex, and ventral inferior parietal areas), as
well as subcortically in the anterior right putamen, posterior left putamen, thalamus,
and cerebellum. On the other hand, MI compared to ME indicated increased activation
more rostral in the frontal lobes and more superior and caudal in the parietal cortex
(i.e., superior and inferior parietal cortex, prefrontal cortex, pre-SMA, lateral PMC, right
anterior cingulate cortex, left parietal lobes, basal ganglia, putamen, and caudate
nucleus) (p = 0.01, non-corrected). More importantly, comparing complex and simple
movements showed no significant activation differences. These results partially confirm
that imagery of a motor act and its actual execution involve similar brain area activation
(Decety et al., 1994; Grafton et al., 1996; Jeannerod, 1994; Rao et al., 1993; Stephan et
al., 1995), with MI partially overlapping the same brain areas as ME but still having its
own specific neural network.
Similar results were found using fMRI to compare the functional anatomy of ME
and MI of 10 right-handed participants (seven males and three females, Mean age = 32
years, SD = 11 years) using a number-guided segmented sequential finger tapping task
(Hanakawa et al., 2003). Overall, results indicated that ME activated the primary sensory
and motor areas, parietal operculum, and anterior cerebellum which had little activity
during MI (-0.1 – 0.1%) as well as the PMC and visual cortex which had mild activity
during MI (0.2 – 0.7%), while areas predominantly activated during MI included the
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precentral sulcus and the posterior superior parietal cortex/precuneus. In addition,
many of the frontoparietal areas and posterior cerebellum were activated in both ME
and MI conditions. These results provided additional support for a functional shift from
more imaginative properties to more motor executive properties in many cortical and
subcortical areas (Gerardin et al., 2000; Stephan et al., 1995). However, false activation
may have occurred because of the subtraction method used to analyze the data
reflecting a difference between complicated responses and simple movement tasks. In
addition, artifacts caused by mild muscle contractions and eye movements as well as the
use of different imagery modes may have altered the results.
Unlike most fMRI studies using non-functional movements, Ehrrson, Geyer, and
Naito (2003) expanded this area by investigating whether imagery of voluntary
movements of different body parts correspond to body-part-specific motor
representations. Seven right-handed (six males and one female, Mean age = 25)
completed a training session of three ME conditions (flexion/extension movements of
the fingers, flexion/extension movements of the toes, and horizontal tongue
movements), three MI conditions (imaging the ME movements), six rest conditions
serving as an independent baseline for each movement/imagery condition, and
subsequently completed these same task conditions inside the scanner. Findings
indicated that motor imagery engages somatotopically organized sections of the M1 in
which each body part (i.e., hand, foot, and tongue) activated body-part-specific
representations in primary and non-primary motor areas.
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In order to further explore and expand the literature on the fine modulation in
network activation during ME and MI, Solodkin et al. (2004) explored the interrelationships among the relevant brain areas for VI, KI, and ME. After measuring EMG
activity during execution of an unpaced thumb opposition movement as well as KI and
VI of the movement, eighteen right-handed participants (nine males and nine females)
were divided into two groups (KI and ME; VI and ME) and completed the same task
inside the scanner. Intra-subject and inter-subject analyses were performed using a
region of interest approach largely confirmed the functional anatomy of MI of previous
studies (Fadiga et al., 1999; Jeannerod, 1995). In addition, the networks for ME, KI, and
VI were statistically different, with the most notable difference between KI and ME in
M1 suggesting that a physiological mechanism exists that prevents overt movements
during imagery conditions.
Functional MRI was also utilized by Lacourse et al. (2005) to compare the
functional neuroanatomy associated with executed and imagined finger movements
according to novel and skilled learning phases. Using their right hand, 54 participants
(19 males and 35 females) completed the MIQ (mean score = 22.6 ± 4.9), VMIQ (mean
score = 94.3 ± 24.2), and a subsequent sequential button press task inside a scanner
before (novel) and after (skilled) a week of intensive physical practice. Results indicated
that skilled participants were significantly faster at executing the task compared to the
novel participants (p < 0.001), but there was no difference in the amount of execution
errors. Based on a voxel of interest analysis, it was found that congruent brain
activations are associated with ME and motor imagery in both phases with clusters of
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activation in the M1, ventral PMC, primary somatosensory cortex, and SMA. Further
analysis indicated that voxels of interest were more similar to ME in the skilled rather
than the novel phase of learning. Congruent cortical and subcortical motor areas
associated during both novel and skilled phases support the effectiveness of a MI based
training program to acquire and rehearse skilled movements. However, there were two
methodological flaws: (1) the use of a blocked design was not able to differentiate
motor planning from ME, making it unclear as to whether the activation reflects
differences in planning or execution or both, and (2) the use of multi-session learning
may have caused the reproducibility of the BOLD signal such that non-specific withinsession effects my confound the effects of learning.
More recently, Szameitat, Shen, Conforto, and Sterr (2012) investigated the
activation of the sensorimotor system without overt movement during three covert
movement modes (MI, passive movement, and movement observation). For this, 21
healthy, right-handed participants (11 males and 10 females) and five stroke patients
were separated into one of the four movement conditions (i.e., execution, MI,
movement observation, and passive movement) and underwent fMRI scanning. Results
in healthy participants demonstrated that overt movements of the wrist activated a
network of areas in the lateral sensorimotor cortices, medial motor cortices, and
parietal areas. Like execution, imagery activated the SMA. However, unlike execution
activating more primary motor cortices, imagery predominantly activated premotor and
prefrontal areas which are associated with motor planning. In patients, the attempt to
execute wrist movements extensively activated the sensorimotor network (primary
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motor and sensory areas) which was most like MI suggesting that imagery may be the
best approach to activate the motor system in stroke patients. However, matched
controls were not used in this study so caution should be taken when transferring
results between patient samples and healthy participants.
Functional movement tasks. Recent neuroimaging research has moved toward
using functional movement task paradigms (e.g., gait and tool use) to study how the
brain functions during activities of daily living. Functional movements, as referred to in
the following research, are those involved with larger, more complex gross motor
movements that often have a specific purpose. Like non-functional movement tasks,
functional movement tasks are also assessed on the accuracy as well as the imagery
movement time of the task compared to its physical execution. However, because larger
movements are involved they cannot be performed inside a scanner without producing
artifacts in the data. Although direct comparisons cannot be made inside the scanner,
using functional movements are the most important outcomes to pursue and measure
(Uswatte et al., 2000) in rehabilitation and sport settings.
Within the fMRI research, a commonly used functional movement task paradigm
is the ability to use a tool in order to detect apraxia. One of the most reliable predictors
of actual tool use is the ability of an individual to pantomime the use of the same tool
allowing for the collection of data regarding human hemispheric specialization for tool
use. However, since the specific anatomic substrates of these tool use applications is
still poorly defined Moll et al. (2000) conducted a study to identify the brain areas
activated when one pantomimes the use of tools. While in an fMRI scanner, 16 (11
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males and five females) right-handed individuals completed a tool use and shame
(control) praxis in which each participant was asked to gesture the use of 24 common
tools with a control task between each task, with eight of these participants being asked
to imagine the execution of the task. A subtraction analysis was used to analyze five
regions of interest of the cerebral hemisphere showing that the imagined performance
of the same actions did not essentially change the cortical activations compared to the
physical execution condition (i.e., parietal lobe, caudal dorsolateral frontal cortex of the
left cerebral hemisphere, and inferior parietal lobule). Even though these results add to
the notion that imagined and executed actions enlist the same brain regions, this study
only used a small mixed-gender sample of participants to examine the activated areas in
a superficial manner.
More recent studies using fMRI to focus on image vividness as a key to imagery
ability have been completed by Higuchi et al. (2007) and Imazu et al. (2007) finding
inconsistent results. They investigated brain activity in order to understand the
difference in activity related to actual tool use compared to MI of tool use and infer the
underlying neuronal mechanism(s) of these tasks. Blood oxygenation level-dependent
contrast images of eight participants (five males and three females, 23-39 years old)
were collected as each participant completed 16 tool grasping/tool use tasks in three
conditions (imagery, execution, and control). A fixed effect analysis indicated that both
imagery and execution tasks activated brain areas that were spatially close to each
other (i.e., left M1, SMA, posterior parietal cortex, posterior inferior parietal sulcus, and
right cerebellum). Although these results support previous findings suggesting that
95

neural mechanisms contribute to skillful tool use, because muscle activation and
sensory movement was not considered, brain regions may have been implicitly
activated altering the true relationship between ME and MI tasks.
Contradicting results were found in a tool use study examining the differences
between actual and imagined usage of chopsticks (Imazu et al., 2007). Twelve righthanded participants (six males and six females, Mean age = 26.1 years) performed the
task of picking up and putting down pieces of plastic using chopsticks in their right hand
across four conditions (tool use, tool mime, tool imagery, and hand imagery) while being
scanned. Blood oxygenation level-dependent contrast images were obtained to indicate
clusters of greater than five voxels that were activated during each condition. Unlike
Higuchi et al. (2007), similar brain activation between execution and imagery was not
directly found. Rather, evidence revealed that activation in the right lateral cerebellum
and precentral gyrus increased during execution of tool use compared to the imagery
condition (i.e., cerebellum, parahippocampal gyrus, corpus callosum, and inferior
parietal lobule). Attaining such results may have been a result of using a well-learned
and familiar tool use task that participants had already acquired the internal mode for
and were not required to learn how to use this tool.
Functional MRI has also been used as a measurement technique to examine the
functional neuroanatomical correlates of MI during more complex and larger everyday
movements. Using more gross body movement tasks (i.e., tie shoelaces, swim, run,
dance) Szameitat, Shen, and Sterr (2007) sought to determine which neural
mechanism(s) are used during MI. Seventeen right-handed participants (six males and
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11 females) imagined movements of their upper extremities (i.e., eat a meal with knife
and fork, cut your fingernails with scissors, write on a piece of paper using a pen, shuffle
and deal playing cares, tie shoelaces, brush/comb your hair, and button a shirt/blouse)
and movements involving the whole body (i.e., swim, lift heavy boxes from floor to
table, run, dance, throw and kick balls, dig a hole using a spade, and use a vacuum
cleaner) during fMRI scanning. In addition, participants completed a post-scan
questionnaire to ensure the vividness of the image was comparable between upper
extremity and whole body movements. Vividness ratings were almost identical (Median
upper extremity score = 6, Median whole body score = 6, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test z =
-0.577, p = 0.564) in which all participants indicated good imagery quality (values ranged
between four and seven for both movement types). Comparison tests indicated that MI
of everyday movements activated the lateral and medial premotor and parietal cortices.
The different movement types also showed a homuncular organization in sensorimotor
cortices while resulting in the same activation in cortical areas. It is likely that the use of
a wide variety of difficult movements led to spatially more extended cortical activations
and smaller individual variability compared to using a simple functional movement task
to indicate more localized and greater individual variability. However, from a
methodological standpoint, physical constraints may make it unlikely to show
tendencies to execute the movement (e.g., running while lying supine in the scanner),
using highly familiar everyday movements preventing the control of familiarity, and not
controlling for variables such as intensity and frequency of imagery.
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Concurrent fMRI research developed a new experimental protocol to quantify
the imagery of gait (Bakker, de Lange, Stevens, Toni, & Bloem, 2007) showing that
movement time increased with increasing path length and decreasing path width in
three conditions (actual walking, MI, and VI). In addition, the effect of the path width on
movement times was significantly stronger during MI and actual walking compared to
the VI condition. In their follow up study, they used the previously validated MI protocol
(Bakker et al., 2007; Stevens, 2005) to examine the cerebral correlates of MI during
normal and precision gait (Bakker, de Lange, Helmich, Scheeringa, Bloem, and Toni,
2008) as well as the motoric specificity of the effects and the effector specificity of MI of
gait. Results of 16 right-handed males (Mean age = 22 years, SD = 2) completing two
tasks, MI and VI of gait, indicated that imagery movement times were longer for the
narrow path during MI, compared to VI, suggesting that MI is sensitive to the
environmental constraints of a narrower path. In addition, cerebral activity (i.e.,
superior parietal lobule, frontal cortex, right cingulate gyrus, and left putamen) was
increased during this task emphasizing the role of cortical structures outside the primary
motor regions in imaging locomotion movements when precision is required. Although,
imagery-related effects were distinguished which were influenced by environmental
constraints and controlled for changes in muscle activity, certain methodological flaws
should be addressed so as to not influence the evidence obtained relating to the MI
experience: (1) task settings, including the participant’s posture and the imagined gait
being performed while sitting in a chair and not in a gait initiation position; (2)
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researchers providing each participant with different instructions; and (3) using tacit
knowledge to estimate the time to actually execute the movement.
Improving upon these limitations, Iseki, Hanakawa, Shinozaki, Nankaku, and
Fukuyama (2008) examined the brain activity during observation and imagery of gait to
test the hypothesis that visual stimuli would assist in invoking motor planning programs
and produce active mental rehearsal of motor acts. Unlike previous studies, fMRI was
used in a virtual reality environment that supplied realistic visual feedback to the
participant which mimics real walking to assess activation of the motor network during
imaginary gait. Using this paradigm, 16 right-handed participants (13 males and three
females) completed six behavioral conditions in which different types of video clips
were shown: (1) gait observation, (2) stepping observation, (3) standing observation, (4)
scramble gait observation, (5) virtual walking, and (6) scrambled virtual walking.
Participants subsequently evaluated the vividness of the mental image of their virtual
walking experience on a five-point scale (1 = image as vivid as normal vision and 5 = no
image at all). It was found that participant’s mean vividness rating of the mental image
was three (SD = 0.8), and that there was a significant correlation between virtual and
actual walking for each individual level (r = 0.67=0.95, p < 0.05 for each subject) as well
as in the pooled data for all subjects (r = 0.78, p < 0.01) indicating that gait imagery
within the virtual walking stimuli paradigm had a motor/kinesthetic aspect. In addition,
common activity between observation and imagery was found in the SMA and M1
suggesting that motor planning centers of gait are activated during both imagery (firstperson perspective) and observation (third-person perspective) of gait behaviors.
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Similarly, cortical control of gait-related imagery of 21 right-handed genderbalanced participants (Mean age = 21.5 years, SD = 1.2) was examined during imagery of
the initiation of gait, stepping over an obstacle, and the termination of gait from a firstperson perspective (Wang et al., 2009). Prior to being scanned, the paradigm was
presented to the participants outside of the scanner. For each experimental condition,
participants watched a video clip of the task and then were instructed to mentally
imitate the movements viewed in the clips. Cortical activation recorded by fMRI
indicated the following results for each gait task: gait initiation – primarily activated the
SMA to control movement preparation and ME (Cunnington, Windischberger, Deecke, &
Moser. 2003; Picard & Strick, 2001); stepping over an obstacle – primarily activated the
SMA, posterior/superior parietal cortex, MT/V5, and PMC providing dynamic balance
and controlling foot trajectory over obstacles (Reynolds & Day, 2005); and gait
termination – primarily activated the prefrontal area (i.e., inferior frontal gyrus and the
pre-SMA) and the superior temporal gyrus contributing to the response inhibition
process (Coxon, Stinear, & Byblow, 2009; Leung & Cai, 2007; Xue, Aron, & Poldrack,
2008). Although this study did not directly monitor imagery performance and analyze
each imagery mode separately, it demonstrated that cortical control is important during
functional movements, especially the different phases of gait.
Despite existing studies on locomotion, the brain network(s) used during real
locomotion has yet to be examined. Therefore, la Fougere et al. (2010) proposed a new
method to investigate brain activation during real steady-state locomotion using [18F]FDG PET and BOLD response in fMRI. Sixteen right handed participants (nine males and
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seven females, Mean age = 61.3 years, SD = 7.8) without gait disorders completed a
locomotion paradigm in which they walked for 10 minutes at a comfortable speed prior
to and after a [18F]FDG after which image acquisition was obtained by PET. The fMRI
portion of the study instructed participants to imagine themselves in the lying (rest
condition), standing, walking, and running conditions, as they had practiced in an earlier
training session. The direct comparison of real and imagined locomotion showed a brain
network consisting of activation of the midline cerebellar areas (vermis, paravermis, and
cerebellar locomotion regions), occipital visual cortices (cuneus and precuneus),
parahippocampal gyrus, and fusiform gyrus. A major difference found was that M1 was
activated during real locomotion, while the SMAs (superior/medial frontal cortex and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and basal ganglia (caudate nucleus and putamen) were
activated during motor imagery. This may occur because imagery may only activate a
premotor planning mode of locomotion, whereas the mode of real locomotion travels
directly from the primary motor areas (Hanakawa et al., 2008). Therefore, real steadystate locomotion represents a direct pathway as measured through PET, while imagined
locomotion encompasses an indirect pathway measured by BOLD fMRI which supports
claims found by Wang et al. (2009).
Subsequent to their aforementioned study, Szameitat, McNamara, Shen, and
Sterr (2012) used fMRI to investigate the functional neuroanatomical correlates of
bimanual coordination demands in MI of everyday actions compared to unimanual
movements. The imagery of unimanual actions as well as bimanual actions of 17
participants (six males and 11 females, Age = 19-31 years) were completed in five
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conditions (bimanual, simple-left, simple-right, complex-left, complex-right, and
baseline) while being scanned. A significant increase was not found in overall neural
activation during MI of bimanual actions compared to MI of unimanual actions, but the
data confirmed that by increasing the complexity of the action increases the
connectivity between brain areas. In addition, data from these participants supported
previous studies (Bakker et al., 2008; Hanakawa et al., 2003; Porro et al., 1996) showing
increases in connectivity between parietal and premotor areas within and between the
left and right hemispheres. These findings provide additional support for the assumed
equivalence of overt and imagined (covert) actions of bimanual and unimanual activities
of daily living.
Lastly, recent investigations have used fMRI to examine the neuronal
involvement activated during MI of an action with an object both with and without
passively holding the object (Mizuguchi et al., 2013). Prior to the experiment, (17 males
and two females, Mean age = 25 years, SD = 2) MI vividness was assessed on a sevenpoint Likert scale (7 = vivid imagery and 1 = not vivid imagery) according to three tasks:
(1) imaging squeezing a foam ball with the right hand while holding the ball with the
right hand, (2) imaging squeezing the ball with the right hand while holding nothing, and
(3) passively holding the ball with the right hand without MI, and then completed these
tasks in the scanner. Imagery vividness scores were significantly better in the imagery
with ball condition (6.5 ± 0.2) compared to the imagery condition without a ball (5.1 ±
0.3) (p < 0.01). First-level and second-level data analyses revealed activation in the SMA,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, cerebellum, and basal ganglia during MI
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suggesting that the frontoparietal networks are mainly involved in the MI of an action
while holding an object.
The generalizability of the aforementioned results obtained by fMRI should be
carefully considered because of the various procedures used to complete each
experiment as well as the various data analysis techniques. Nevertheless, research
utilizing fMRI has generally shown that MI and ME continually produce similar brain
activity suggesting that neural substrates are equivalent (e.g., Imazu et al., 2007; Roa et
al., 1993).
Limitations. Although fMRI is considered a sensitive method to objectively
measure functional brain activity, several restrictions limit the generalizability of the
data because of the various protocols and data analysis strategies that can be used.
With this in mind, it is important to recognize that the BOLD response is an indirect
measure of neural activity and that results obtained from each experiment can
significantly be altered through confounding factors (i.e., noise, head movement,
instructions, muscle activity, and changes in brain state environment) (Vaghela et al.,
2010). In addition, although images can be collected quickly, which should allow for
good temporal resolution, the temporal resolution is limited by the hemodynamic
response which delays the fMRI signal and a finite signal-to-noise ratio. For example, if a
temporal difference is observed in two distinct brain regions, it may represent a
temporal difference or a difference in the hemodynamic response characteristics of the
two regions. Unless deconvolution methods are applied or the regions of interest are
spatially distinct, the temporal difference should be carefully evaluated when using MC
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paradigms in fMRI research. Moreover, current fMRI research typically does not include
EMG to regress out muscle activation artifacts which may alter the brain activation
pattern during MI since it has yet to be determined if this activity is localized to the
specific muscle(s) involved in the movement being imagined or if they are a by-product
of central changes in the CNS. Overall, neuroscience measurement paradigms have
indicated the usefulness of neuroimaging techniques to better understand the
relationship between MI and functional brain processes at a higher level than self-report
measures (Guillot & Collet, 2010).
Recent literature continues to show little evidence of a link between self-report
questionnaires and relevant observable events, leaving the question open whether
these measures truly tap the construct of imagery ability (Lequerica et al., 2002). As
suggested by previous literature (Collet et al., 2011; Guillot & Collet, 2005; Roure et al,
1999), subjective measures should ideally be combined with more objective measures
(i.e., chronometric measures, psychophysiological measures, and neurophysiological
measures) that complement the information garnered from these measures. More
importantly, the convergent validity of self-report measures should be examined
according to objective physiological measures that record activated neural substrates
during MI specifically at the item level and ideally at the same time participants are
engaging in specific types of imagery.
Combining Subjective and Objective Measures
It is not unusual to use multiple measures across subjective and objective
paradigms to examine a dependent variable; in this case, MI. However, when both are
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used it becomes questionable as to whether they are measuring the same underlying
construct. Previous imagery research suggests that there is not a consistent relationship
between self-report questionnaires and objective measures (Ernest, 1977; Danaher &
Thoresen, 1972; Marks, 1972; Rehm, 1973; Richardson, 1977; Rimm & Bottrell, 1969)
because of the inadequate measurement of individual differences within each measure
(Hall et al., 1985). This was initially discussed by Richardson (1977) and Di Vesta et al.
(1971) finding that these two types of tests should load on factors that are orthogonal
to one another, while other correlational and factor analytic studies have repeatedly
shown that self-report and objective measures are largely unrelated (Burton & Fogarty,
2003; Lequerica et al., 2002; McLemore, 1976; Moreau, Clerc, Mansy-Dannay, &
Guerrien, 2010; Poltrock & Brown, 1984).
The argument that the subjective experience of imagery may not actually
indicate a strong relationship to any measurable capacity (Neiser, 1970), and that
reliable physiological correlates of subjective imagery reports are elusive (Campos &
Perez, 1990; Paivio, 1973, 1971; Richardson, 1969; Williams et al., 1995) still remains
today. Because recent literature continues to show little evidence supporting a link
between self-report questionnaires and relevant observable events it is unknown
whether these measures truly tap the construct of imagery ability. Measurement
protocols such as mental rotation tasks, including the paper folding test, cube-cutting
task (i.e., Necker Cube), Gordon Test of Visual Imagery Control, VMIQ, and MIQ have
been used to assess imagery ability, and have been found to have good psychometric
properties. Lequerica et al. (2002) used these measurements to test the hypothesis that
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imagery control is best assessed by measures that tap vividness of static images.
Descriptive correlations of 80 participants (39 males and 41 females, Mean age = 22.1
years, SD = 4.3) were examined revealing no significant correlations between subjective
and objective measures of imagery ability. Overall, objective imagery tasks were more
strongly related to visuoperceptual, visuospatial, and constructional abilities compared
to working memory tests with little or no relationship with subjective imagery
measures. Similarly, Burton and Fogarty (2003) tested the factor structure of VI and
spatial abilities by examining whether a primary imagery factor can be identified as a
separate dimension of individual differences. To do so, 213 participants (99 males and
114 females) completed a test battery of 26 markers of cognitive ability; five self-report
VI questionnaires, seven experimental imagery tasks, and two creative imagery tasks.
Confirmatory factor analysis suggested that self-report measures of imagery ability can
define separate dimensions of spatial ability if the stimuli used in self-report measures
are close to that used in spatial tests. However, current self-report measures include
different stimuli (e.g., recall of movement experience) to examine imagery ability
leading to a weak relationship between subjectively and objectively derived measures.
Attempts to link self-report questionnaires and objective measures have failed to
show a consistent and substantial relationship (Di Vesta et al., 1971; Ernest, 1977;
Poltrock & Brown, 1984; Richardson, 1977) may be the results of: (1) using subjective
measures with poor psychometric properties (i.e., non-effective criterion on which to
base their ratings), (2) confounding components of imagery control, generation, and
vividness, (3) subjective ratings of ability being unrelated to the accuracy with which one
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performs the actual manipulation, (4) not controlling the nature of the image generated
or the strategies used to resolve objective tasks (Lequerica et al., 2002), and (5) the
variability of time since experiencing the movement linked to memory decay.
Furthermore, the nature of the instructions, including imagery perspective and mode as
well as skill level should be taken into account.
Because of the aforementioned limitations, brain imaging measures that capture
the “real-time” imagery experience of individuals have emerged. For example, Amedi et
al. (2005) argued that the subjective experiences of VI and visual perception are
different. Functional MRI demonstrated that each task (i.e., visual objective recognition
and viewing scrambled images of the same objects) showed positive BOLD activation in
visual brain regions in relation to scores on the VVIQ establishing that most brain areas
activated during VI are also activated during visual perception of objects. These results
are difficult to generalize to movement experiences relevant in the sport sciences
because this study used a simple visual object recognition task making it difficult to
relate to studies in the motor domain. In addition, perceiving objects do not require
much filtering, and because the visual items in this study were so salient the mechanism
that creates this deactivation was still unclear. Therefore, the recorded results may be
due to less neuronal activity in “irrelevant” sensory areas during VI compared to visual
perception or an active suppression process triggered by a separate brain region.
To our knowledge, Cui et al, (2007) have been the only researchers claiming that
individual variability in imagery can be measured objectively. Eight participants first
completed the VVIQ and then a visualization task (i.e., bench press or stair climbing)
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within an fMRI scanner in relation to a color-naming interference task. Results indicated
that participants who reported being more visual in subjective and objective measures
are more susceptible to a color-naming interference task suggesting that individual
differences in VI vividness can be quantifiable without the use of subjective measures.
However, participants either completed an upper or lower body task which has been
shown to influence the consistency of activation within the general imagery networks
(Hetu et al., 2013). While results such as these add insight into the “real-time” imagery
experience, consistent evidence for validating self-report questionnaires is lacking.
Common self-report imagery ability questionnaires have been recently used as
screening tools to determine the functional neuroanatomical networks activated
between ME and MI. Early cognitive psychology research used EEG to investigate the
topographical changes of brain activity accompanying VI and MI between good and poor
imagers (Marks & Isaac, 1995). The VVIQ and VMIQ were used to select 16 participants
based on their self-reported vivid or non-vivid imagery ability scores (eight highest and
eight lowest scores) to complete both imagined and physical performance of a finger
touching and fist clenching task. Data indicated that there were differences in the
patterning of electrical activity responses between participants selected for their reports
on vivid and non-vivid imagery which are consistent with previous findings and further
confirm the construct validity of the VVIQ and VMIQ.
More recently, Williams et al. (2012) completed a similar study of Guillot et al.
(2008, 2009) to determine the extent to which the vividness of a motor image is
associated with the pattern and/or level of neural activation in motor related areas of
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the brain. The relationship between imagery ability and MEP amplitude following TMS
during MI was examined in 15 participants (five males and 10 females) completing a
mental rotation task during four conditions (i.e., static hand (baseline), movement
observation, MI, and ME). Correlations between imagery ability and MEP amplitude
revealed an inverse correlation with the scores on the kinesthetic components of the
VMIQ-2 indicating that greater MEP amplitude is associated with more vivid and
kinesthetic images, and that activation of the motor system during MI appears to be
influence by imagery ability. Although research suggests that poor imagers may use
different techniques to solve a task compared to good imagers (Logle, Pernet,
Buonocore, & Della, 2001), an individual’s self-reported ability to produce vivid images
can reflect their ability to reproduce a vivid image of the task.
MI is currently considered a multi-dimensional construct (Guillot & Collet, 2008),
and its underlying processes have recently been measured using a combination of
psychometric tests, qualitative procedures, chronometric methods, and
psychophysiological techniques. To improve upon using these techniques separately, a
motor imagery index (MII) was developed to integrate certain aspects of the above
measures into a single index of MI quality (Collet et al., 2011). It was hypothesized that
an overall MII score can be calculated from six components: (1) self-estimation of image
quality, (2) psychometric assessment of imagery vividness, (3) MC, and (4) three
psychophysiological indices of imagery. Accordingly, each sub-indicator was calculated,
weighted and summed to determine the final index of movement imagery ability for
each individual; the greater the index, the better the imager.
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The MII was recently used to screen participants as good or poor imagers in a
study exploring the relationship between MI and change in corticomotor and
intracortical excitability during MI (Lebon, Byblow, Collet, Guillot, & Stinear, 2012)
indicating that greater corticomotor excitability during imagery was facilitated by MI
compared to the listening only condition (control). Furthermore, good imagers
experienced muscle-specific temporal modulation of corticomotor excitability, similar to
that observed during ME whereas poor imagers only experienced a general increase in
corticomotor excitability during MI that was not muscle specific. Although this study
showed the reliability of the MII to separate participants based on MI ability and that it
may more accurately describe participant’s imagery ability, a thorough understanding of
each tool and data processing method as well as having access to the equipment is
needed.
Individual Differences that Moderate the Effectiveness of Imagery
Sport psychologists have examined various individual differences, factors
referring to relatively stable traits or differences that exist between people in their
subjective evaluations of the world, to explain imagery variations. These have been used
in an effort to explain and/or predict the performance of participants in sport contexts,
but they are also relevant in the study of imagery. Drawing from Paivio (1985), imagery
is an ability that improves with practice, but its effectiveness on performance is
contingent on specific individual characteristics such as gender (i.e., biological sex)
handedness (i.e., asymmetry of hemispheric activation), and movement experience.
These differences can influence the imagery system in working memory directly, in
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which athletes with good imagery ability may perform better in a competition than
athletes with poor imagery skills because they are better able to imagine the upcoming
performance. Therefore, it is important to discuss how these individual differences
moderate imagery effectiveness.
Gender
Findings concerning gender have shown general trends throughout the sport and
neuroscience literature. Galton (1883) originally proposed that females have better
abilities of visualizing than males and that this ability increases with age in both genders.
This has been confirmed by studies with females reporting more auditory imagery
(Griffitts, 1927), color imagery (Palmer & Field, 1968), and visual imagery (Campos &
Perez, 1988; Durndell & Wetherick, 1975; Harshman & Paivio, 1987; Narchal & Broota,
1988; Paivio & Harshman, 1983). Additional studies show that females also report more
vivid visual imagery using the Betts’ Questionnaire upon Mental Imagery (Sheehan,
1967; White, Ashton, Brown, 1977) and the VVIQ (Campos & Sueiro, 1993; McKelvie,
1986), as well as more vivid movement imagery using the VMIQ (Campos & Perez,
1988).
Studies finding females to have better imagery ability compared to males have
used self-report measurements (Campos & Perez, 1988; Durndell & Wetherick, 1975;
Harshman & Paivio, 1987; Narchal & Broota, 1988; Paivio & Harshman, 1983). For
example, in a sample of 51 male and 82 female undergraduate students that completed
the VMIQ Campos and Perez (1988) showed that females reported significantly greater
vividness of movement imagery than men which corroborate with previous
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investigations (Ashton & White, 1980; Sheehan, 1967; White et al., 1977). Similar results
were found in an additional investigation of 289 participants (134 males and 155
females) of various age groups who completed the VVIQ indicating that visual imagery
vividness is significantly influenced by gender, F(1, 283) = 6.905, p < 0.05, in all age
groups (Campos & Sueiro, 1993). Furthermore, Isaac and Marks (1994) investigated
individual differences in imagery experiences and compared the differences in the VVIQ
and VMIQ distributions obtained from 345 children and 202 adults. Overall, females
reported more vivid imagery on both questionnaires, substantiating earlier findings.
Results indicating that females have better imaginal processes may be explained by
their superior in free and incidental learning (Sheehan, 1971) and the ability to recall
picture details (Marks, 1973).
Although earlier work investigating gender differences indicates females to have
better imagery ability, it has been rivaled by others showing that males have better
visual imagery (e.g., Christiansen, 1969), a greater variety of form imagery, and auditory
imagery (White et al., 1977). More recent studies have found gender differences in
spatial abilities and in sensory integration (Berthoz & Viaud-Delmon, 1999; Campos,
Perez-Fabello, & Gomez-Juncal, 2004), particularly with mental rotation tests (the ability
to rotate mental representations of objects) showing male performance advantages
(Parsons et al., 2004; Siegel-Hinson & McKeever, 2002). For example, in a sample of 129
participants (60 males and 69 females) Campos et al. (2004) investigated gender
differences in performance-assessed and self-reported imaging capacity showing that
males obtained higher scores than females on performance-based tests (i.e.,
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visuospatial ability scores); however, no gender differences existed for imagery control.
Similar studies also indicated that males responded more quickly with fewer error rates
when rotating objects (Rilea, 2008) as well as the ability to preserve the temporal
organization of movement during mental practice (Hoyek, Champely, Collet, Fargier, &
Guillot, 2009) and ease of movement imagery (Monsma et al., 2009; Williams et al.,
2011).
Despite certain studies showing gender differences, others have found no
significant gender differences in the imagery experience (Ashton & White, 1980; Beech
& Leslie, 1978; Campos & Perez, 1988; Lane, 1977; McConkey & Nogrady, 1986), even
expressing that gender differences are unimportant to examine (Di Vesta, Ingersoll, &
Sunshine, 1971). For example, in a sample of 60 participants (24 males and 34 females)
Parsons et al. (2004) explored the relationship between mental rotation tasks in a virtual
environment and other neuropsychological measures according to gender differences.
Results are contradictory because they showed significant gender differences favoring
males (t (42) = -3.27; p = 0.002) on a paper-and-pencil version of the mental rotation
test, but no differences were found between males and females on duration (t (20) = 0.18; p = 0.86) or efficiency (t (20) = 0.37; p = 0.72) of the virtual reality spatial rotation
test. A mental rotation paradigm was also used by Seurinck, Vingerhoets, de Lange, and
Achten (2004) to examine gender specific cortical activation patterns of 22 right-handed
participants (11 males and 11 females) during the mental rotation of hands and tools.
Imaging data revealed a common cortical activation pattern for males and females
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including the superior frontal lobe, middle frontal gyrus, and extrastriate occipital areas
indicating that both genders use similar motor strategies during mental rotation tasks.
Recent studies continue to show non-significant differences between genders.
For example, in a study of 56 participants (28 females and 28 males), Callow and Hardy
(2004) did not find any significant differences in imagery ability between males and
females on any of the MIQ or VMIQ scales and totals which is contradictory to previous
research indicating females self-reporting better imagery ability (Campos & Perez, 1988;
Campos & Sueiro, 1993; McKelvie, 1986; Sheehan, 1967; White et al., 1977). Likewise,
gender differences were not found in MIQ-R score (t = 0.7, p > 0.05), mental
chronometry (t = -0.82, p > 0.05), auto-estimation score (t=0.6, p > 0.05), ANS activity
(t=0.07, p > 0.05), global imagery score (t=0.6, p> 0.05), expertise (Guillot et al., 2008),
imagery perspective (p > 0.05), motor threshold, MEP latencies and amplitudes, central
conduction time (Livingston, Goodkin, & Ingersoll, 2010), muscle responses (Guillot et
al., 2007), or VI versus KI (Guillot et al., 2009). Overall, imagery has long been considered
in both sport psychology and neuroscience and differences in theoretical assumptions
and measurement paradigms may explain equivocal findings. Given these
inconsistencies, the present study will only use female participants to decrease the
possibility of gender playing a role in brain activity differences.
Handedness
Handedness is considered an important example of hemispheric specialization in
humans (Serrien et al., 2006), making it paramount to control investigations of
neurological activity during MI because brain activity in the cortices, gyri, and sulci
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differs depending on the dominant hand (Hammond, 2002; Rademacher et al., 2001).
Handedness can either refer to hand preference or the asymmetrical performance of a
task (Triggs, Calvanio, Levine, Heaton, & Heilman, 2000). There has been a strong
interest in handed because of how it can impact brain function when completing a task
(Corballis, 2003; Grabowska, Herman, Nowicka, Szatkowska, & Szelag, 1994).
Brain mapping studies using fMRI and PET have attempted to identify neuronal
underpinnings by comparing movement related activity during finger and/or hand
movements in right- and left-handers (Lutz et al., 2005; Siebner et al., 2002; Solodkin et
al., 2001). These studies focused on differences in lateralization of movement related
activity in different areas of the brain including the amygdala, hippocampus, primary
sensorimotor cortex, SMA, PMC, and M1 (Dassonville et al., 1997; Herve et al., 2006;
Kim et al., 1993; Siebner et al., 2002; Solodkin et al., 2001; Szabo, Xiong, Lancaster,
Rainey, & Fox, 2001) suggesting that brain asymmetry may occur because of
hemispheric lateralization of the cortical areas directing motor function. Evidence has
illustrated handedness related structural and functional asymmetries of simple motor
tasks (Baraldi et al., 1999; Hammond, 2002; Rademacher et al., 2001). For example, in a
sample of 10 right-handed male participants completing a sequential finger-to-thumb
opposition with the right or left hand Baraldi et al. (1999) showed that only movement
of the contralateral hand was found to be equally distributed in the left and right
perirolandic cortex (including the PMC of the dominant hemisphere), while ipsilateral
finger movements did not show any significantly activated brain areas. However, other
studies using more complex motor tasks show that the degree of asymmetry decreases
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with task difficulty (Hausmann, Kirk, & Corballis, 2004) or the effect of handedness was
found in other brain areas (i.e., SMA, PMC) (Babiloni et al., 2003; Siebner et al., 2002;
Solodkin et al., 2001). These results indicate that the nature of the task (i.e., force,
speed, and accuracy) as well as age and gender (Kumar & Mandal, 2003) interact with
handedness and alter motor activation patterns in the brain.
In addition, research on lateralized neuronal activity has not revealed a clear
pattern of association and the affect handedness has on brain activity (Fischer, 2005;
Livingston et al., 2010; Szabo et al., 2001). For example, in a sample of 20 right-handed
and 17-left handed participants completing a 10-item handedness questionnaire (drawn
from the Edinburgh Laterality Inventory and Reitan Handedness Scale), Sazabo et al.
(2001) compared the amygdalar and hippocampal volume ratios between right- and
left-handed participants during fMRI. Results showed significant differences for volume
ratios between right- and left-handed participants with the amygdala and hippocampus
volumes significantly larger on the right side than on the left for right-handed
participants, while the left-handed group did not show a significant difference between
right- and left-sided structures. Subsequently, with a sample of 16 males and 16 females
de Gennaro et al. (2004) conducted a TMS study examining the asymmetry of
corticospinal excitability by recording the MEPs of the abductor digiti minimi muscles in
both hands. Before completing the TMS protocol hand preference was measured by a
standard handedness questionnaire with 16 (eight males and eight females) righthanded participants and 16 (eight males and eight females) left-handed participants.
Results indicated that motor thresholds of right-handed participants were lower than
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left-handed participants; specifically, MEP amplitudes of right-handed participants were
significantly greater for the right hand, and left-handed participants showed greater
MEPs for the left hand. Because of the debate of cortical motor activation during
finger/hand movements, Kloppel et al. (2007) examined the impact of hand preference
on neuronal activity in the PMC of 16 right-handed and 16 left-handed participants.
Data from event-related fMRI revealed a relative increase in activity in the dorsal PMC
and right primary sensorimotor cortex in right-handed participants compared to lefthanded participants indicating that handedness is associated with differences in motor
control of movement tasks. Altogether, results indicate that the cortical component of
the motor system is, to an extent, based on hand preference.
More recent research has measured the effect of hand preference according to
reaction time within mental rotation paradigms (Choisdealbha, Brady, & Maguinness,
2011; Takeda, Shimoda, Sato, Ogano, & Kato, 2010), as well as the difference in brain
organization of left and right handed individuals (Grabowska et al., 2012). For example,
in a sample of 16 right-handed males and 15 left-handed males (assessed by the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory) Takeda et al. (2010) used a mental rotation task to
show that right-handed participants responded faster to a right hand picture than a left
hand, whereas no significant difference was seen for left-handed participants suggesting
that this difference depends on a laterality balance of hand motor skills. In addition, a
sample of 52 participants (24 males and 28 females) completed an fMRI experimental
paradigm consisting of a simple (flexion/extension of the index finger) and complex
(sequential opposition of the thumb to the other finger) movement task to examine the
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brain organization of motor control in right- and left-handers (Grabowska et al., 2012).
Results showed that both right- and left-handers’ movements of the preferred hand
activated the contralateral hemisphere, whereas a balanced pattern was found for the
non-preferred hand suggesting that the preferred hand is controlled mainly by the
hemisphere contralateral to that hand.
The aforementioned studies continue to show that handedness alters brain
activation during motor tasks, particularly that the contralateral hemisphere is activated
according to hand preference. However, there were no studies found examining the
changes in the brain when participants are asked to complete a task with their right
hand versus their left hand, which may prove to be an important methodological
paradigm. In order for handedness to not be a confounding factor, only right-handed
individuals will be included.
Movement Experience
Movement experience, or expertise, refers to the ability to maintain a given skill
level under a variety of environmental conditions (see Fairweather, 1999; Fitts & Posner,
1973). Overall, imagery significantly helps performance of both novice and experienced
athletes, but the effects of imagery are stronger with higher competitive athletes or
those with more experience compared to lower level athletes or those with less
experience (Calmels et al., 2004; Cumming & Hall, 2002; Gregg et al., 2005). For
example, in a sample of 150 athletes (78 males and 72 females) of varying experience
levels Cumming & Hall (2002) showed that higher level athletes perceived imagery to be
more relevant to performance and reported using it more frequently compared to
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recreational athletes. This is because experienced athletes tend to have more effective
strategies when inspecting a particular visual display (Adams, 1987), as well as having
more refined knowledge bases and effective utilization of information compared to
novices which alters the neural mechanisms during imagery. Understanding the
relationship between experience and imagery is important whenever measuring
imagery ability.
Researchers have commonly examined the effects of experience on MI by
comparing novice and expert athletes (Milton, Small, & Solodkin, 2004; Milton,
Solodkin, Hlustik, & Small, 2007; Ross, Thach, Ruggieri, Lieber, & Lapresto, 2003) and
performers (Kleber, Birbaumer, Veit, Trevorrow, & Lotze, 2007). Comparisons have
shown differences between novices and expert athletes completing self-report
questionnaires (e.g., McAvinue & Robertson, 2007; Morris et al., 2005) and a variety of
prospective judgments (e.g., Ouchi et al., 2005), as well as mental rotation and motor
simulation paradigms (Frak et al., 2001; Johnson, 2000; Shepard & Metzler, 1971). For
example, during single photon emission computerized tomography Charlot, Tzourio,
Zilbovicius, Mazoyer, & Denis (1992) showed expertise related differences in a mental
scanning paradigm in which significant increases in blood flow were found in the left
temporo-occipital cortex of good visuospatial imagers compared to poor visuospatial
imagers. In addition, in a sample of eight right-handed male professional chess players
and six (four males and two females) amateur chess players activation was found in the
precuneus and cerebellum for professionals, while the premotor and parieto-occipital
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cortices were activated in the amateurs supporting the idea that the cerebellum and
precuneus play a large role in imagery processing judgments.
Modern brain imaging techniques (i.e., PET and fMRI) allow researchers to
identify neural substrates that can be related to motor skill learning and the functional
changes seen during acquisition (e.g., Karni, 1996) and motor sequence learning
(Grafton et al., 1996; Hazeltine, Grafton, & Ivry, 1997; Lafleur et al., 2002; Floyer-Lea &
Matthews, 2005). For example, in a sample of eight right-handed professional violinists
(six males and two females) and eight right-handed amateurs (two males and six
females) Lotze, Scheler, Tan, Braun, and Birbaumer (2003) found less neural activation
in professional violinists compared to amateur violinists during the physical execution
and imagery of a musical task. Similar results were found in pianists demonstrating
decreased activation in the motor cortex (i.e., SMA, PMC, and ipsilateral M1) implying
an economy of effort (i.e., reduced recruitment of motor association areas) for
professional musicians (Haslinger et al., 2004; Hund-Georgiadis, & von Cramon, 1999;
Krings et al., 2000).
Studies have also shown that neural networks activated by the execution of a
movement differ as a function of the level of experience (Lacourse et al., 2005; Milton et
al., 2007; Ross et al., 2003). For example, six male golfers of various handicaps
completed a brain mapping study comparing a golf swing using IVI illustrating an inverse
relationship between brain activity and skill level; decreased activations occurred with
increased skill level, especially in the SMA and cerebellum (Ross et al., 2003). Similar
results were found in 54 participants (19 males and 35 females) completing the MIQ
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(Mean = 22.6, SD = 4.9), the VMIQ (Mean = 94.3, SD = 24.2), and a subsequent
sequential button press task inside a scanner before (novel) and after (skilled) a week of
intensive physical practice (Lacourse et al., 2005). MRI results revealed congruent brain
activations associated with ME and MI in both the novel and skilled phases of learning
(i.e., similar clusters in M1, ventral PMC, primary somatosensory cortex, and SMA).
Although both studies demonstrate congruent activation between novel and skilled
individuals, the novel phase showed more extensive activations compared to the skilled
phase. It was later reported that brain regions activated in novices but not experienced
individuals are involved in motor planning in the initial phases of learning (Milton et al.,
2007).
More recently, Wei and Luo (2010) examined 12 (six males and six females) sport
experts (divers) and 12 (six males and six females) novices during imagery of
professional motor skills and simple motor skills. Functional MRI data indicated that
sport experts revealed a specific, focused cerebral activity pattern found in experiencerelated motor tasks compared to novices, which may indicate that they are able to use a
higher order of motor control during MI. Chang et al. (2011) also completed an fMRI
study comparing the activation maps of 18 elite archers (six males and 12 females) and
18 non-archers (eight males and 10 females) during the mental rehearsal of archery.
Elite archers showed activation in the supplementary motor areas, while non-archers
showed activation in the premotor and supplementary motor areas, inferior frontal
region, basal ganglia, and cerebellum indicating that additional brain areas are activated
when learning an unfamiliar task. These findings indicate a relative economy of effort in
121

the cortical processes of elite individuals requiring less energy to execute which may
account for their enhanced motor performance. Together, these data support
differences between the neural mechanisms activated by novices and experts during
imagery, as a function of the individual movement experience. In order to address this
difference, normal, college-aged female students will be targeted to participate.
Limitations of the Literature
There is a methodological assumption that imagery is generated by the same
mechanisms as those that sub-serve perception, but efforts to measure the actual
formation of vivid and accurate images as well as relate subjective and objective
measures of imagery have produced unfavorable results. Despite cumulative findings
that IA impacts motivational and cognitive functions, as well as the learning and
performance of individuals, one major limitation still exists: the bulk of what we know
about imagery measurement, especially in the sport science literature, rests on various
self-report inventories (i.e., MIQ and VMIQ). This is problematic because the
psychometric validation of imagery has not been measured using objective measures
concurrently while participants are engaged in imagery. This is despite using advanced
technology for other purposes such as investigating the topical changes of brain activity
accompanying VI and MI between good and poor imagers, and determining whether the
vividness of a motor image is associated with the pattern of neural activation in motor
related areas of the brain. If the major purposes of imagery research are to discern why
individuals are using imagery and what they are imaging, it is imperative to use
instruments intended to measure target characteristics (i.e., perspective, imagery
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ability, and vividness) and how this is connected to neural activity. If current
technologies, which enable the observation of neural activity, do not show a consistent
relationship with the concurrent mental simulation of movement, then the concurrent
validity cannot be established and we cannot be confident that self-report
questionnaires actually capture the imagery construct. One way to do this has been to
use neurophysiological measures (i.e., PET and fMRI) to measure brain activity of vivid
and accurate mental images experienced by participants screened for MI ability.
However, research has indicated that it is inappropriate to equate results from
subjective measures to objective measures of IA (e.g., Moreau et al., 2010), and that
imagery ability scores may not correctly classify imagery ability groups (e.g., van der
Meulen et al., 2012). Therefore, the convergent validity between like scales as well as
the discriminant validity between different scales of current self-report imagery
questionnaires (i.e., MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2) should be examined to further validate their
use.
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this research study was twofold: (1) to help extend the present
theories of motor imagery by examining if imagery ability measured subjectively and
objectively converge to indicate that brain activity corresponds to self-report imagery
ability, and (2) to extend the construct validity of two commonly used self-report IA
questionnaires. The present study was devised to examine whether a group of healthy
participants screened as having good or poor imagery abilities recruited comparable or
distinct brain activity during each of three conditions (i.e., KI, IVI, and EVI); brain activity
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was measured while participants were instructed to, and purported to mentally perform
an upper extremity movement. Accordingly, we cross-validated self-report and neural
measures by comparing the BOLD signal using fMRI technology of participants screened
as having good or poor IA using a cluster analysis to classify participants examining
correlations between like scales for convergent validity as well as between different
scales for discriminant validity. To this end, the following research aims will be
addressed:
Research Aim #1: Isolate the common/core neural network that is activated
during motor imagery (in general) in contrast to a control (rest) condition.
H1: There may be a common neural network that is activated by all of the
imagery types to a control condition (i.e., supplementary motor area, premotor cortex,
and primary motor cortex).
Research Aim #2: Isolate differences in neural activation between the three
types of motor imagery (EVI, IVI, and KI).
H1: External visual imagery will elicit greater activity in the ventral visual
stream (ventrolateral occipito temporal cortex, inferior parietal cortex, precuneus,
posterior cingulate, and frontopolar cortex) when compared directly to IVI.
H2: Internal visual imagery will elicit greater activity in the dorsal visual
stream (inferior parietal and somatosensory cortex) when directly compared to EVI.
H3: Both visual imagery conditions will elicit greater activity in the
posterior lateral premotor cortex, occipital activations (primary visual cortex, secondary
visual cortex, and associative visual cortex), superior parietal regions (somatosensory
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cortex, PMC, and SMA), and posterior inferior parietal lobe when compared to the KI
condition.
H4: Kinesthetic imagery will elicit greater activity in the superior lateral
premotor cortex, anterior and posterior parts of the SMA, lateral and anterior parts of
the inferior parietal lobe, frontal areas (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, ventral anterior
cingulate cortex, inferior frontal areas (pars opercularis), basal ganglia (putamen and
caudate nucleus)), and cerebellum when compared to the VI conditions.
Research Aim #3: Explore the biological validity of the MIQ-3, determining if
participants classified as having good versus poor imagery ability, using a self-report
measure, can be differentiated based on the BOLD signal while engaged in imagery.
H1: During IVI, participants classified as having good IVI imagery ability
will show more activity (increased intensity) in the dorsal visual stream (inferior parietal
and somatosensory cortex), as well as the posterior lateral premotor cortex, occipital
activations (primary visual cortex, secondary visual cortex, and associative visual cortex),
superior parietal regions (somatosensory cortex, PMC, and SMA), and posterior inferior
parietal lobe when compared to those classified as having poor IVI ability.
H2: During EVI, participants classified as having good EVI imagery ability
will show more activity (increased intensity) in the ventral visual stream (ventrolateral
occipito temporal cortex, inferior parietal cortex, precuneus, posterior cingulate, and
frontopolar cortex), as well as the posterior lateral premotor cortex, occipital activations
(primary visual cortex, secondary visual cortex, and associative visual cortex), superior
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parietal regions (somatosensory cortex, PMC, and SMA), and posterior inferior parietal
lobe compared to those classified as having poor EVI ability.
H3: During KI, participants classified as having good KI imagery ability will
show more activation (increased intensity) in the superior lateral premotor cortex,
anterior and posterior parts of the SMA, lateral and anterior parts of the inferior parietal
lobe, frontal areas (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, ventral anterior cingulate cortex,
inferior frontal areas (pars opercularis), basal ganglia (putamen and caudate nucleus)),
and cerebellum compared to those classified as having poor KI ability.
Research Aim #4: Examine the convergent validity between like scales (EVI, IVI,
and KI) of the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2.
H1: There will be significant moderate to high (r ≥ 0.50) positive
correlations between like subscales of the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2.
H2: There will be lower correlations between unlike subscales of the MIQ3 and VMIQ-2.
H3: The VMIQ-2 subscale scores and BOLD signals of good and poor
imagers grouped by MIQ-3 scores will be significantly different.
Data from the present study illustrated the “real-time” imagery experience of
participants, and also provided data to validate that participants were actually engaging
in the indicated imagery condition while completing a task from a self-report imagery
ability questionnaire affirming the practicality of questionnaire-based imagery
assessments.
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CHAPTER 2: JOURNAL ARTICLE 1
BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR INTRA-INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN MOVEMENT IMAGERY ABILITIES1
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Seiler, B. S., Monsma, E., & Newman-Norlund, R. To be submitted to Journal of Sport and Exercise
Psychology.
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Imagery research remains a prominent topic as theoretical models such as the
Applied Model of Mental Imagery (Martin, Moritz & Hall, 1999), PETTLEP (Holmes &
Collins, 2001) and MIIMS (Guillot & Collet, 2008) are serving the movement sciences
with an ultimate goal of discovering precise imagery prescriptions in sport, dance,
exercise and rehabilitation contexts. The effectiveness of using imagery as a
performance enhancing strategy depends upon one’s capacity to generate images.
Images are reformed or constructed anew from information stored in long-term
memory and can include emotive properties along with those that are motor. Motor
imagery (MI) involves deliberate cognitive simulation or rehearsal of an action without
engaging in overt physical movements (Moran et al., 2012; Olsson & Nyberg, 2010).
Studies have shown MI is an ability that improves with practice (e.g., Goss, Hall, Buckolz
& Fishburne, 1986), and according to Paivio (1985) it is a function of experience
interacting with genetic (biological) variability. That is, efficiency in recruiting neural
networks (i.e., when more than one area/region is consistently activated) during
imagery translates to perceived ease, vividness and/or controllability of generating
images or, imagery ability. Studies affirm that imagery abilities are not universal across
individuals. Rather, an individual may have varying capacities to generate images
depending on imagery mode (Goss et al., 1986; Guillot, Collet, Nguyen, Malouin,
Richards & Doyon, 2009) and/or perspective (Williams, Cumming, Ntoumanis, NordinBates, Ramsey & Hall, 2012).
Visual (e.g., what an individual sees) and kinesthetic (i.e., sensation of what an
image feels like) are the two most common sensory modes used for generating images.
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When visual images are generated, they are either seen from the first-person
perspective (i.e., image viewed through one’s own eyes) or the third-person perspective
(i.e., image viewed from an observer’s standpoint, such as on a video or as part of the
audience) (Callow et al., 2013). In both the behavioral and neural sciences, these
imagery modes and perspectives are typically assessed using the Movement Imagery
Questionnaire (MIQ: Hall, Pongrac, & Buckholz, 1985), now in its second revision (MIQ3: Williams et al., 2012) or the Vividness of Imagery Ability Questionnaire (VMIQ: Isaac,
Marks, & Russell, 1986) also revised (VMIQ-2: Roberts, Callow, Hardy, Markland, &
Bringer, 2008). Both instruments measure visual (VI) and kinesthetic imagery (KI)
abilities and the modifications include separation of the visual scale into internal (IVI)
and external (EVI) perspectives. Internal validity of these constructs accumulated over
time and iterations. For example, Hall and Martin (1997) reduced the number of
movements from nine to four (i.e., items) and inversed the scale so that higher scores
represented better abilities. This is in contrast to the VMIQ-2 which is comprised of 12
movements and higher scores are anchored as poorer vividness and clarity. Notably,
and aligned with Richardson’s (1995) assertions of gender differences in imagery ability,
Monsma et al. (2009) demonstrated through traditional confirmatory factor analysis
that the visual and kinesthetic model fit better for females than males. This was not the
case in the recent Multitrait-Multimethod (MTMM) analyses of the MIQ-3 which
accounts for the common variance related to applying the same four movements when
assessing each imagery ability; gender invariance of the three constructs was
demonstrated using this method (Williams et al., 2012).
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With evolutionary technology, imagery researchers are actualizing Paivio’s idea
that there is a biological basis to inter- and intra-individual differences in imagery
abilities. Mental chronometric (see Guillot & Collet, 2005) and neurological studies (see
Guillot et al., 2008; 2009) have long supported the congruence, or theoretically the
functional equivalence (Homes & Collins, 2001) between physical movement and MI of
that movement, but recently researchers have embarked on validating MI ability
assessments with neurological data (Guillot et al., 2008; 2009; Jiang et al., in press). This
line of research is particularly relevant because a central tenet of theoretical models,
such as Martin, Moritz & Hall’s (1999) Applied Model of Mental Imagery, is that
individuals having greater capacities to generate MI will experience greater learning and
performance-related benefits; imagery ability mediates and moderates the relationship
between what is imaged and the intended learning, performance or rehabilitation
outcomes. Accordingly, Cumming and Williams’ (2013) recently introduced the Revised
Applied Model of Deliberate Imagery Use for Sport, Dance, Exercise and Rehabilitation.
A seminal extension of the model was inclusion of personally meaningful reasons for
using various types of imagery while maintaining the importance of imagery ability as
originally proposed by Martin et al. (1999). Interestingly, the revised model explains that
imagery characteristics such as mode and perspective are influenced by imagery ability.
This is counter to sport and neuroscience conceptualizations and particularly
assessments of imagery indicating intra-individual differences in the measured
characteristics, like VI and KI modes or internal (IVI) and external (EVI) perspectives. If
these imagery characteristics are represented on imagery ability scales and are each
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distinguishable by neural network activity, then mode and perspective distinctions are
imagery abilities in and of themselves. This is of course demonstrated through intraindividual differences in MIQ scores particularly in intervention studies where
participants are screened into one of four groups based on reporting 1) good visual and
poor kinesthetic and albeit unusually, even 2) poor visual and good kinesthetic abilities
in addition to those reporting 3) good and 4) poor scores for both scales (Abma, Fry, Li &
Relyea, 2002; Goss et al., 1986). Moreover, through imagery intervention Rogers, Hall,
and Barr (1991) demonstrated imagery abilities improve with practice.
In addition to the psychometric and behavioral evidence supporting intraindividual differences in imagery abilities, interestingly, neuroscience studies have
actually driven mode and perspective distinctions of the MIQ-3 (see Williams et al.,
2012), but studies have not yet examined the biological validity of this popular
instrument directly. Within the neurological paradigm, fMRI technology measures the
blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal in specific brain areas during real-time
imagery enabling the isolation of areas, within areas representing neural networks that
are active and associated with the instructions to use a specified imagery ability (i.e., KI,
IVI, or EVI). Using the cognitive subtraction method (Peterson et al., 1989), which
involves comparing two conditions that are presumed to differ in in only one discrete
feature, enables isolation of peak activation areas while participants are engaged in
imagery, thus, biologically representing imagery ability. Neurological explanations are
important to advance models driving the sport science literature. Simulation theory for
examples predicts an overlap of brain activity for physically performing and imagining
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the same movement (Jeannerod, 2001). Therefore, if brain activity is mapped as
different in location and intensity when mode or perspectives are compared while
participants are instructed and purport to be using a particular imagery ability, not only
is this biological evidence of construct validity but also representative of intra-individual
differences in imagery abilities.
Initial fMRI investigations demonstrated real-time visual and kinesthetic imagery
recruit some common (e.g., connection from the superior parietal lobule to the SMA)
but also different neural substrates in finger (Binkofski et al., 2000) and hand (Solodkin
et al., 2004) movement tasks where VI is represented by peak activity in visual areas
such as areas between the occipital cortex and parietal lobule (posterior intraparietal
sulcus) and KI by activity in motor-related areas which are more anterior. Although
these pioneering studies elucidated neural networks involved during visual and
kinesthetic imagery, there were important methodological limitations including: 1)
participants were not screened as having superior imagery abilities, 2) manipulation
checks to control the quality of imagery during data collection were overlooked
(Binkofski et al., 2000; Solodkin et al., 2004) and 3) a cross sectional design was used
where participants were either assigned to a visual or kinesthetic imagery group
(Solodkin et al., 2004), precluding intra-individual comparisons.
To address these limitations, Guillot et al. (2009) devised a global imagery score
inclusive of an aggregated MIQ-3 score, mental chronometry and a physiological
measure (i.e., skin resistance) to screen good imagery ability participants into their
study. They also used a within subjects design where visual neural activity was
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compared to kinesthetic activity in the same participants in addition to comparing
activity while physically performing the imaged task. Among these good imagery ability
participants, neural network activations for imagined compared to physically performed
movements were similar, further supporting the functional equivalence theory.
Moreover, when visual and kinesthetic neural networks were compared, results
indicated divergent networks; VI activated occipital areas and the superior parietal
lobules while motor cortex and inferior parietal lobules were activated during KI. This
ground breaking biological evidence for intra-individual variability in neural networks
associated with two different imagery modes led researchers to question whether other
imagery abilities could be further differentiated.
Jiang et al. (in press) recently extended the external validity of KI and VI inferred
through imagery during a finger tapping task by asking participants to image one of the
VMIQ-2 gross motor movements that was involved in screening for good imagery ability
participants. Using fMRI to identify and distinguish neural networks used during imagery
modes and perspectives (KI, IVI, and EVI), results indicated that each imagery ability
involved independent processes making them distinguishable from each other.
Specifically, KI activated a large amount of subcortical areas in the cerebellum and areas
in the inferior frontal cortex, IVI activated more of the parietal lobule, and interestingly,
EVI activated the temporal cortex. While most of the results accurately mapped
respective brain areas expected to be associated with kinesthetic and visual imagery
abilities, the temporal cortex activity during EVI was irrelevant to MI and likely
associated with perceiving the spatial elements off the instruction screen.
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A common limitation of both these latter studies is the type of movement
imagined during fMRI scanning. While finger tapping was ecologically valid (i.e., the
movement could be done while inside the scanner) it lacks relevance to gross motor
tasks which were the basis of the imagery screening tool and are more relevant to sport
settings. In contrast, although the imagery task chosen in the Jiang et al. (in press) study
was directly part of the imagery ability screening instrument, the temporal distance
between experiencing the VMIQ-2 movements in general, may have also confounded
the findings. Additionally, because visual and kinesthetic scores were aggregated, it is
unknown whether those with better abilities in one mode over another had more
efficient neural networks when engaged in imagery and physical practice of a finger
tapping task. Despite the accumulating biological evidence supporting within subject
neural network differences for imagery modes (Guillot et al., 2009; 1998; Solodkin et al.,
2004) and perspectives (Jackson et al., 2006; Kosslyn et al., 2001; Thompson & Kosslyn,
2000), studies have yet to examine intra-individual differences in neural networks
involved in imagining any of the MIQ movements while using KI, IVI, and EVI MI abilities.
The purpose of this study was to examine the construct validity of the MIQ-3. To
this end, we first considered the relationships between the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2 scales. It
was hypothesized that similar imagery ability scales would be related but not indicative
of multicolinearity (i.e., r > .90), and that relationships between other paired imagery
ability scales would be lower than those that are alike. In addition, we examined the
construct validity of the MIQ-3 through fMRI by comparing the neural activity with
specific imagery abilities (i.e., KI, IVI, and EVI) while engaged in a selected MIQ-3
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movement. Consistent with functional equivalence of neural networks and previous
research (Binkofski et al., 2000; Guillot et al., 2008, 2009; Jiang et al., in press; Solodkin
et al., 2004) we expected KI to activate motor-related areas, IVI to activate the parietal
lobule, and EVI to activate occipital areas and the temporal lobe. Next, applying the
tenets of simulation theory (Jeannerod, 2001) our second aim was to isolate the
common neural network across all imagery abilities while engaged in a selected MIQ-3
movement. Consistent with previous literature (e.g., Guillot et al., 2009; Halpern &
Zatorre, 1999; Jiang et al., in press; Munzert, Zentgraf, Stark, & Vaitl, 2008; Sharma,
Jones, Carpenter, & Baron, 2008), it was hypothesized that the SMA, PMC, and M1
would be more active during imagery than at rest. Intra-individual differences in neural
activation during KI, IVI, and EVI were then considered. It was hypothesized that: (1) KI
would elicit greater activity in the motor-related neural pathways (i.e., premotor cortex,
SMA, inferior parietal lobule, frontal areas) and subcortical areas) when compared to VI,
(2) IVI would elicit greater activity in the dorsal visual stream compared to EVI, (3) EVI
would elicit greater brain activity in the ventral visual stream compared to IVI, and (4)
both EVI and IVI would elicit greater activity in the visual neural pathways (i.e., premotor
cortex, occipital cortices, superior parietal areas, and inferior parietal lobule) when
compared to KI.
Method
Participants
From an initial screening of 206 participants, 18 healthy, female participants
between 18 and 30 years of age (Mean age = 23.72 ± 2.42), screened as having good
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imagery abilities were selected for the study. Participants were 15 non-Hispanic White
Americans, one Black/African American, one Hispanic/Hispanic American, and one
Asian/Asian American. Their highest education level was high school diploma (n = 5),
undergraduate degree (n = 10), and master’s degree (n = 3). Participants’ sport history
varied (e.g., basketball, soccer, gymnastics, lacrosse, and rugby), while two participants
did not report any. All participants were screened as right-handed (Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (EHI) Mean = 94.17 ± 9.26), had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, self-reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders and were not
taking any medications.
Imagery Assessments
Movement Imagery Questionnaire-3 (MIQ-3: Williams et al., 2011). The 12-item
MIQ-3 measures the self-reported ease or difficulty of generating images of four
separate movements (arm rotation, jump, knee lift and toe touch) each along three
scales: kinesthetic imagery (KI), internal visual imagery (IVI) and external visual imagery
(EVI). Item completion involves physically performing each movement, imagining
oneself performing the movement, then rating the ease or difficulty of imaging each
movement on a 7-point Likert-scale where 1 = very hard to see/feel and 7 = very easy to
see/feel. Subscale scores for the MIQ-3 range from 4-28 where higher scores represent
better imagery ability. The MIQ-3 displays adequate internal consistency (α > 0.69) and
concurrent validity with the VMIQ-2 (Williams et al., 2011). In the present study (n =
206), alpha coefficients were: KI = 0.87, IVI = 0.83, and EVI = 0.88 with moderate inter-
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scale correlations (KI versus EVI: r = 0.36; KI versus IVI: r = 0.52 and EVI versus IVI: r =
0.56, p < 0.01).
Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire-2 (VMIQ-2: Roberts et al., 2008).
The VMIQ-2 assesses self-reported imagery vividness (i.e., clarity and realism) and is
comprised of 12 motor tasks (e.g., walking, running, jumping sideways) for each of the
three subscales: KI, EVI, and IVI. Participants record a score based on the clarity
associated with representing each movement mentally using a 5-point Likert-scale from
1 (perfectly clear and vivid) to 5 (no image at all, you only know that you are “thinking”
of the skill). In the present study, the VMIQ-2 scale was inversed to be consistent with
the MIQ-3 where lower scores represented poor imagery ability and higher scores
represented good imagery ability; subscales range from 12-60. Consistent with previous
research (Williams et al., 2011, 2012) the internal consistencies of the VMIQ-2 scales in
the present study were: KI = 0.95; IVI = 0.94 and EVI = 0.94. Inter-scale correlations were
also moderate (KI versus EVI: r = 0.39; KI versus IVI: r = 0.56 and EVI versus IVI: r = 0.65).
Manipulation Check. To assess the extent participants followed the study
protocol, participants completed a post-experiment debriefing questionnaire where
they were asked to rate the extent they were able to focus on each imagery perspective
or modality during the scan, whether they switched between imagery perspectives or
imagery modalities, and the extent they were able to focus on the MIQ-3 protocol (i.e.,
arm movement) on a 10-point scale (1 = not at all to 10 = greatly).
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Mental Chronometry
Based on the premise that imagery is under voluntary control (Sharma et al.,
2008), mental chronometry was used as a manipulation check for temporal congruence
between physical movement and imagery of that movement. Consistent with previous
work (Collet et al., 2011; Malouin et al., 2008), participants were asked to physically
perform and imagine the arm rotation task (Figure 2.1) along each of the MIQ-3 imagery
abilities repeatedly for 30 seconds at a personally comfortable cadence. Participants
followed audible prompts on a computer screen to begin and end each trial. The
number of MIQ-3 arm rotation movements physically performed over 30 seconds was
recorded followed by recording the number of KI, IVI and EVI self-reported repetitions
performed while in an fMRI simulation scanner. Physical and imaged repetitions of the
MIQ-3 arm rotation protocol were averaged across the three trials.
Electromyography (EMG)
Aligned with previous recommendations (Guillot et al., 2009) to record muscular
inactivity during MI to control for brain activation caused by actual muscle contractions,
muscle activity was recorded using surface sensors to collect raw EMG signals during the
MIQ-3 arm movement protocol for each condition (e.g., physical, KI, IVI, and EVI) during
the fMRI simulation. This ensures that the pattern of brain activity found through fMRI
is independent of activity caused by muscle activity. Two EMG sensors with a
transmission range of 20 meters (Trigno Wireless EMG System) were placed on the
pectoralis major and anterior portion or the deltoideus muscle of the non-dominant
hand (left), and adhered to the skin by adhesive interfaces (Delsys, Inc.). These
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placement locations were chosen because they were the primary movers of the arm
rotation task (Figure 2.2). Participants were instructed not to put on any lotions/oils to
improve skin/sensor contact. The root mean squared value of the EMG signals
(EMGrms) was calculated for each 30 second trial. The mean values for each movement
was calculated over three trials of the duration for each condition. Each trial was
separated from the next by a rest period (lasting 30 seconds) in order for any muscle
activation to cease, and participants to mentally rest.
Procedure
Pre-Screening. After securing Institutional Review Board approval, participation
was solicited electronically and by posting calls throughout the university and
surrounding campus area. Participation was initiated by visiting a SurveyMonkey
website on the solicitation to complete the background questionnaire that screened for
conditions unsafe and contraindicative to fMRI scanning (e.g., severe claustrophobia,
fracture repaired with metal, history of cancer).
At the initial session, participants with qualifying backgrounds and deemed fMRI
safe completed the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2 which were distributed in a random order to
control for order effect. The MIQ-3 scores were used to screen for good imagery ability.
The criteria was established through a cluster analysis of the total (n = 206) sample with
scores of six or seven for each item classified good imagers. Twenty-eight participants
met these criteria. Participants who did not qualify for the fMRI experiment were
thanked for their time and did not proceed further in the study. Then, using Microsoft
Excel, a random sample of 20 was generated for the fMRI data collection.
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fMRI Simulation. To ensure high-quality fMRI data, participants were educated
about the fMRI process using a mock fMRI scanner that closely matched the conditions
of actual scanning. At this mock session, the meaning of the MIQ-3 conditions were
explained, fMRI safety issues were discussed using the fMRI participant screening
document from the brain imaging center, and the participant practiced the MIQ-3
protocol in a realistic facsimile fMRI scanner. As part of the protocol, mental
chronometric and EMG measurements were collected both outside (standing and
physical completing the task) and inside (lying supine imagining the task) the mock fMRI
scanner while scanner sound effects were playing. Specifically, participants went
through a mock localizer (Siemens_Loacalizer), anatomical scan (Siemens_MPRAGE),
and functional scan (Siemens_EPI); all with the sound effects on. The purpose of the
fMRI simulation session was for participants to become comfortable with the audible
prompts, presentation stimuli, task, and familiar with the scanning procedure. At the
conclusion of this session, participants were scheduled for their fMRI scanning session.
Functional Imaging. Within two weeks, the participants attended the scanning
session. Functional MRI was performed using a 3T Magneton Trio system (Siemens,
Erlanger, Germany) fitted with a 12-channel head coil located at the McCausland Center
for Brain Imaging, University of South Carolina at Palmetto Richland Memorial Hospital.
Participants were supine on the table with their head immobilized using pillows and
foam pads. The MRI scanlasted approximately 45 minutes and included: (1) one 21second localizer (scout) to localize functional axial slices, (2) one 6-minute and 17
second high-resolution anatomical scan [sagittal T1-weight; repetition time: 2250 ms
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echo time 4.15 ms; one slab divided into 192 slices; slice thickness: 1 mm; flip angle: 9
degrees; field of view: 256 x 256 mm2; voxel size: 1 x 1 x 1 mm3; bandwidth 150 Hz per
voxel; echo spacing: 9.4 ms], (3) three 10-minute and 51 second functional runs
[ascending, interleaved, transversal; repetition time: 1550 ms; echo time: 34.0 ms; 42
slices; slice thickness: 3.00 mm; flip angle: 71 degrees; field of view: 216 x 216 mm2;
voxel size: 3 x 3 x 3 mm3; BOLD threshold: 4.00; bandwidth: 1984 Hz per voxel; echo
spacing: 0.59 ms], (4) and one 6-minute and 10 second T2-weight resting state scan
[descending, interleaved, transversal; repetition time: 1850 ms; echo time: 30 ms; 34
slices; slice thickness: 3.00 mm; flip angle: 75 degrees; field of view: 208 x 208 mm2;
voxel size: 3 x 3 x 3 mm3; BOLD threshold: 4.00; bandwidth: 2004 Hz per voxel; echo
spacing: 0.58 ms]. These scans were administered in the aforementioned order for all
participants.
Conditions and Stimuli. The same arm rotation task from the MIQ-3 was used as
the imagery stimulus because of its simplicity allowing subjects to control and
reproduce the task. This task involved participants slowly extending their non-dominant
hand straight out to their side so that it is parallel to the ground, palm down. They then
moved their arm forward until it was directly in front of their body (still parallel to the
ground). Experimental conditions included KI, IVI, and EVI, as well as a control condition
that involved viewing a fixation cross. There were three scanning sessions with six
repetitions for each experimental condition, resulting in 18 trials for each experimental
condition.
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The experimental conditions (i.e., FEELING, INTERNAL Perspective, EXTERNAL
Perspective, and REST) were presented in pseudorandomized order (counterbalanced
for condition) using Presentation software (NeuroBehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley,
CA). All stimuli were projected onto a screen positioned behind the fMRI scanner that
was seen by the participants through a mirror mounted onto the head coil. Each
participant completed three functional scanning runs with a duration of ten minutes and
thirty seconds each. Within each run, each participant completed 6 trials in each
experimental condition. Each trial lasted twenty-three seconds and consisted of: i) an
auditory cue indicating the participant should open their eyes, ii) a visual prompt to
inform the participant of the imagery condition (3 seconds) and iii) a blank screen which
was presented while the participants engaged in imagery (20 seconds). All participants
were instructed to close their eyes after reading the imagery condition and to keep
them closed for the duration of subsequent motor imagery. All control (rest) conditions
required the participant to stare at a fixation cross in the middle of the screen.
Individual trials were separated by a pseudo-randomly chosen temporal jitter of 150,
250, 350 or 450 milliseconds. Following the scanning session, participants completed a
post-experiment debriefing questionnaire.
Data Analysis. All data was pre-processed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
software (SPM8, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London). Initially, motion
correction in the functional images was completed using SPM realignment. This
estimates six rigid-body transformation parameters for each image by finding the
parameters that minimize the mean squared difference between it and a reference
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image. The structural T1-weighted scan was used as the reference image for each
subject. This image was co-registered to the mean functional image. The functional and
anatomical images were normalized to MNI space using trilinear interpolation method.
The scans were smoothed using a Gaussian kernel set at 8 mm full width at halfmaximum.
Statistical analyses were completed using a general linear model with separate
model regressors for each task condition to describe the data through experimental
effects. Six regressors were used (x, y, z, yaw, pitch, and roll). One sample t-tests were
used to contrast the following experimental conditions: aggregated imagery conditions
(KI, IVI, and EVI) minus rest, KI minus rest, IVI minus rest, EVI minus rest, KI minus IVI, KI
minus EVI, IVI minus KI, IVI minus EVI, EVI minus IVI, and EVI minus KI. We also
calculated the inverse contrasts of IVI minus EVI, KI minus EVI, and KI minus IVI.
Comparisons of the functional data were assessed at the p < 0.001, uncorrected level.
Activated clusters were considered significant if their spatial extent threshold was
greater than 3 voxels. The results are presented at the cluster level (k) and peak t-value
(local peak activation amplitude), with the associated MNI coordinates (See Figure 2.3
for Chronological Order of Experiment)
Results
Imagery Background
Frequency statistics were computed for the questions on mental imagery
background. Approximately 77.8% (n = 14) of the participants indicated that they knew
what mental imagery is. From these participants, most defined imagery as imagining or
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visualizing a task, object or performance in their mind without moving. Additionally,
61.1% (n = 11) indicated that they had previously used mental imagery for performance
enhancement specifically in sport, dance or injury rehabilitation.
Mental Chronometry
Participants physically completed an average of 7.44 ± 2.38 (Min = 4.00, Max =
12.67) full arm rotation repetitions in 30 seconds across the three subscales. By scale
the averages were: KI = 7.04 ± 2.36, IVI = 7.59 ± 2.76 and EVI = 7.30 ± 2.64. The
minimum and maximum scores were: KI: 3.67 and 13.00; IVI: 4.33 and 14.67; and EVI:
4.00 and 13.33.
EMG Activity during fMRI Simulation
When considering raw EMG activity of the pectoralis major muscle and the
anterior portion of the deltoideus muscle, separate repeated-measure ANOVAs for each
condition was not significant; therefore, the mean value was used for subsequent
analyses. In addition, separate EMGrms comparisons between the imagery conditions
showed no significant muscle activity for either muscle (p > 0.05) (Table 2.1).
Accordingly, EMG activity was not used as a regressor in the analysis of fMRI data.
Movement Imagery Questionnaires
The overall mean score for the MIQ-3 was 81.17 ± 2.41 (Range = 76-84) and for
each scale: KI = 27.28 ± 0.89 (Min = 25, Max = 28), IVI = 27.17 ± 0.86 (Min = 25, Max =
28), and EVI = 26.72 ± 1.45 (Min = 24, Max = 28). MIQ-3 intra-scale correlations using
Spearman’s rho for the MIQ-3 ranged between 0.40 and 0.48, indicating scales were
related but not multi-collinear (r > 0.90).
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The overall mean score for the VMIQ-2 was 161.72 ± 15.61, Range = 129-180)
and for each scale: 55.00 ± 5.26 for KI, 51.89 ± 8.37 for IVI, and 54.83 ± 5.78 for EVI. The
minimal and maximal scores were 44 and 60, 32 and 60, and 41 and 60, KI, IVI, and EVI,
respectively. VMIQ-2 intra-scale correlations using Spearman’s rho were between 0.41
and 0.70. Inter-scale correlations between the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2 ranged from 0.540.65. See Table 2.2 for descriptive statistics and inter-scale correlations between the
MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2.
fMRI Results
Of the 18 participants, 50% of the participants had previously undergone an MRI
(n = 9) (e.g., knee, shoulder, ankle), but not necessarily of their brain. The debriefing
questionnaire showed that one participant self-reported switching between imagery
perspective and modality during the brain-imaging task (with a score less than five). As a
result, their data was removed from further analysis. Based on a Likert-scale (1 = not at
all to 10 = greatly) the debriefing questionnaire indicated that participants, on average,
were able to focus on each imagery perspective (Mean = 7.22 ± 1.26) and each imagery
modality (Mean = 7.33 ±1.65) during the scanning session.
Imagery Conditions Compared to Control (Rest) Condition
When all imagery conditions (aggregate of KI, IVI, and EVI) were compared to
rest significant activation was found bilaterally in the middle frontal gyrus, frontal
rolandic operculum, inferior temporal gyrus, superior and inferior parietal lobule, and
precentral gyrus. Additionally, significant activation was found in the frontal cortex (i.e.,
left superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal orbicularis, and inferior frontal triangularis),
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temporal cortex (i.e., left temporal rolandic operculum and superior temporal pole), and
various subcortical areas (i.e., right cerebellum (Lobule VI and Crus I), and left insula and
hippocampus). Lastly, the right inferior occipital gyrus was the only visual area activated
when all imagery conditions were compared to rest (Table 2.3).
Examination of individual comparisons confirmed a number of our predictions. KI
elicited activations in the inferior parietal lobule (bilaterally), frontal areas (i.e., bilateral
inferior frontal orbicularis, left middle frontal gyrus, and right inferior frontal
opercularis), left putamen, and right cerebellum (Crus I). There were also activations
bilaterally in the middle and inferior temporal gyri and calcarine, left thalamus and SMA,
and right insula and postcentral gyrus (Table 2.3).
IVI elicited activations similar to KI, but also recruited sites in the bilateral
inferior frontal orbicularis and middle temporal gyrus, right inferior frontal opercularis,
superior temporal gyrus, postcentral gyrus, insula and cerebellum (Lobule VI), and the
left inferior temporal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, SMA, inferior frontal triangularis,
middle frontal orbicularis, superior temporal gyrus, temporal rolandic operculum,
superior temporal pole and insula. Expected activations were also found in the superior
parietal areas (i.e., bilateral superior parietal lobule and left precenetral gyrus) (Table
2.4).
As predicted, EVI recruited sites in the occipital cortex (i.e., right inferior occipital
gyrus and let middle occipital gyrus), superior parietal areas (i.e., bilateral precentral
gyrus, left SMA, right superior parietal gyrus, and right postcentral gyrus), and the
inferior parietal lobe bilaterally. Significant activations were also found bilaterally in the
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inferior frontal orbicularis, middle frontal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, the left inferior
frontal triangularis, middle frontal orbicularis and putamen, and the right inferior frontal
opercularis, superior temporal gyrus, superior temporal pole, supramarginal gyrus,
cerebellum (Lobule VI) and insula (Table 2.4).
Contrasts across Imagery Conditions
When IVI was subtracted from KI, motor-related areas with significant
activations were found in the left superior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, SMA
and hippocampus, and the right caudate nucleus and cerebellum (Lobule VIIb and
Lobule VIII). Although the contrast of EVI subtracted from KI showed less activations,
there were still significant activations in the right SMA and thalamus as well as the
vermis (III). Neither contrast showed peak activations in occipital areas, consistent with
KI activating more motor-related areas (Table 2.5).
When KI was subtracted from IVI, no significant activations were present. In
addition, when EVI was subtracted from IVI, the only significantly activated brain area
was in the right SMA (Table 2.6).
When IVI was subtracted from EVI, the only area significantly activated relating
to the expected ventral visual stream was the left inferior parietal lobule. However,
when KI was subtracted from EVI peak activations were found bilaterally in the
precentral gyrus. Significant activation sites were also found in the frontal cortex (i.e.,
right middle frontal gyrus), temporal cortex (i.e., right superior and inferior temporal
gyrus, and left middle temporal gyrus), parietal cortex (i.e., right inferior parietal lobule
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and supramarginal gyrus, and left postcentral gyrus), and the right paracentral lobule
(Table 2.7).
Discussion
This was the first study to consider neural network activity differences across
imagery abilities while participants purported to be using each of their three MI abilities
measured by the MIQ-3, one of the most common instruments used in both behavioral
and neural facets of sport sciences. As movement imagery ability continues to be a
central mediator, or moderator in at least three prominent theoretical models driving
sport science research, instrument validation remains essential for enhancing
generalizability of proposed model relationships.
In order to determine common activity across all conditions, the rest condition
was subtracted from all of the conditions (KI, IVI, and EVI). There was an overall
common neural network comprised of the bilateral inferior frontal orbicularis and
middle temporal gyrus, right inferior frontal opercularis, superior temporal gyrus and
postcentral gyrus, and the left SMA, which is not consistent with previous research
(Jiang et al., in press; Guillot et al., 2008, 2009). Even when all imagery conditions (KI,
IVI, and EVI) were compared to the rest condition our results only suggest similar
activation sites that were found previously in the superior and inferior parietal lobules,
precentral gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, occipital gyrus, and cerebellum (Lobule VI and
Crus I). However, consistent with Jiang et al. (in press), who were the first to examine
real-time imagery of a VMIQ-2 movement among those screened by the respective
instrument and Guillot et al. (2008, 2009), active networks during KI compared to VI
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included the superior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, SMA, cerebellum, and
caudate nucleus. In addition, when overall VI was compared to KI there was significant
activity in the expected superior parietal areas (i.e., precentral and postcentral gyri, and
paracentral lobule) and the inferior parietal lobule, which was all produced by EVI; in
contrast, occipital (e.g., primary, secondary and associative visual cortexes) activations
were not significant for neither VI ability in our study. These findings may be attributed
to the MIQ-3 protocol involving simple, temporally recent motor performance
compared to having the participants imagine a past experience with the movement as
with VMIQ-2 instructions, or that the participants were only thinking about, not
genuinely imagining the movement.
In contrast, considering the difference between rest and activity during each
condition separately we subtracted each imagery ability from rest. When rest was
subtracted from KI our results were consistent with the previous study by Guillot et al.
(2009) showing peak activation in frontal and parietal lobules (specifically the inferior
parietal lobule), subcortical areas (i.e., cerebellum and putamen). However, we also
received additional activation in the insula associated with motor planning, and the
temporal and occipital cortices which have not been found to be associated with KI.
When comparing the visual perspectives to the rest condition, similar results were
found during both IVI and EVI with significant activations in the precentral gyrus, SMA,
and inferior and superior parietal lobules as in previous studies that considered gross
motor movements (Jiang et al., in press) or simple motor tasks (Gerardin et al., 2000;
Guillot et al., 2008, 2009; Lafleur et al, 2003; Stephan et al., 1995). IVI and EVI also
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activated areas associated with working memory and memory retrieval (i.e., inferior and
middle frontal gyri) (Leung, Gore, & Goldman-Rakic, 2002; Pochon et al., 2002; Rama et
al., 2001; Ranganath, Johnson, & D’Esposito, 2003, Sun et al., 2005; Zhang, Leung, &
Johnson, 2003), motor planning (i.e., insula and supramarginal gyrus) (Beurze, de Lange,
Toni, & Medendorp, 2007; Meister et al., 2007), visual mental imagery (i.e., inferior and
middle occipital gyri) (Platel et al., 1997), and voluntary hand movement (i.e.,
postcentral gyrus) (Bernard, et al., 2002). These data provide evidence that these areas
are likely to be involved with updating information in working memory to accurately
plan for the motor movement and the actual visual mental imagery of the MIQ-3 arm
rotation task.
The visual imagery perspectives (IVI and EVI) were also compared to the rest
condition. For IVI, peak activation found in the precentral gyrus, SMA, and inferior and
superior parietal lobules are consistent with recent studies by Guillot et al. (2008) and
Jiang et al. (in press). Our results also showed peak activations in the inferior frontal
areas, middle and superior temporal gyri and subcortical areas, possibly reflecting
participants using brain areas for motor planning (Beurze, de Lange, Toni, &
Medendorp, 2007) and motor preparation (Alexander & Crutcher, 1990); however,
increased activity in the temporal cortex has not been found to be related to either IVI
or EVI. Furthermore, compared to IVI, EVI revealed an increased amount of activity in
the middle and inferior occipital gyri. Increased occipital activation during EVI when
compared to the rest condition is likely due to the role of EVI in visuospatial processing
involving a visual representation of the action (Mahoney & Avener, 1977), which has
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been considered a truer form of VI (Hall, Rodgers, & Barr, 1990; Janssen & Sheikh, 1994;
White & Hardy, 1995).
In order to isolate dominant neural areas discriminating each imagery ability, all
possible differences between conditions were examined. When comparing KI with the VI
perspectives, results indicated more activation in subcortical brain areas when EVI was
subtracted from KI, but activations were in the SMA, vermis (III) and thalamus, not the
caudate nucleus, inferior frontal triangularis, or inferior frontal orbicularis as Jiang et al.
(in press) found. However, more activity in the caudate nucleus was found when IVI was
subtracted from KI, as well as peak activity in the superior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal
lobule, hippocampus, and cerebellum (Lobule VIIb and Lobule VIII), while Jiang et al. (in
press) found no peak activations for this contrast. The significant activation of the
superior frontal gyrus when IVI, but not EVI, were subtracted from KI may be related to
the functional involvement of this network in self-awareness and in coordination with
the action of the sensory system (Goldberg, Harel, & Malach, 2006). Although results for
KI compared to the VI perspectives showed increased activity in different areas
compared to recent research (e.g., Jiang et al., in press), these data are consistent with
studies identifying that subcortical brain areas are related to action control (Graybiel,
2000; Schubert, von Cramon, Niendorf, Pollmann, & Bublak, 1998), which correspond
with the timing, force and exactness of reference properties of KI (Denis, 1985).
While IVI minus KI and EVI minus KI showed a large overlap in activity in previous
studies (i.e., inferior parietal lobule, middle temporal gyrus, middle occipital gyrus, and
angular gyrus), the present study’s activations were not evident when KI was subtracted
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from IVI. However, the contrast between EVI and KI showed similar peak activations like
Jiang et al. (in press) in the inferior parietal lobule, and the superior and middle
temporal gyri. Compared to results found by Jiang et al. (in press), divergent brain
activity patterns were observed in the inferior temporal gyrus, precentral and
postcentral gyri, supramarginal gyrus, and paracentral lobule when KI was subtracted
from EVI. Although current results are inconsistent with imagery ability studies, these
brain areas are associated with planning and executing voluntary movements (Bernard
et al., 2002; Meister et al., 2004) and motor imagery (Munert, Zentgraf, Stark, & Vaitl,
2008; Porro et al., 1996; Sharma, Jones, Carpenter, & Baron, 2008; Tomasino, Werner,
Weiss, & Fink, 2007) which are needed to complete the arm rotation task used in the
present study. Furthermore, it is important to note that neither visual imagery
perspective was significantly activated when compared to KI as expected relative to
previous studies (e.g., Jackson et al., 2006; Solodkin et al., 2004; Thompson & Kosslyn,
2000), suggesting that participants were using the same occipital areas of the brain
during KI as those used for VI and not exclusively imagining how the movement feels.
Directly comparing the two visual imagery perspectives only showed significant
peak activation in the inferior parietal lobule when IVI was subtracted from EVI.
Although Jiang et al. (in press) also found significant activation in the inferior parietal
lobule when subtracting IVI from EVI, they also found activity in the superior and middle
temporal gyri, middle occipital gyrus, and angular gyrus. Moreover, our results are
inconsistent with Jiang et al. (in press) who did not find peak activation in the SMA when
EVI was subtracted from IVI, but found increased activation in a large number of brain
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areas related to voluntary hand movement, working memory, memory retrieval, and
motor and visual mental imagery (e.g., middle and superior frontal gyri, precentral
gyrus, inferior and superior parietal lobules, middle and superior occipital gyri, and
several subcortical areas). Because peak activations were not found when directly
contrasting the two visual imagery perspectives (IVI minus EVI), similar brain areas are
suggested to be used during MI of an upper extremity arm rotation task. This is
inconsistent with previous findings by Jiang et al. (in press) and our hypotheses for the
increased activation of specific visual streams for IVI (dorsal visual stream) and EVI
(ventral dorsal stream).
This evidence of biological inconsistency corroborates inconsistencies found in
behavioral imagery perspective studies showing different effect on motor learning and
performance depending on the perspective used during imagery training programs. For
example, Callow et al. (2013) demonstrated that IVI was more effective than EVI for a
task focused on the planning of movements in response to changes in the visual field,
while Hardy and Callow (1999) found that EVI was more effective than IVI for tasks
dependent on the visuospatial processing of a movement. Studies in the behavioral and
neuroscience literature have provided additional evidence for neurological distinctions
between imagery perspectives (e.g., Callow et al., 2013; Callow & Hardy, 2004; Fourkas,
Avenanti, Urgesi, & Aglioti, 2006; Jiang et al., in press; Ruby & Decety, 2003). However,
our results do not provide additional evidence that distinguishes between imagery
perspectives based on underlying brain areas. Instead, we found that IVI and EVI appear
to activate similar brain areas, and distinctions (activating more brain areas) were only
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found when KI was subtracted from EVI. A possible explanation for these imagery
perspective brain area inconsistencies could be the task type, temporal recency with the
movement experience and imagery instructions. Unlike the VMIQ-2, the MIQ-3 tasks are
simple movements, experienced right before the imagery component and the
instructions specify rating the ease of using imagery abilities rather than the degree of
vividness. Additionally, the arm rotation task should have activated different brain areas
than a t task involving a whole body movement such as the stair climbing action used in
the Jiang et al. (in press) study. Therefore, subsequent studies are needed comparing
neural activity areas for within questionnaire movements that differ in motor properties
(e.g., the MIQ-3 arm rotation and whole body jump movement).
It is also important to point out that our results are inconsistent with previous
studies (e.g., Guillot et al., 2008, 2009; Jiang et al., in press, Solodkin et al., 2004) in that
there was a significant amount of temporal cortex activation for all imagery ability
conditions when compared to rest, and specifically when KI was subtracted from EVI.
This is unusual because the temporal cortex is usually found to be associated with the
observation of motion (Rizzolatti et al., 1996) and visual motion processing (Beer,
Blakemore, Previc, & Liotti, 2002; Deutschlander et al., 2002; Dupont, Orban, de Bruyn,
Verbruggen, & Mortelmans, 1994), which are both associated with movement
preparation or interpreting the meaning of visual stimuli and not necessary with MI.
However, this increased activation may have been caused by participants using memory
recall and retrieval strategies to imagine the arm rotation movement as the temporal
cortex links conscious memory processes and the ventral visual pathway (Danckert, Gati,
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Menon, & Kohler, 2007; Douglas, Phelps, & Davachi, 2007). Given the temporal recency
of the written MIQ-R instructions, this activity could also reflect the processing of the
spatial location of the instruction screen relative to the participant.
Compared to studies in the behavioral sport science literature, especially those
examining imagery training programs, advocating for the use of either IVI or EVI
depending on the type of task in question, our results do not support previous research
(Goodale, 2011; Milner and Goodale, 2008) distinguishing between visual streams for
specific VI abilities. From the data presented here, we suggest that EVI and IVI may
actually involve more common neural processes than independent processes.
Moreover, previous research suggests (de Haan & Cowey, 2011) that there may be more
than two pathways because neurophysiological evidence does not clearly support
present pathway models or pathway models used in VI.
Regarding brain activity patterns between VI (IVI and EVI) and KI, we found
similar overlapping brain activation to Guillot et al. (2009) including motor-related
areas, frontal areas, and the inferior parietal lobule. When comparing VI ability
perspectives separately, there was a lack of increased activity for IVI in occipital areas
and superior parietal areas when compared directly to KI. By contrast, a divergent
pattern of increased activity was observed when EVI and KI were compared directly; EVI
activated predominantly temporal areas and the precentral and postcentral gyri,
whereas KI only yielded more activity in the inferior parietal lobule. These results
advance Guillot et al.’s (2008) study suggesting that IVI and KI may use similar neural
systems, while EVI and KI are mediated through separate neural systems which may
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have implications for what type of imagery is used in neurorehabilitation and motor
learning.
This study is unique because it was only the second study to examine the brain
networks used for different imagery perspectives and modalities. Unlike previous fMRI
work, we restricted our sample to female participants because other studies have
shown higher self-report MIQ scale scores among this population (e.g., Campos & Perez,
1988; Campos & Sueiro, 1993; Goss et al., 1986; Isaac & Marks, 1994). As recommended
by Guillot and colleagues (2009) to account for possible confounding neural activity
across the three imagery conditions, we considered EMG data in the pectoralis major
and deltoideus muscles but found no differences, precluding the need to statistically
control for this activity. We also verified that participants’ imagery speed was consistent
across conditions and with the pace of physically performing the movement with mental
chronometry finding no significant differences.
Four limitations of the current study should be considered in future
investigations. First, our sample was restricted to females classified as having good
imagery abilities calling for a male sample replication. BOLD response comparisons
between those who score low and high imagery ability scale is also warranted. The
second limitation relates to the type of movement used for the imagery task that may
introduce some variations in the underlying brain activation and BOLD signal due to
possible differences between upper extremity and lower extremity movements as well
as gross and fine motor movements. This only presents a potential confounding factor
between studies that may cause a difference in significantly activated brain areas, but
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may have a significant impact on using imagery for motor-rehabilitation of the upper
extremity compared to lower extremity. Therefore, subsequent studies should examine
a lower extremity movement of the MIQ-3 in a similar manner (i.e., knee lift). Third, the
present study considered neural activity relating only to three specific imagery abilities
related to movement and did not tap any abilities used to create cognitive and affective
image content as measured by Williams and Cummings’ (2011) Sport Imagery Ability
Questionnaire. Lastly, the gross motor MIQ tasks preclude confirmation of common
neural substrates during MI and physical performance of the movements because MIQ3 movements are not possible in current fMRI machines.
Despite some inconsistencies with Jiang et al. (in press), the present findings
provide initial biological validation of the MIQ-3 subscales. Specifically, distinct brain
activity for imagery perspectives and modalities was demonstrated reflecting those that
mediate the specific types of imagery abilities delineated in the MIQ-3. This scalespecific neural activity is evidence of VMIQ-2 convergent validity because the
participants screened as having good imagery abilities with the MIQ-3 also scored
respectively better on the VMIQ-2 scales. Additionally, the moderate inter-scale
correlations on the full 206 participants are more direct evidence of construct validity.
Furthermore, the present findings contribute to theoretical and practical implications in
the sport science literature for motor learning and rehabilitation. First, based on
research demonstrating imagery benefits for enhancing motor performance and
facilitating motor learning (e.g., Guillot et al., 2008) across a variety of tasks, it is
necessary to understand the underlying neural processes for each type of imagery
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ability. Although our results are inconsistent with previous literature (Guillot et al.,
2009; Jiang et al., in press), we propose that additional studies reexamine the brain
activity associated with each imagery ability so that we can be confident in assigning a
specific type of imagery during neural rehabilitation to encourage cerebral plasticity
following imagery-based training programs (Lacourse, Turner, Randolph-Orr, Schandler,
& Cohen, 2004). Second, in lieu of the revised applied model of deliberate imagery use
for sport, dance, exercise, and rehabilitation, further biological evidence delineating the
breadth of imagery abilities encompassed by the model is warranted. These findings will
help researchers and practitioners establish better imagery intervention to further
enhance behavioral and cognitive performance in motor-related domains.
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Table 2.1
Descriptive Statistics of the Raw EMGrms Data

M
SD
F
p-value
Pectoralis Major
Physical
244.59 501.49 2.1
0.14
KI
17.59 36.75 1.08
0.35
IVI
16.66 31.59 1.45
0.25
EVI
16.59 29.03 0.65
0.53
Deltoidius (anterior portion)
Physical
236.06 274.69 1.38
0.26
0.49
KI
20.11
2.48 0.73
IVI
20.04
2.34 0.97
0.39
0.53
EVI
19.95
2.21 0.65
Note.* p < 0.05
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Table 2.2
Descriptive Statistics and Inter-Scale Correlations between the MIQ-3 and the VMIQ-2
KI
IVI
EVI
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
MIQ-3
27.28
0.89
27.17
0.86
26.72
1.45
VMIQ-2
55.00
5.26
51.89
8.37
54.83
5.78
R
0.65
0.54
0.60
Note. r = MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2 inter-scale correlations; ߙ and r: n = 206
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Table 2.3
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during All Imagery Conditions and KI Compared to Rest
Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Sup
Frontal Inf Orb

a

b

L /R

L
L
R
L

Frontal Mid

L

Frontal Inf Tri
Frontal Inf Oper
Rolandic Oper

R
L
R
L
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Frontal Mid Orb

R
Temporal Cortex
Temporal Mid

Rolandic Oper
Temporal Pole Sup

R

L
L
L

All – Rest
Local Maxima Peak Coordinates
c
(MNI)
X
Y
Z

Cluster
d
Size
K

T-value

-24
-18
-40
-50
50

-8
68
44
38
38

52
10
-16
-6
-10

7365
4
28
44
384

8.73
4.00
5.36
3.75
4.65

-40
-46
-26
-42
-46
42
-38
58
-50
-48
60
60

54
46
52
38
30
48
28
12
6
4
8
4

-12
-2
-12
30
32
24
30
12
14
2
30
12

28
44
4
205
205
3
205
384
860
860
8
26

4.00
4.41
3.94
5.17
4.97
3.89
4.64
4.58
6.53
5.80
4.16
3.84

44
62
56
-52
-48
-48

-42
-44
-70
-54
6
10

8
12
6
12
16
0

294
294
82
3731
1369
1369

8.23
4.49
4.29
7.09
6.81
5.93

d

KI – Rest
Local Maxima Peak Coordinates
c
(MNI)
x
y
z

e

Cluster
d
Size
k

T-value

-40
-46
52
50

44
44
28
38

-16
-2
-2
-10

26
56
36
15

5.77
4.31
4.04
4.03

-36
-38

38
28

26
32

202
202

5.36
4.38

58

12

14

26

4.12

46
56

-44
-70

8
6

92
3

5.43
3.96

-50

-30

-12

216

6.37

Temporal Inf

R

58
50

-64
-20

-2
-18

82
28

4.53
4.18

L

Temporal Sup
Parietal Cortex
Parietal Sup

Parietal Inf
Postcentral
Motor/Premotor Cortex
Supp Motor Area
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Precentral
Occipital Cortex
Occipital Inf
Calcarine
Subcortical Areas
Cerebellum (VI)
Cerebellum (Crus I)
Insula

R

68
68

-30
-32

10
18

23
23

4.08
4.01

L
R

-24
28
16
-40
36
30

-66
-46
-66
-42
-46
-32

62
60
58
56
48
56

3731
810
184
3731
810
230

7.99
4.79
5.97
7.66
6.17
4.57

-6
-6
-58
60

-4
-8
-4
10

64
72
32
30

7365
7365
1369
384

12.20
11.81
5.15
4.78

48

-76

-10

82

4.26

L
R
R
L
L
R
R
L
R

50

-18

-22

9

4.00

-54
-46
-44
68

-26
-16
-4
-30

-18
-26
-26
22

216
216
9
3

4.82
4.55
3.86
3.87

-44
36
28

-40
-44
-46

48
46
58

2272
235
235

5.92
4.35
4.06

-6

-4

66

5721

11.32

-24
16

-68
-66

62
64

2272
72

7.85
4.76

R
38
-60
-24
230
6.69
R
36
-78
-22
7
4.37
36
-78
-22
17
4.68
L
-30
18
8
36
4.12
R
48
14
-2
36
3.95
Hippocampus
L
-22
-14
-20
5
3.91
Putamen
L
-30
-10
52
5721
9.63
Thalamus
L
-14
-12
64
5721
9.18
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local maxima thresholded at the p <
0.001 level.

Table 2.4
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during IVI and EVI Conditions Compared to Rest

Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Inf Orb

La/Rb

R
L
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Frontal Inf Tri

L

Frontal Inf Oper

R

Frontal Mid Orb
Frontal Mid

L
L
R

Temporal Cortex
Temporal Mid

L

R
Temporal Sup

Rolandic Oper
Temporal Pole Sup
Temporal Inf
Parietal Cortex

L
R
L
L
R
L

IVI – Rest
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
c
Coordinates (MNI)
Sized
X
Y
Z
K

T-valuee

EVI – Rest
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
c
Coordinates (MNI)
Sized
x
y
Z
k

Tvaluee

50
-40
-42
-40
-46
58
58
-36

38
44
44
38
30
14
14
56

-10
-16
-2
28
30
12
30
-12

65
19
5
93
93
40
13
19

4.62
4.19
3.80
4.38
4.32
4.31
4.24
4.20

48
-40

38
42

-12
-16

104
22

4.79
5.04

-38

28

28

149

4.79

58
48
-40
-44
44

12
14
44
36
48

14
0
-2
32
22

336
278
33
149
7

4.68
4.08
4.45
4.96
3.94

-52
-50
-60
46
62
-56
68

-58
-30
-22
-44
-44
-44
-30

12
-12
2
8
12
20
14

2570
259
10
196
23
2570
16

6.96
5.82
4.00
6.51
4.57
6.65
4.31

-52
-60

-56
-20

14
0

3450
77

7.23
4.73

56

-70

6

217

4.31

38
60

-34
-44

14
14

372
372

4.80
4.65

-48
-50

6
10

16
-4

1142
1142

6.88
5.99
44

14

-20

278

5.02

-60

-62

-6

13

4.35

Parietal Sup

Postcentral
Parietal Inf

L
R

-24
18

-66
-66

64
56

2570
94

8.17
4.88

R
L

64
-58

-6
-30

28
44

24
10

4.34
3.90

-2
-6
-6
-58

2
-4
-6
-4

60
64
72
30

6667
6667
6667
1142

10.93
10.17
10.03
4.89

R
Supramarginal
Motor/Premotor Cortex
Supp Motor Area

Precentral
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Occipital Cortex
Occipital Inf
Occipital Mid
Subcortical Areas
Cerebellum (VI)
Insula

R
L

L
R
R
L
R
L
R

38
-30
46
48

-60
18
14
14

-24
8
-20
-2

192
31
15
4

6.42
4.14
3.91
3.80

16
30
62
-36
-44
36
38
56

-64
-50
-6
-44
-40
-44
-36
-28

56
64
32
52
48
46
48
48

244
992
336
3450
3450
992
992
23

7.74
5.00
4.83
8.53
8.10
6.83
6.61
4.44

-2
-2

-6
0

66
58

9366
9366

13.60
12.74

-32
60

-10
4

54
24

9366
336

8.97
5.84

48
-46

-80
-76

-4
2

217
36

4.53
4.24

38

-58

-24

234

7.97

48

6

-18

278

4.35

Putamen
L
-32
-12
16
28
Note. aL = left hemisphere, bR = right hemisphere, cMNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, dExtent threshold k = 3, eT-value: local maxima
thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.
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Table 2.5
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during KI Compared to EVI and IVI.

Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Sup
Parietal Cortex
Parietal Inf
Motor/Premotor Cortex
Supp Motor Area

La/Rb

KI - EVI
Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)c
X
Y
Z

Cluster
Sized
k

T-valuee

KI - IVI
Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)c
x
y
Z

Cluster
Sized
k

Tvaluee

L

-24

46

42

11

4.13

L

-52

44

56

5

3.97

R

12
4

-4
8

70
70

16
7

4.18
3.88
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L
-10
22
66
15
Subcortical Areas
Vermis (III)
0
-34
-48
36
3.91
Thalamus
R
18
-14
8
16
4.15
Caudate
R
14
8
22
40
Hippocampus
L
-22
-26
-6
6
Cerebellum (VIIb)
R
28
-74
-46
6
Cerebellum (VIII)
R
18
-68
-40
8
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local maxima
thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.

4.28

4.48
4.01
3.93
3.94

Table 2.6
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during IVI Compared to EVI and KI.

Area

La/Rb

IVI-EVI
Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)c
X
Y
Z

Cluster
Sized
k

T-valuee

IVI-KI
Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)c
x
y
Z

Cluster
Sized
k

Motor/Premotor Cortex
Supp Motor Area
R
14
-6
68
4
3.79
Note. aL = left hemisphere, bR = right hemisphere, cMNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, dExtent threshold k = 3, eT-value: local maxima
thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.

Tvaluee
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Table 2.7
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during EVI Compared to IVI and KI.

Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Mid
Temporal Cortex
Temporal Sup
Temporal Inf
Temporal Mid
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Parietal Cortex
Parietal Inf
Postcentral
Supramarginal
Motor/Premotor Cortex
Precentral

La/Rb

EVI-IVI
Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)c
X
Y
Z

Cluster
Sized
k

T-valuee

EVI-KI
Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)c
x
y
Z

Cluster
Sized
k

Tvaluee

R

40

32

24

7

3.98

R
R
L

46
54
-46
-46

-24
-62
-62
-70

60
-4
16
20

497
23
66
66

4.68
4.21
4.13
3.94

48
-48
-48
36

-38
-14
-8
-38

54
46
58
42

497
213
213
497

5.74
4.77
4.53
6.59

L
R
L
R
L

-38

-46

46

7

3.92

-40
-8
56
213
-22
-14
64
50
-30
-18
58
50
R
46
8
32
43
52
12
36
43
Paracentral Lobule
R
0
-30
68
3
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local maxima
thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.

4.23
4.46
3.76
4.10
3.92
3.82

Figure 2.1
MIQ-3 arm rotation task
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Figure 2.2
Electromyography surface sensor placement
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PreScreening
•SurveyMonkey
Questionnaire

Session
#1
•MIQ-3
•VMIQ-2

Session
#2
•MRI Simulation
•Mental
Chronometry
•Electromyography

Figure 2.3
Chronological order of experiment
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Session
#3
•fMRI Scan
•PostExperiment
Debriefing
Questionnaire
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Imagery is a top-down, knowledge driven process involving the generation or
regeneration of parts of a brain representation or neural network (i.e., when more than
one area/region is consistently activated) that is under the conscious control of the

individual (Holmes & Calmels, 2008). Specifically, motor imagery (MI) is a dynamic state
that enables an individual to mentally stimulate their mind to rehearse an action
without engaging in overt physical movements (Moran et al., 2012; Olsson & Nyberg,
2010), and is subdivided into different modalities including visual and kinesthetic
imagery. Visual imagery (VI) requires imagining from an internal or external perspective,
while kinesthetic imagery (KI) requires one to feel the movement. There is now evidence
showing that MI and movement execution share similar neural networks (Cuthbert,
Vrana, & Bradley, 1991; Gerardin et al., 2000; Szameitat, Shen, & Sterr, 2007), and that
imagined movements retain the same temporal characteristics as the corresponding
overt movement (Decety & Jeannerod, 1996; Decety et al., 1989; Jeannerod, 2001).
Although not fully overlapping, this relationship between MI and movement execution
can be used to explain behavioral research showing matched perceptual performances
of executed versus imagined stimuli.
Results from previous studies have shown that MI can improve the performance
and learning of a variety of motor tasks (Feltz & Landers, 1983; Guillot & Collet, 2008)
dependent on an individual’s level of expertise. For example, through fMRI Wei and Luo
(2010) provided additional evidence for an inverse relationship between brain activity
and skill level (see Lotze et al., 2003; Ross et al., 2003) by showing that sport experts
have a focused cerebral activity pattern found in experience-related motor tasks
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compared to novices. This economy of effort or neural efficiency in the brain of experts,
although at an increased level, may account for their enhanced motor performance.
Motor learning and performance outcomes (Munroe et al., 2000; Murphy, 1994)
and imagery intervention effectiveness (Hall, Buckolz, & Fishburne, 1992) are dependent
on other individual-dependent variables like imagery ability (Guillot & Collet, 2005;
Martin, Moritz, & Hall, 1999; Cumming et al., 2013). Findings in neuroscience note that
imagery ability is one of the most variable factors altering neural activity (Guillot et al.,
2008), and aligned with Paivio’s (1985) notion that imagery ability is a product of
genetics interacting with experience, several psychological, behavioral and neuroscience
studies support the inter-individual capacity to elicit mental images. Based on MIQ
scores, Robin et al. (2007) have demonstrated this showing that good imagers
performed significantly better than poor imagers on tennis performance. Similar
findings were found when examining the relationship between imagery ability and the
acquisition, retention and reacquisition of movements (Goss, Hall, Buckolz, & Fishburne,
1986) as well as how it affects learning in gymnastics (Lawrence, Callow & Roberts,
2013). These studies indicate that good imagery ability is associated with MI practice of
motor performance, especially facilitating the acquisition of a movement.
Previous neuroscience research has distinguished brain areas that are active
during imagery compared to rest (Binkofski et al., 2000; Guillot et al., 2008, 2009; Jiang
et al., in press; Seiler et al., in review; Solodkin et al., 2004), as well as the brain areas
that are active during imagery and the physical execution of a task (Guillot et al., 2008,
2009; Solodkin et al., 2004) indicating similar behavioral and anatomical characteristics
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of movement execution. It is also increasingly evident through fMRI studies that
regional brain activity distinguishes the three movement imagery abilities (KI, IVI, and
EVI). Most recently, Jiang et al. (in press) used the VMIQ-2 to screen good imagery
ability participants and compared regional activity during imagery of the stair climbing
item while using each of the three abilities. Results indicated activity in the SMA during
each type of imagery, while also showing divergent patterns for KI (i.e., subcortical
areas), IVI (i.e., parietal lobule), and EVI (i.e., temporal cortex). While this study laid the
foundation for fMRI cross validation of movement imagery ability assessments and
BOLD responses during real time imagery there are some notable limitations. First, the
VMIQ-2 movements involve recall of past experiences which could be highly variable
across participants regardless of their imagery ability, confounding the intensity and
perhaps regional breadth of neural activity. Guillot et al. (2009) also recommended that
“electromyography (EMG) data should be used to record the muscular quiescence
during MI and to ensure that the pattern of cerebral activations observed during MI was
not due to any movement” (p. 2166).
To address these limitations, Seiler et al. (in review) used the MIQ-3 to screen for
good imagery ability participants in their cross validation with fMRI BOLD response
during real-time imagery of the MIQ-3 arm rotation movement. The MIQ-3 protocol
involves physically completing a movement prior to using a specified imagery ability to
imagine that movement, thus, minimizing the movement experience variability
weakness of the VMIQ-2. Moreover, movement-related EMG activity and temporal
equivalence between physically performing each movement and imagery of those using
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each of the abilities were verified as being consistent across conditions through mental
chronometry (i.e., physically performing the movement, KI, IVI and EVI). Results were
similar to the work of Guillot et al. (2008) and to some extent with (Jiang et al., in press)
when comparing imagery to a rest condition in that the inferior frontal orbicularis,
inferior and superior parietal lobules, SMA, precentral gyrus, and cerebellum were
consistently activated during IVI. However, unlike Jiang et al. (In press), there were less
peak activities during IVI contrasted with KI and EVI. There was additional activity in the
parietal (i.e., postcentral and supramarginal gyri) and motor/premotor (i.e., precentral
gyrus and paracentral lobule) cortices when KI was subtracted from EVI and peak
activations in the superior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, SMA, and subcortical
areas when KI was contrasted with IVI, which were inconsistent to those observed in
Jiang et al.’s (in press) study.
The results of the latter two studies (Jiang et al., in press; Seiler et al., in review)
indicate that the neural networks underlying each imagery ability (KI, IVI, and EVI)
remain inconclusive, and may reflect the studies’ features such as the variability in
questionnaire protocol, the movement task characteristic or the participant
characteristics. In order to elucidate inter-individual differences in neural activity aligned
with the recommendations of Jiang et al. (in press) the present study extended the
results of Seiler et al. (in review) by comparing the good imagers from that study to a
separate sample of poor imagers as screened by the MIQ-3. Until now, only Guillot et al.
(2008) have considered neural activity comparisons between good and poor imagers
using an earlier version of the MIQ-R (Martin et al., 1997), but during both imagery and
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physical performance of a sequential finger task. Although restricted only to the IVI
condition, the good imagery group reported more activation in the parietal and
premotor areas when compared to poor imagers, while the poor imagers displayed a
wider distributed network activity including the cerebellum, frontal and cingulate
cortices. Furthermore, their participants were subjected to a battery of tests (i.e., global
imagery score) to screen good and poor imager groups clouding the biological validity of
the MIQ movements.
Therefore, the purpose of this study was twofold. First, we examined the
convergent validity between like scales (KI, IVI, and EVI) for the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2 by
examining mean differences between good and poor imagery ability participant groups.
Second, to cross-validate self-reported and neural measures of imagery ability, we
compared fMRI-BOLD signals of participants screened as having good to those screened
as having poor imagery abilities with the MIQ-3 during real-time imagery of the arm
rotation movement. Aligned with Guillot et al. (2008), we expected that even though
both groups may show similar activations, the poor imager group would activate a more
diffuse brain network compared to the good imager group who would show greater
intensity in fewer areas. More specifically, based on previous findings (Binkofski et al.,
2000; Guillot et al., 2008, 2009; Jiang et al., in press) it was hypothesized that compared
to participants with good imagery abilities, motor-related areas (i.e., premotor cortex
and SMA, frontal areas (i.e., prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex, and inferior frontal
areas) and subcortical areas were expected to have lower peak activations in the poor
imagery group for KI. In addition, lower peak activations would be observed in motor186

related areas, the superior and inferior parietal lobules, and the dorsal visual stream
during IVI of poor imagers compared to good imagers. Instead, greater activity was
expected in motor-related areas and the inferior and superior parietal lobules among
good imagers. Furthermore, unlike IVI, we expected higher peak activations in the
ventral visual stream for EVI in participants screened as having good imagery abilities
compared to those with poor imagery.
Method
Participants
From an initial screening of 206 participants, 37 healthy, right-handed female
participants between 18 and 30 years old (Mean age = 23.43 ± 2.69) who were screened
as having good or poor MIQ-3 scores were selected and placed into good or poor
imagery ability groups. All participants were screened as right handed (Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (EHI) Mean = 91.75 ± 12.41), had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, self-reported no history of neurological of psychiatric disorders and were not
taking any neurological altering medications.
The good imagery group was composed of 18 participants between 20 and 30
years of age (Mean = 23.72 ± 2.42) and screened as right-handed (EHI Mean = 94.16 ±
9.26). Participants were 15 non-Hispanic White Americans, one Black/African American,
one Hispanic/Hispanic American, and one Asian/Asian American. The highest education
level included high school diploma (n = 5), bachelor degree (n = 10), and master’s degree
(n = 3). Good imagers’ sport history varied (e., basketball, soccer, gymnastics, lacrosse,
and rugby), while two participants did not report any sport history.
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Nineteen participants comprised the poor imagery group and were 19 to 28
years of age (Mean = 23.16 ± 2.97) and screened as right-handed (EHI Mean = 89.46 ±
14.68). In this group, participants were 18 non-Hispanic White Americans and one
Hispanic/Hispanic American. The highest education level was a high school diploma (n =
7), bachelor degree (n = 7), and master’s degree (n = 5). The sport history of poor
imagers varied (e.g., dance/ballet, golf, equestrian, fencing, and soccer), while four
participants did not report any sport history.
Imagery Assessments
Movement Imagery Questionnaire-3 (MIQ-3: Williams et al., 2011). The MIQ-3 is
comprised of 12 items measuring the self-reported ease or difficulty of generating
images of four separate movements (arm rotation, jump, knee lift and toe touch) each
along three subscales: KI, IVI and EVI. After physically performing each movement and
imagining oneself performing the movement, participants rate the difficulty of imaging
each movement using a 7-point Likert-scale from 1 (very hard to see/feel) to 7 (very
easy to see/feel). Subscale scores for the MIQ-3 range from 4-28 where better scores
represent better imagery ability. The MIQ-3 displays adequate internal consistency (α >
0.69) and concurrent validity with the VMIQ-2 (Williams et al., 2011), and in the present
study KI = 0.87, IVI = 0.83, and EVI = 0.88 with moderate inter-scale correlations (KI
versus EVI: r = 0.35; KI versus IVI: r = 0.51 and EVI versus IVI: r = 0.57, p < 0.01).
Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire-2 (VMIQ-2: Roberts et al., 2008).
The VMIQ-2 assesses self-reported imagery vividness (i.e., clarity and realism) and is
comprised of 12 motor tasks for each of the three subscales: KI, EVI, and IVI. Participants
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recorded a score based on the clarity associated with representing each movement
mentally using a 5-point Likert-scale from 1 (perfectly clear and vivid) to 5 (no image at
all, you only know that you are “thinking” of the skill). In the present study, the VMIQ-2
scale was inversed to be consistent with the MIQ-3 where lower scores represented
poor imagery ability and better scores represented good imagery ability. Subscale scores
for the VMIQ-2 ranged from 12-60 where better scores represent better imagery ability.
Consistent with previous research (Williams et al., 2011, 2012) the internal consistencies
of the VMIQ-2 scales in the present study were: KI = 0.95; IVI = 0.94 and EVI = 0.04.
Inter-scale correlations were also moderate (KI versus EVI: r = 0.39; KI versus IVI: r = 0.56
and EVI versus IVI: r = 0.65).
Manipulation Check. To assess the extent participants followed the study
protocol, participants completed a post-experiment debriefing questionnaire where
they were asked to rate the extent they were able to focus on each imagery perspective
or modality during the scan, whether they switched between imagery perspectives or
imagery modalities, and the extent they were able to focus on the MIQ-3 protocol (i.e.,
arm movement) on a 10-point Likert-scale (1 = not at all to 10 = greatly).
Mental Chronometry
Consistent with previous work (for review, see Collet et al., 2011; Guillot et al.,
2005; Malouin et al., 2008) the temporal congruence between physically executed and
imagined actions was evaluated by asking the participants to physically perform and
imagine the arm rotation task (Figure 3.1) using each of the MIQ-3 abilities repeatedly
for 30 seconds at a personally comfortable cadence. Participants followed audible
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prompts on a computer screen to begin and end each trial. The number of full MIQ-3
arm movements physically performed over 30 seconds was recorded followed by
recording the number of KI, IVI, and EVI repetitions performed while in an fMRI
simulation scanner. Physical and imaged repetitions of the MIQ-3 arm movement
protocol were averaged across the three trials.
Electromyography (EMG)
Aligned with recommendations (Guillot et al., 2008), muscle activity was
recorded using surface sensors to collect raw EMG signals during the MIQ-3 arm
rotation movement protocol for each condition (i.e., physical, KI, IVI, and EVI) during the
fMRI simulation. Two EMG sensors with a transmission range of 20 meters (Trigno
Wireless EMG System) were placed on the pectoralis major and anterior portion or the
deltoideus muscle of the non-dominant hand (left), and adhered to the skin by adhesive
interfaces (Delsys, Inc.). These placement locations were chosen because they were the
primary movers of the arm rotation task (Figure 3.2). Participants were instructed not to
put on any lotions/oils to improve skin/sensor connectivity. The root mean squared
value of the EMG signals (EMGrms) was calculated for each 30 second trial. The mean
values for each movement was calculated over three trials of the duration for each
condition. Each trial was separated from the next by a rest period (lasting 30 seconds) in
order for any muscle activation to cease, and participants to mentally rest.
Procedure
Pre-Screening. After securing Institutional Review Board approval at the host
university, participation was solicited electronically and through posted calls throughout
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the university and the surrounding campus area. Participation was initiated by visiting a
SurveyMonkey website to complete the background questionnaire that screened for
conditions unsafe and contraindicative to fMRI scanning (e.g., severe claustrophobia,
fracture repaired with metal, history of cancer). At the initial session, participants with
qualifying backgrounds and deemed fMRI safe completed the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2
distributed in a random order to control for order effect.
The imagery ability criterion for the present experiment was devised by
completing a cluster analysis to the original raw MIQ-3 data of 206 participants. The
analysis indicated four clusters of participant profiles, with a particular cluster of
participants that had good imagery ability MIQ-3 scores (e.g., KI > 25, IVI > 25, EVI > 24)
and a cluster of participants with poor imagery ability MIQ-3 scores (e.g., KI < 22, IVI <
21, EVI < 23). Participants scoring within the cut-score criteria were selected to
participate (good imager group = 28; poor imager group = 25). Then, a computer
generated random sample from the qualified participants was selected for the fMRI
experiment. Participants who did not qualify for the fMRI experiment based on the cutscores were contacted to thank them for their time and did not proceed further in the
study.
fMRI Simulation. To ensure high-quality fMRI data, participants were educated
about the fMRI process using a mock fMRI scanner that closely matched the conditions
of actual scanning. At this mock session, the meaning of the MIQ-3 conditions were
explained, fMRI safety issues were discussed using the fMRI participant screening
document from the brain imaging center, and the participant practiced the MIQ-3
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protocol in a realistic facsimile fMRI scanner. As part of the protocol, mental
chronometric and EMG measurements were collected both outside (standing and
physical completing the task) and inside (lying supine imagining the task) the mock fMRI
scanner while scanner sound effects were playing. Specifically, participants went
through a mock localizer (Siemens_Loacalizer), anatomical scan (Siemens_MPRAGE),
and functional scan (Siemens_EPI); all with the sound effects on. The purpose of the
fMRI simulation session was for participants to become comfortable with the audible
prompts, presentation stimuli, task, and familiar with the scanning procedure. At the
conclusion of this session, participants were scheduled for their fMRI scanning session.
Functional Imaging. Within two weeks, the participants attended the scanning
session. Functional MRI was performed using a 3T Magneton Trio system (Siemens,
Erlanger, Germany) fitted with a 12-channel head coil located at the McCausland Center
for Brain Imaging, University of South Carolina at Palmetto Richland Memorial Hospital.
Participants were supine on the table with their head immobilized using pillows and
foam pads. The MRI scan lasted approximately 45 minutes and included: (1) one 21second localizer (scout) to localize functional axial slices, (2) one 6-minute and 17
second high-resolution anatomical scan [sagittal T1-weight; repetition time: 2250 ms
echo time 4.15 ms; one slab divided into 192 slices; slice thickness: 1 mm; flip angle: 9
degrees; field of view: 256 x 256 mm2; voxel size: 1 x 1 x 1 mm3; bandwidth 150 Hz per
voxel; echo spacing: 9.4 ms], (3) three 10-minute and 51 second functional runs
[ascending, interleaved, transversal; repetition time: 1550 ms; echo time: 34.0 ms; 42
slices; slice thickness: 3.00 mm; flip angle: 71 degrees; field of view: 216 x 216 mm2;
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voxel size: 3 x 3 x 3 mm3; BOLD threshold: 4.00; bandwidth: 1984 Hz per voxel; echo
spacing: 0.59 ms], (4) and one 6-minute and 10 second T2-weight resting state scan
[descending, interleaved, transversal; repetition time: 1850 ms; echo time: 30 ms; 34
slices; slice thickness: 3.00 mm; flip angle: 75 degrees; field of view: 208 x 208 mm2;
voxel size: 3 x 3 x 3 mm3; BOLD threshold: 4.00; bandwidth: 2004 Hz per voxel; echo
spacing: 0.58 ms]. These scans were administered in the aforementioned order for all
participants.
Conditions and Stimuli. The same arm rotation task from the MIQ-3 was used as
the imagery stimulus because of its simplicity allowing subjects to control and
reproduce the task. This task involved participants slowly extending their non-dominant
hand straight out to their side so that it is parallel to the ground, palm down. They then
moved their arm forward until it was directly in front of their body (still parallel to the
ground). Experimental conditions included KI, IVI, and EVI, as well as a control condition
that involved viewing a fixation cross. There were three scanning sessions with six
repetitions for each experimental condition, resulting in 18 trials for each experimental
condition. All conditions were randomized and counterbalanced across each run for
each participant.
The experimental conditions (i.e., FEELING, INTERNAL Perspective, EXTERNAL
Perspective, and REST) were presented in pseudo-randomized order (counterbalanced
for condition) using Presentation software (NeuroBehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley,
CA). All stimuli were projected onto a screen positioned behind the fMRI scanner that
was seen by the participants through a mirror mounted onto the head coil. Each
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participant completed three functional scanning runs with a duration of ten minutes and
thirty seconds each. Within each run, each participant completed 6 trials in each
experimental condition. Each trial lasted twenty-three seconds and consisted of: i) an
auditory cue indicating the participant should open their eyes, ii) a visual prompt to
inform the participant of the imagery condition (3 seconds) and iii) a blank screen which
was presented while the participants engaged in imagery (20 seconds). All participants
were instructed to close their eyes after reading the imagery condition and to keep
them closed for the duration of subsequent motor imagery. All control (rest) conditions
required the participant to stare at a fixation cross in the middle of the screen.
Individual trials were separated by a pseudo-randomly chosen temporal jitter of 150,
250, 350 or 450 milliseconds. Following the scanning session, participants completed a
post-experiment debriefing questionnaire.
Data Analysis. All data was pre-processed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
software (SPM8, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London). Initially, motion
correction in the functional images was completed using SPM realignment. This
estimates six rigid-body transformation parameters for each image by finding the
parameters that minimize the mean squared difference between it and a reference
image. The structural T1-weighted scan was used as the reference image for each
subject. This image was co-registered to the mean functional image. The functional and
anatomical images were normalized to MNI space using trilinear interpolation method.
The scans were smoothed using a Gaussian kernel set at 8 mm full width at halfmaximum.
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Statistical analyses were completed using a general linear model with separate
model regressors for each task condition to describe the data through experimental
effects. Six regressors were used (x, y, z, yaw, pitch, and roll). One sample t-tests were
used to contrast the following experimental conditions: aggregated imagery conditions
(KI, IVI, and EVI) minus rest, KI minus rest, IVI minus rest, EVI minus rest, KI minus IVI, KI
minus EVI, IVI minus KI, IVI minus EVI, EVI minus IVI, and EVI minus KI. We also
calculated the inverse contrasts of IVI minus EVI, KI minus EVI, and KI minus IVI.
Comparisons of the functional data were assessed at the p < 0.001, uncorrected level.
Activated clusters were considered significant if their spatial extent threshold was
greater than 3 voxels. The results are presented at the cluster level (k) and peak t-value
(local peak activation amplitude), with the associated MNI coordinates (See Figure 2.3
for Chronological Order of Experiment)
Results
Imagery Background
Frequency statistics indicated 68% (good imagers = 14; poor imagers = 11) of
participants reported knowing what mental imagery is while 12 did not (good imagers =
4; poor imagers = 8). Those that did defined mental imagery as imagining or visualizing a
task, object, or performance in their mind without moving; nine participants did not
provide a definition. Overall, 16 participants had a positive attitude toward using
imagery for developing skills and increasing successful performances, while nine
participants had a neutral attitude and 10 participants did not provide a response. When
asked if imagery was previously used for performance enhancement, more good
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imagers (n = 11) than poor imagers (n = 4) indicated that they had previously used
mental imagery for sport, dance or injury rehabilitation.
Mental Chronometry and Imagery Ability Variation by Imagery Ability
Results of the MANOVA for 30-seconds of physical repetitions and KI, IVI, and EVI
imagined repetitions of the MIQ-3 arm rotation task by imagery ability group was not
significant, Pillai's Trace = 0.18, F (4, 32) = 1.80, p > 0.05, indicating that good imagers
completed approximately the same amount of physical repetitions as did poor imagers.
The multivariate analysis results for the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2 scales by ability group were
significant, Pillai's Trace = 0.87, p < 0.001, Eta = 0.89, with significant univariate analyses
for the scales on each questionnaire favoring the good imagery group (Table 3.1).
Composite mean MIQ-3 scores were 81.17 ± 2.41 in the good imager group and
48.47 ± 8.42 in the poor imager group. Individual scale scores for the good imager group
were: KI = 27.29 ± 0.89, IVI = 27.17 ± 0.86 and EVI = 26.72 ± 1.45. Poor imager mean
scores were 17.79 ± 4.44 for KI, 15.63 ± 3.30 for IVI, and 15.05 ± 5.03 for EVI. Composite
mean scores for the VMIQ-2 were also calculated. Overall, mean VMIQ-2 scores were
161.72 ± 15.61 for good imagers and 112.68 ± 23.89 for the poor imager group. Mean
scores for the good imager group were: KI = 55.00 ± 5.26, IVI = 51.89 ± 8.37 and EVI =
54.83 ± 5.26. Poor imager mean scores were: KI = 38.58 ± 9.97, IVI = 33.32 ± 10.58 and
EVI = 40.79 ± 10.46. Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients conducted to examine
inter-scale correlations for the sample (n = 37) indicated significant correlations for all
scale conditions (Table 3.2).

196

EMG Activity during Imagery Conditions
All EMG statistical computations were completed with raw EMG data. When
considering EMG activity of the pectoralis major muscle and the anterior portion of the
deltoideus muscle, separate repeated-measure ANOVAs for each condition did not
reach significance across the three trials (p > 0.05). Consequently, an average EMGrms
value was acceptable to be used for the remaining analyses. EMGrms independent
samples t-tests for each imagery condition showed no significant muscle activity for
either muscle (p > 0.05), precluding EMG regression from the fMRI analyses. Lastly, ttests for mean differences between groups also were not found to be significant (p =
0.07 – 0.85) (Table 3.1).
fMRI Results
Of the 37 participants, 43.2% of the participants had previously undergone an
MRI (n = 16) (e.g., knee, shoulder, ankle), but not necessarily of their brain. Nine of
these participants were classified as good imagers and seven were classified as poor
imagers.
On a 10-point Likert scale (1 = greatly to 10 = not at all), the debriefing
questionnaire showed that two participants switched between imagery perspective
(one good imager and one poor imager) and three participants (one good imager and
two poor imagers) switched between imagery modality during the brain-imaging task
(with a score less than five). As a result, their data was removed from any further data
analysis. On a Likert scale (1 = not at all to 10 = greatly) most poor imagers were able to
focus on each imagery perspective (Mean = 7.00 ± 1.60) and were able to focus on each
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imagery modality (Mean = 6.68 ± 1.83). On the same scale, all good imagers indicated
that they were able to focus on each imagery perspective (Mean = 7.22 ± 1.26), while all
but one good imager was able to focus on each imagery modality (Mean = 7.33 ± 1.65).
Lastly, when asked to what extent they were able to focus on the task during scanning
16 poor imagers and 17 good imagers indicated that they were able to focus on the task
during the scanning (rating of greater than 5).
Contrasts across Good and Poor Imagers
In order to assess gross differences in neural recruitment between the two
groups during imagery in general, we first compared good and poor imager groups for
all imagery abilities (KI + IVI + EVI – Rest) with a two-sample t-test, peak activations were
found in the left cingulate gyrus and right middle cingulum (Figure 3.4). Significant
differences were also found when rest was subtracted from KI in the left caudate
nucleus (Figure 3.5), and when rest was subtracted from EVI in the left precentral gyrus
and SMA, and the right lingual gyrus and cerebellum (Lobule VIII) (Figure 3.6). No
significant differences between good and poor imager groups were found for the IVI
minus rest contrast.
The two-sample t-test IVI – KI only revealed one significant difference between
good and poor imagers in the right inferior frontal orbicularis (Figure 3.7). However, the
EVI – KI comparison showed the most differences between the groups, including the left
precentral and postcentral gyri, SMA, pallidum and putamen, and the right caudate
nucleus, putamen, insula, middle and superior frontal orbicularis, pallidum, postcentral
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gyrus and heschl gyrus (Figure 3.8). All other two-sample t-tests between good and poor
imagers did not present with significant differences.
Significant mean differences in activation were also found when the poor imager
group was compared to the good imager group. The KI minus IVI contrast showed peak
activation differences in the right inferior frontal orbicularis between the groups (Figure
3.9). Significant differences were also found when EVI was subtracted from KI in the left
thalamus, precentral gyrus, pallidum, putamen and postcentral gyrus, and the right
caudate nucleus, putamen, insula, pallidum, postcentral gyrus, middle frontal orbicularis
and heschl gyrus (Figure 3.10). Lastly, there was a mean activation difference in the left
middle cingulum was significant between the good and poor imagery groups when KI
was subtracted from EVI (Figure 3.11). All other two-sample t-tests comparing the poor
imager group to the good imager group failed to yield significant differences.
Contrasts across Imagery Conditions and Rest
When the rest condition was subtracted from all of the imagery conditions (KI,
IVI, and EVI), both groups showed activations of the left middle frontal gyrus, inferior
frontal orbicularis, inferior and superior parietal lobule, and insula. On the right side of
the brain, significant peak activations were found in the inferior frontal opercularis,
frontal rolandic operculum, superior temporal gyrus, and postcentral gyrus. In the good
imager group, activations were also observed bilaterally in the middle temporal gyrus
and precentral gyrus. Additional peak activations were found in the right middle frontal
gyrus, inferior frontal orbicularis, inferior temporal gyrus, inferior and superior parietal
lobules, inferior occipital cortex and cerebellum (Lobule VI and Crus I), and the left
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frontal rolandic operculum, superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal orbicularis, inferior
frontal triangularis, temporal rolandic operculum, superior temporal pole, SMA and
hippocampus. In the poor imager groups, peaks of activation were located in the left
inferior frontal opercularis, superior temporal gyrus, precuneus and cerebellum (Lobule
IV and V), and the right supramarginal gyrus, putamen and insula (Table 3.3).
The contrast between KI and the rest condition (KI minus rest) for the good
imager group showed greater expected significant activations in the left SMA, middle
frontal gyrus and putamen, the right inferior frontal opercularis and cerebellum (Crus I),
and the inferior frontal orbicularis bilaterally. Although the poor imager group had
significant activations in some of these same areas (i.e., left SMA and bilateral inferior
frontal orbicularis), their peak activation level was less than the good imager group.
Additional peak activations shared by the good imager and poor imager groups included
the left inferior parietal lobule and right insula. The good imager group also showed
peak activations bilaterally in the middle and inferior temporal gyri and calcarine, the
right superior temporal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, postcentral gyrus, and left
thalamus. Additional activations for the poor imager group were found in the left
inferior frontal opercularis, superior temporal gyrus, precuneus, superior parietal lobule
and cerebellum (Lobule IV and Lobule V), the right frontal rolandic operculum,
supramarginal gyrus, precentral gyrus, and the pallidum bilaterally (Table 3.4).
When the rest condition was subtracted from IVI, both groups showed activation
bilaterally in the superior temporal gyrus, the right inferior frontal opercularis, middle
temporal gyrus, and the left inferior parietal lobule, SMA and insula. In the good imager
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group, activations were also observed bilaterally in the inferior frontal orbicularis and
superior parietal lobule. The left inferior frontal triangularis, middle frontal orbicularis,
superior temporal pole, middle and inferior temporal gyri, temporal rolandic operculum
and precentral gyrus, and the right postcentral gyrus, insula and cerebellum (Lobule VI)
also showed peak activations in the good imager group. In the poor imager group, peaks
of activation were located in the middle frontal gyrus and pallidum bilaterally, the left
inferior frontal opercularis and cerebellum (Lobule IV and V), and the right frontal
rolandic operculum, superior temporal pole and supramarginal gyrus (Table 3.5).
Finally, when the rest condition was subtracted from EVI significant activation
sites were found in the right inferior frontal opercularis and supramarginal gyrus, and
the left inferior parietal lobule and precentral gyrus for both the good imager and poor
imager groups. Additional activation in the good imager group was found in the inferior
frontal orbicularis, middle frontal gyrus, and middle temporal gyrus bilaterally. The good
imager group also presented peak activations in the left inferior frontal triangularis,
middle frontal orbicularis, SMA, middle occipital gyrus and putamen, and the right
superior temporal gyrus, superior temporal pole, superior and inferior parietal lobule,
precentral and postcentral gyri, inferior occipital gyrus, cerebellum (Lobule VI) and
insula compared to the poor imager group. Although the poor imager group showed less
activations for EVI when compared to rest, there were significant activations located in
the superior frontal gyrus bilaterally, and the left superior parietal lobule and calcarine
(Table 3.6).
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Contrasts across Imagery Conditions
When EVI was subtracted from KI, both groups had peak activations in the right
SMA. For the good imagery group, additional peak activations were only found in
subcortical areas (i.e., vermis (III) and thalamus) when compared to poor imagers.
Compared to the good imager group, the poor imager group showed an increased
number of peak activation sites in the supramarginal gyrus bilaterally, as well as the left
inferior frontal triangularis, middle frontal gyrus, SMA, lingual gyrus, cerebellum (Lobule
IX) and middle cingulum, and the right superior, inferior and middle temporal gyri, insula
and cerebellum (Lobule VI, Lobule VIII, and Crus I) (Figure 3.7). When IVI was subtracted
from KI, the good imager group presented significant activation in the left superior
frontal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, SMA and hippocampus, and the right caudate
nucleus and cerebellum (Lobule VIIb and VIII) (Table 3.8). For the same contrast, the
poor imager group showed peak activations mostly in the frontal cortex (i.e., left inferior
frontal triangularis, middle frontal orbicularis and superior frontal gyrus, and bilateral
inferior and superior frontal orbicularis), as well as the left supramarginal gyrus,
pallidum and middle cingulum, and the right cerebellum (Crus II) (Table 3.8).
When KI was subtracted from IVI, no significant activations were present for the
good imagery group or the poor imager group. However, when EVI was subtracted from
IVI, significant activations were only found in the right SMA for the good imager group.
In the poor imager group, peak activations were found in the left cuneus and caudate
nucleus bilaterally (Table 3.9).
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When IVI was subtracted from EVI in the poor imager group, no significant
activations were present. However, when IVI was subtracted from EVI in the good
imager group, peak activation was found in the left inferior parietal lobule (Table 3.10).
When KI was subtracted from EVI, the good imager group showed activations bilaterally
in the precentral gyrus. Peak activations were also found in the right middle frontal
gyrus, superior and inferior temporal gyri, inferior parietal lobule, supramarginal gyrus
and paracentral lobule, and the left middle temporal gyrus and postcentral gyrus
compared to the poor imager group. Although the contrast of KI subtracted from EVI
showed less activation for the poor imager group, there were significant activations
located in the right middle occipital gyrus and insula compared to the good imager
group (Table 3.11).
Discussion
Extending the preliminary biological evidence of intra-individual variability in
neural network activity associated with the MIQ-3 protocol, this was the first study
comparing real-time inter-individual differences among participants screened as having
good and poor imagery abilities by the MIQ-3. This line of biological validation of KI, IVI
and EVI constructs are essential to advance both the behavioral and neuroscience
literature because at least three theoretical models currently guide research in these
disciplines. Prior to examining neural activity differences, we established that our MIQ-3
screened participants also reported significantly different KI, IVI and EVI scores on the
VMIQ-2 (Table 3.1). Psychometrically, the VMIQ-2 means favoring the good imagery
group, the MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2 inter-scale correlations of this sample (n = 37) and those
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(n = 206) reported in Seiler et al. (in review) are evidence of convergent validity.
Controlling for temporal equivalence of imagining and physically performing the
task through mental chronometry and muscular activity EEG data were unique aspects
of our study and aligned with the recommendations of Guillot et al. (2008, 2009).
Finding no intra- or inter-individual differences in these variables precluded statistical
control in subsequent modeling analyses of neural activity data. In order to establish
common neural network areas during imagery in general, brain regions and specific
areas were compared to rest through the cognitive subtraction method (Petersen et al.,
1989). Rest minus the aggregated imagery abilities (KI, IVI, and EVI) indicated that both
the good imagery group and poor imagery group presented peak activations in the
inferior parietal lobule as well as motor-related regions (i.e., SMA, cerebellum, and
insula). Consistent with previous research and our hypotheses, this pattern of activation
overlaps, although not completely, those associated with motor imagery properties
(Decety et al., 1997; Gerardin et al., 2000; Grafton et al., 1996; Lotze et al., 1999;
Stephan et al., 1995; Malouin et al., 2003; Boecker et al., 2002; Halpern & Zatorre,
1999). Also consistent with our hypotheses, activation was found in the inferior frontal
regions which are associated with movement inhibition properties. Although
inconsistent with our hypothesis, a large amount of temporal region activation was also
found that is associated with visual motion processing and observation of movement.
In order to capture regions and areas in which BOLD signal differentiated
between imagery type, activity differences in location and intensity during KI, IVI, and
EVI were compared to rest separated for each imagery ability group. Extending previous
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work limited to IVI (Guillot et al., 2008, 2009), the focus of activation when KI was
compared to the rest condition was equal across the good imager and poor imager
groups partially confirming our hypothesis; peak activation during KI was in the inferior
frontal regions (i.e., inferior frontal opercularis and inferior frontal orbicularis), inferior
parietal lobule, SMA, cerebellum, and putamen for both good and poor imager groups.
Such activations, especially in the inferior parietal lobule and inferior frontal regions are
consistent with previous research indicating their role in generating motor images
(Gerardin et al., 2000; Kapur et al., 1994; Lafleur et al., 2002; Lotze & Halsband, 2006;
Meister et al., 2004; Ranganath, Johnson, & D’Esposito, 2003; Rama et al., 2001; Sun et
al., 2005). Additionally, good imagers recruited several areas in the temporal cortex and
also the occipital cortex (i.e., calcarine: location of the primary visual cortex) compared
to poor imagers. The additional areas active in the temporal cortex for good imagers is
not consistent with previous research (Guillot et al., 2008; Jiang et al., in press), with the
primary functions of these areas associated with auditory and visual motor processing.
Conversely, the poor imagers had more activation in the parietal cortex areas
(i.e., precuneus, supramarginal gyrus, superior parietal gyrus, and postcentral gyrus) and
the pallidum compared to the good imagers. Although these findings are inconsistent to
the areas expected to be activated by KI, it suggests that poor imagers are using an
increased amount of brain areas while imagining a movement. These differences may be
the result of poor imagers relying on working memory (Catalan, Honda, Weeks, Cohen,
& Hallet, 1998; Yoo, Paralkar, & Panych, 2004; Rama et al., 2001; Tsukiura et al., 2001)
to create the image or planning of the motor action (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006;
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Kawashima, Roland, & O’Sullivan, 1995; Meister et al., 2004). Furthermore, the
activation of the precuneus in this contrast is surprising because it is associated with
internally represented visual images (Oshio et al., 2010), not KI.
When directly comparing IVI to the rest condition, expected activation in the
inferior parietal lobule and SMA was found in both good and poor imager groups. Also
consistent with our hypothesis, good imagers showed peak activation in the superior
parietal regions (superior parietal and postcentral gyri). However, inconsistent results
were also found for both the good imager (i.e., inferior frontal region, temporal cortex,
precentral gyrus, insula, and cerebellum) and poor imager (i.e., middle frontal gyrus,
middle and superior temporal gyri, supramarginal gyrus, pallidum, and cerebellum)
groups. Although the good imager group activated the expected dorsal visual stream,
the amount of activity found in the good imager group was also more widespread
compared to the poor imager group. This is unlike the previous study comparing good
and poor imagers by Guillot et al. (2008), indicating that good imagers had an efficient
neural network of greater activation in the parietal and premotor regions, while poor
imagers recruited more areas in the oribto-frontal and cingulate cortices as well as the
cerebellum.
Lastly, we subtracted the rest condition from EVI and examined the peak
activation between the good and poor imager groups, which revealed the greatest
difference in peak brain activity between the groups. Consistent with our hypothesis, we
found peak activations in the inferior and superior parietal lobules, postcentral gyrus,
SMA, and occipito-temporal cortex for the good imager group. However, other expected
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areas of the visual stream (i.e., precuneus, cingulate gyrus and frontopolar cortex) as
well as the premotor cortex were not found to be activated. In the poor imager group,
activations consistent with our hypothesis were only found in the superior and inferior
parietal lobules and calcarine, while additional activations were found in the superior
frontal, supramarginal and precentral gyri. Although we expected a limited number of
activation areas with increased intensity for the good imager group, we found the
opposite with this group having a broader distributed neural network including brain
areas associated with visual mental imagery, motor planning, and working memory
which reflect participants’ brain activity when retrieving and producing the mental
image. Specifically, the increased activation in the putamen has strong reciprocal
connections with the caudate nucleus involved in integrating spatial information with
motor behavior formation, while may also assist in controlling motor preparation
(Alexander & Crutcher, 1990) and tasks (DeLong et al., 1984) as well as movement
sequences (Marchand et al., 2008). Although EVI is only being compared to a rest
condition, this has been the only contrast to show peak activation in true occipital areas
(i.e., inferior and middle occipital gyri). Many studies have reported that EVI is
considered a truer form of VI (Hall, Rodgers, & Barr, 1990; Janssen & Sheikh, 1994;
White & Hard, 1995) relying on visuospatial processing (Mahoney & Avener, 1977)
suggesting that such activations in the occipital cortex, putamen and insula should be
expected.
When mean differences for EVI between the good imager group and the poor
imager group was contrasted to the rest condition, the focus of activation was increased
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in the motor and sensorimotor areas for the good imager group. Such activity in motor
areas may be attributed to a greater, or possibly the equivalent amount, neural effort
needed to imagine the arm rotation task. Although both groups may have activated
these areas, the average difference between the good group and the poor group was
truly significant revealing that they may be better at separating and engaging in EVI.
Differences between good and poor imagers during each imagery ability
condition were further elucidated by examining overall activation areas to rest between
good and poor imagers revealed indicating greater activation in the frontal, parietal and
premotor regions known to be associated with motor imagery (Decety et al., 1997;
Gerarding et al, 2000; Grafton et al., 1996) for the good imager group. In contrast, poor
imagers recruited more subcortical regions (e.g., cerebellum and pallidum) and the
middle frontal gyrus, suggesting that they had difficulty retrieving the movement in
working memory and eliciting a mental representation of this movement (Duzel et al.,
2001; Leung, Gore, & Goldman-Rakic, 2002; Pochon et al., 2002; Ruggs, Fletcher, Frith,
Frackowiak, & Dolan, 1996; Tulving et al., 1994; Zhang, Leung, & Johnson, 2003).
Consistent with our hypothesis, the good imager group had peak activation in
most of the predicted brain areas (i.e., inferior parietal lobule, SMA, caudate nucleus,
and cerebellum) when IVI was subtracted from KI, suggesting that these areas are part
of a neural network that produces KI (Guillot et al., 2009). Again, however, the poor
imagers were found to have increase of activity in the frontal cortex, as well as other
areas not related to MI (i.e., supramarginal gyrus and middle cingulum), suggesting that
poor imagers are dependent on a more widely distributed neural network when
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engaging in imagery. However, inconsistencies were found when the poor imager group
was compared to the good imager group (isolating the activity recorded only by poor
imagers) for KI minus IVI. This contrast showed that poor imagers were found to have
greater activation in the inferior frontal orbicularis. The increased activation in the
inferior frontal orbicularis has strong connections to working memory (Ranganath,
Johnson, & D’Esposito, 2003; Kapur et al., 1994) and the subsystems that store and
manipulate visual images but not those involved in KI.
Investigating the activation areas during KI compared to EVI for good and poor
imagers showed poor imagers to have a larger pattern of activation. Compared to the
good imager group only having significant activation in the SMA and thalamus, the poor
imager group had various peak activations in the frontal, temporal and parietal cortices,
as well as the cerebellum. Although the SMA was expected to have increased activation
during KI for good imagers, our results were inconsistent with our hypothesis for other
areas being activated associated with KI (i.e., inferior parietal lobule, inferior frontal
areas, putamen, caudate nucleus, and cerebellum). Additional peak activations by the
poor imager group were found when EVI was subtracted from KI compared to the good
imager group. Although there was more active brain regions, only two (i.e., caudate
nucleus and putamen) have been associated with KI, reflecting poor imagers’ need to
have an extensively activated brain network to create mental images compared to good
imagers.
Inconsistent with our hypothesis that IVI would elicit greater activity in the
dorsal visual stream, results indicated that only good imagers recruited the SMA known
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to be associated with motor planning/control (Bischoff-Grethe, Goedert, Willingham, &
Grafton, 2004; Perry et al., 1999; Schubotz & von Cramon, 2001, 2002), movement
preparation (Jenkins, Jahanshahi, Jeuptner, Passingham, & Brooks; Stephan et al., 1995),
movement initiation (Jenkins, Jahanshahi, Jeuptner, Passingham, & Brooks, 2000, and
motor imagery (Boecker et al., 2002; Halpern & Zatorre, 1999; Malouin, Richards,
Jackson, Dumas, & Doyon, 2003; Halpern & Zatorre, 1999) compared to the poor imager
group. This is also inconsistent with previous studies illustrating the similarity in brain
activity when participants engage in MI of a movement task (Lotze et al., 1999).
Moreover, when directly comparing group means for IVI to the other imagery
abilities (KI and EVI) we only found that good imagers had greater mean activation in the
inferior frontal orbicularis compared to poor imagers, which is known to play a role in
movement inhibition (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004). Although some results are
similar to Guillot et al. (2008 (i.e., SMA and frontal regions), their study only instructed
participants to imagine their task using the first-person perspective compared to a rest
and physical condition, not the other imagery abilities. Results may be explained by task
type differences (finger-sequence task versus gross motor movement) and the
inconsistency in our imagery screening methods (global imagery score versus MIQ-3
subscale scores).
Distinct neural contributions of EVI for good and poor imagers in relation to the
other imagery abilities have yet to be proposed. Although research has found that
different VI perspectives can cause different effects on motor learning and motor
performance (e.g., Hardy & Callow, 1999) and that distinct brain areas underlie the two
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VI perspectives (Guillot et al., 2009; Jiang et al., in press), our results did not support
this. When IVI was subtracted from EVI, the only remaining brain area to be significantly
activated solely by EVI was located in the inferior parietal lobule only for the good
imagers which has been associated with both VI and KI abilities. Because of this lack in
peak activation we suggest two ideas: 1) both good imagers and poor imagers use the
same neural network for EVI in comparison to IVI, and 2) there is a large overlap in brain
areas activated by both EVI and IVI particularly for this simple, upper body arm rotation
task. Nevertheless, our results support and provide neuroscientific evidence to a recent
narrative by Callow and Roberts (2012) negating that different imagery perspectives
exist.
When EVI was compared to KI, a larger distinction in brain activity was found
between the good imagery group and poor imager group; however, peak activations did
not follow expected patterns indicated in our hypothesis. Instead, the good imager
group activated areas not associated with EVI (i.e., middle frontal gyrus, middle
temporal gyrus, postcentral gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, precentral gryus, and
paracentral lobule), but rather areas associated with motor learning (e.g., Grafton,
Salidis, & Willingham, 2001; Penhune & Doyon, 2005; van Mier, Perlmutter, & Petersen,
2004), working memory and memory retrieval (e.g.,Duzel et al., 2001; Pochon et al.,
2002; Zhang, Leung, & Johnson, 2003), kinesthetic perception (Bodegard et al., 2003;
Naito, 2004; Naito, Roland, & Ehrsson, 2002), and motor imagery (Munzert, Zentgraf,
Stark, & Vaitl, 2008; Porro et al., 1996; Sharma, Jones, Carpenter, & Baron, 2008;
Tomasino, Werner, Weiss, & Fink, 2007). In contrast, poor imagers were only found to
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recruit the middle occipital gyrus and insula, possibly reflecting their lack of ability in
distinguishing separate imagery abilities when instructed to only engage in one specific
imagery ability.
When mean group differences between good and poor imagers were compared
for EVI minus KI, the middle cingulum was found to be significantly activated when
comparing poor imagers to good imagers. This activity is inconsistent with our
hypothesis and is of interest because the same area was significantly activated when
good imagers were compared to poor imagers when EVI was subtracted from KI.
However, this appears to only reflect the significant difference between the groups in
the middle cingulum with good imagers still revealing greater activation, not necessarily
the direction of the difference. There was a similar outcome for poor imagers compared
to good imagers when KI was subtracted from EVI. Both groups activated the similar
areas except for one area that the good imagers manifested greater activation in
compared to the poor imager group, the superior frontal orbicularis. Independent of the
comparison, good imagers still produced greater activation in all activated areas
compared to poor imagers. Such activation can be explained by good imagers using
working memory to produce the mental image (Ranganath, Johnson, & D’Esposito,
2003; Kapur, 1994) or inhibiting motor movement (Vollm et al., 2006; Del-Ben et al.,
2005).
Given that the brain activity found for the imagery abilities had some
distinctions, we provide central evidence that the different imagery modalities
delineated in the MIQ-3 reflect those defined in the sport science literature (Guillot et
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al., 2009). However, because data regarding IVI and EVI are inconsistent with a recent
study by Jiang et al. (in press) additional examination of these imagery abilities is
suggested to determine if they have truly distinct or overlapping neural networks.
Moreover, our data does not show consistent increased intensity for the good imagery
group in the predicted neural networks developed from previous literature (Binkofski et
al., 2000; Guillot et al., 2008, 2009; Jiang et al., in press; Solodkin et al., 2004),
suggesting that the MIQ-3 was not effective in separating good imagers from poor
imagers. Therefore, imagery ability questionnaires may need to be combined with other
measures to truly distinguish between a group of good imagers from poor imagers as
previously utilized by Guillot et al. (2008). To further overcome these inconsistencies,
and given that imagery remains an important moderator in motor learning and
performance, future studies should further examine the neural activity of good and poor
imagers distinguished solely by self-report imagery ability questionnaires.
The present findings provide initial evidence regarding the neural activity found
across imagery abilities in good and poor imagers. Although our results are inconsistent
with previous studies, those either did not investigate the neural substrates involved in
all imagery abilities or only examined participants with good imagery abilities (Binkofski
et al., Guillot et al., 2008, 2009; Lotze et al., 2003; Solodkin, 2004). Moreover, Guillot et
al. (2008) reported that good imagers showed greater activations in the parietal and
premotor areas during the imagined performance of a finger sequence task than poor
imagers. Such activations may be explained by the fact that in their experiment, the
participants were required to learn a specific sequence of movement coordinating the
213

use of small muscle movements. Thus, it is possible that such task characteristics (e.g.,
speed and learning a movement sequence) required increased brain activation because
of the motor sequencing/planning and motor learning involved to complete the task.
Therefore, future replicative investigations should consider a broader range of tasks
perhaps comparing neural activity across the four MIQ-3 movements.
The following limitations of the current study are warranted. First, we restricted
our study to only female participants. Therefore, the present results may only represent
the neural patterns of females when engaging in different types of imagery and cannot
be generalized to males. We suggest that future studies should consider whether similar
or different brain activity will occur in a sample of male participants, thought to have
performance advantages for imagery tasks involving spatial abilities (Berthoz & ViaudDelmon, 1999; Campos, Perez-Fabello, & Gomez, Juncal, 2004; Parsons et al., 2004;
Siegel-Hinson & McKeever, 2002). In addition, we required the participants to close their
eyes when engaging in the imagery task. Previous studies have shown that the eyesopen and eyes-closed states may produce some variations in the underlying neural
activity found in the visual and visual-related regions, and that some may go undetected
(Marx et al., 2004). Therefore, future studies should have participants engage in MI with
their eyes-open or eyes-closed, as well as having their eyes-open or eyes-closed during
the rest condition to examine if there are differences in activations/deactivations for
different brain regions, especially in the occipital cortex for the VI conditions. Overall,
our findings in part support Paivio’s (1985) assertion that imagery ability has a biological
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(genetic) basis, and the central idea of theoretical models proposing various
performance-related relationships that are mediated or moderated by imagery abilities.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by a research grant from the College of Education at
the University of South Carolina, Columbia to promote the dissemination of research to
members of the University community, the media, and the citizens of the state of South
Carolina. This work was also supported by a grant from the McCausland Center for Brain
Imaging and the Department of Physical Education and Athletic Training. We would also
like to express appreciation to Courtney Bellissimo for her assistance in the data
collection process.

215

Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics for MIQ-3 Screened Ability Groups
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Physical Repetitions (in 30 s)
Imagery Repetitions (in 30 s)
KI
IVI
EVI
MIQ-3 Scores
KI
IVI
EVI
VMIQ-2 Scores
KI
IVI
EVI
Raw EMGrms (mV in 30 s)**
Pectoralis Major
Physical
KI
IVI
EVI
Deltoidius (anterior portion)
Physical
KI
IVI
EVI
Note. *p < 0.01 (2-tailed), ** p > 0.05

Good Imagery Ability
(n = 18)
X
SD
7.44
2.38

Poor Imagery Ability
(n = 19)
X
SD
7.58
2.09

F
0.03

7.04
7.59
7.30

2.36
2.76
2.64

5.98
6.12
5.82

2.09
1.83
2.02

2.07
3.68
3.66

6.82
6.79
6.68

0.19
0.16
0.22

4.45
3.99
3.76

0.19
0.16
0.22

78.98*
150.02*
89.81*

4.32
4.57
4.58

0.19
0.17
0.16

2.78
3.40
3.23

0.18
0.16
0.16

34.83*
25.14*
36.31*

244.56
17.59
16.66
16.59

501.49
36.75
31.59
29.03

22.46
9.92
9.27
7.84

13.42
10.55
8.00
2.05

-1.88
-0.87
-0.99
-1.28

236.06
20.11
20.01
19.95

274.69
2.48
2.34
2.21

132.22
19.04
18.97
19.05

142.55
0.23
0.23
0.60

-1.43
-1.82
-1.93
-1.66

T-Value

Table 3.2
MIQ-3 and VMIQ-2 Inter-Scale Correlations for Screened Ability Groups

KI
MIQ-3
IVI
EVI
Note. *p < 0.01 (2-tailed)

KI
.64*
.78*
.73*
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VMIQ-2
IVI
.59*
.71*
.61*

EVI
.80*
.73*
.66*

Table 3.3
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during All Imagery Conditions Compared to Rest for Good and Poor Imagers

Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Mid

Frontal Inf Oper
Rolandic Oper

a

b

L /R

L
R
R
L
L
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R

Frontal Inf Orb

L

Frontal Sup

R
L

Frontal Mid Orb

L

Frontal Inf Tri
Temporal Cortex
Temporal Sup

Temporal Mid

L
L
R
R

Good Imagers
Local Maxima Peak Coordinates
Cluster
c
d
(MNI)
Size
X
Y
z
k

e

T-value

-42
-46
42
58

38
30
48
12

30
32
24
12

205
205
3
384

5.17
4.97
3.89
4.58

-50
-48
60
60

6
4
8
4

14
2
30
12

860
860
8
26

6.53
5.80
4.16
3.84

-40
-50
50
-24
-18
-40
-46
-26
-38

44
38
38
-8
68
54
46
52
28

-16
-6
-10
52
10
-12
-2
-12
30

28
44
384
7365
4
28
44
4
205

5.36
3.75
4.65
8.73
4.00
4.00
4.41
3.94
4.64

68
68
44
62
56

-30
-32
-42
-44
-70

10
18
8
12
6

23
23
294
294
82

4.08
4.01
8.23
4.49
4.29

Poor Imagers
Local Maxima Peak Coordinates
Cluster
c
d
(MNI)
Size
x
y
z
k

e

T-value

-24

-4

50

3770

10.68

56
-60

10
8

18
18

311
122

4.86
4.70

50
56
56
-44
-46

8
14
2
46
38

4
0
40
-14
-14

311
311
32
21
21

4.53
4.41
4.06
3.96
3.81

-50
60

6
-36

-2
24

122
28

4.15
4.07

Rolandic Oper
Temporal Pole Sup
Temporal Inf

L
L
L
R

-52
-48
-48
58
50

-54
6
10
-64
-20

12
16
0
-2
-18

3731
1369
1369
82
28

7.09
6.81
5.93
4.53
4.18

Parietal Cortex
Parietal Inf

L

-40

-42

56

3731

7.66

R
R
R
L
R

36

-46

48

810

6.17

30
-24
28
16

-32
-66
-46
-66

56
62
60
58

230
3731
810
184

4.57
7.99
4.79
5.97

Supramarginal
Postcentral
Parietal Sup

Precuneus
Motor/Premotor Cortex
Supp Motor Area
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Precentral
Occipital Cortex
Occipital Inf
Subcortical Areas
Putamen
Insula

L
L
L
R

-6
-6
-58
60

-4
-8
-4
10

64
72
32
30

7365
7365
1369
384

12.20
11.81
5.15
4.78

R

48

-76

-10

82

4.26

-40
-48

-46
-44

56
62

3770
3770

4.84
4.56

40
34
-34

-30
-36
-60

40
50
66

367
367
22

5.64
4.19
4.35

-14

-66

66

18

4.31

R
28
0
54
3770
6.78
R
34
18
4
105
5.07
L
-30
18
8
36
4.12
-30
16
8
38
4.46
Cerebellum (IV & V)
L
-4
-48
-10
17
4.37
Cerebellum (VI)
R
38
-60
-24
230
6.69
Cerebellum (Crus I)
R
36
-78
-22
7
4.37
Hippocampus
L
-22
-14
-20
5
3.91
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local maxima thresholded at the p <
0.001 level.

Table 3.4
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during KI Compared to Rest for Good and Poor Imagers

Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Inf Oper
Rolandic Oper
Frontal Inf Orb

a

b

L /R

L
R
R
L
R
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Frontal Mid
Temporal Cortex
Temporal Sup
Temporal Mid

Temporal Inf

L

L
R
R
L
R
L

Good Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
Coordinates (MNI)c
Sized
x
Y
z
k

Tvaluee

58

12

14

26

4.12

-40
-46
52
50
-36
-38

44
44
28
38
38
28

-16
-2
-2
-10
26
32

26
56
36
15
202
202

5.77
4.31
4.04
4.03
5.36
4.38

68
46
56
-50
50
-54
-46
-44

-30
-44
-70
-30
-18
-26
-16
-4

22
8
6
-12
-22
-18
-26
-26

3
92
3
216
9
216
216
9

3.87
5.43
3.96
6.37
4.00
4.82
4.55
3.86

Poor Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
Coordinates (MNI)c
Sized
x
y
z
k

Tvaluee

-60

8

18

518

8.27

48
-42
-46
-38

8
46
38
34

10
-12
-14
-12

863
109
109
109

4.90
4.56
4.01
3.93

-52

6

-2

518

4.88

Parietal Cortex
Parietal Inf

Precuneus
Supramarginal
Parietal Sup
Postcentral
Motor/Premotor Cortex
Supp Motor Area
Precentral
Occipital Cortex
Calcarine
221

Subcortical Areas
Pallidum

L

-44

-40

48

2272

5.92

R
L
R

36

-44

46

235

4.35

L
R

28

-46

58

235

4.06

L
R

-6

-4

66

5721

11.32

L
R

-24
16

-68
-66

62
64

2272
72

7.85
4.76

-54
-48

-36
-44

50
62

1336
1336

7.10
6.25

-14
66
60
-32

-64
-30
-36
-62

68
30
26
66

25
82
82
7

4.56
4.24
4.17
4.00

-6
58

0
10

68
20

3898
863

6.98
4.91

R
24
-2
48
3898
6.95
L
-16
0
-2
33
4.16
Insula
R
48
14
-2
36
3.95
36
16
4
863
5.83
Cerebellum (IV & V)
L
-6
-48
-12
3
3.73
Cerebellum (Crus I)
R
36
-78
-22
17
4.68
Putamen
L
-30
-10
52
5721
9.63
Thalamus
L
-14
-12
64
5721
9.18
Note. aL = left hemisphere, bR = right hemisphere, cMNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, dExtent threshold k = 3, eT-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.

Table 3.5
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during IVI Compared to Rest for Good and Poor Imagers

Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Mid
Frontal Inf Oper

a

b

L /R

L
R
R
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Rolandic Oper
Frontal Inf Orb

L
R
R
L

Frontal Inf Tri

L

Frontal Mid Orb
Temporal Cortex
Temporal Pole Sup
Temporal Sup
Temporal Mid

L
R
L
R
L
R
L

Rolandic Oper
Temporal Inf
Parietal Cortex
Supramarginal

L
L
R

Good Imagers
Local Maxima Peak Coordinates
Cluster
c
d
(MNI)
Size
X
Y
z
k

58
58

14
14

12
30

40
13

e

T-value

4.31
4.24

50
-40
-42
-40
-46
-36

38
44
44
38
30
56

-10
-16
-2
28
30
-12

65
19
5
93
93
19

4.62
4.19
3.80
4.38
4.32
4.20

-50
68
-56
46
62
-52
-50
-60
-48
-60

10
-30
-44
-44
-44
-58
-30
-22
6
-62

-4
14
20
8
12
12
-12
2
16
-6

1142
16
2570
196
23
2570
259
10
1142
13

5.99
4.31
6.65
6.51
4.57
6.96
5.82
4.00
6.88
4.35

Poor Imagers
Local Maxima Peak Coordinates
Cluster
c
d
(MNI)
Size
X
y
z
k

e

T-value

-24
34
56

-4
18
10

50
6
16

3422
87
351

9.98
5.50
4.87

-54
50

8
8

14
4

47
351

4.13
4.64

56

14

-2

351

5.00

60
-52
52

-36
6
-74

24
-2
4

70
47
3

4.59
4.05
3.99

40

-32

42

401

6.06

Parietal Inf

L

-58

-30

44

10

3.90

Precuneus
Parietal Sup

L
L
R
R

-24
18
64

-66
-66
-6

64
56
28

2570
94
24

8.17
4.88
4.34

-2
-6
-6
-58

2
-4
-6
-4

60
64
72
30

6667
6667
6667
1142

10.93
10.17
10.03
4.89

Postcentral
Motor/Premotor Cortex
Supp Motor Area

Precentral
Subcortical Areas
Pallidum

Cerebellum (IV & V)
Insula

L

L
R
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L
L
L
R

-40
-46
-14

-46
-28
-66

56
46
66

725
725
17

4.99
4.92
4.29

-6

0

60

3422

6.18

22
22
-22
-4
-30

-4
0
-4
-48
16

48
4
4
-10
8

3422
25
18
17
28

7.19
4.12
4.08
4.55
4.43

-30
18
8
31
4.14
46
14
-20
15
3.91
48
14
-2
4
3.80
Cerebellum (VI)
R
38
-60
-24
192
6.42
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local maxima thresholded at the p <
0.001 level.

Table 3.6
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during EVI Compared to Rest for Good and Poor Imagers

Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Sup
Frontal Inf Oper
Frontal Inf Orb
224

Frontal Inf Tri
Frontal Mid Orb
Frontal Mid

a

b

L /R

L
R
R
R
L
L
L
L
R

Temporal Cortex
Temporal Mid

L

Temporal Sup

R
R

Temporal Pole Sup
Parietal Cortex
Parietal Sup

R
L
R

Good Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
Coordinates (MNI)c
Sized
x
Y
Z
k

Tvaluee

58
48
48
-40
-38
-40
-44
44

12
14
38
42
28
44
36
48

14
0
-12
-16
28
-2
32
22

336
278
104
22
149
33
149
7

4.68
4.08
4.79
5.04
4.79
4.45
4.96
3.94

-52
-60
56
38
60
44

-56
-20
-70
-34
-44
14

14
0
6
14
14
-20

3450
77
217
372
372
278

7.23
4.73
4.31
4.80
4.65
5.02

16
30

-64
-50

56
64

244
992

7.74
5.00

Poor Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
Coordinates (MNI)c
Sized
x
y
z
k

Tvaluee

-24
26
56

-4
-2
10

52
54
20

3032
3032
9

9.43
6.34
4.00

-36

-58

66

362

4.51

Parietal Inf

L
R

Supramarginal
Postcentral
Motor/Premotor Cortex
Precentral
Supp Motor Area

R
R
L
R
L

-36
-44
36
38
56
62

-44
-40
-44
-36
-28
-6

52
48
46
48
48
32

3450
3450
992
992
23
336

8.53
8.10
6.83
6.61
4.44
4.83

-40

-46

56

362

4.39

42

-32

42

84

4.39

-32
60
-2
-2

-10
4
-6
0

54
24
66
58

9366
336
9366
9366

8.97
5.84
13.60
12.74

-50

0

36

14

3.90
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Occipital Cortex
Calcarine
L
-16
-66
66
3
3.89
Occipital Inf
R
48
-80
-4
217
4.53
Occipital Mid
L
-46
-76
2
36
4.24
Subcortical Areas
Cerebellum (VI)
R
38
-58
-24
234
7.97
Insula
R
48
6
-18
278
4.35
Putamen
L
-32
-12
16
28
5.61
a
b
c
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, dExtent threshold k = 3, eT-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.

Table 3.7
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during KI Compared to EVI for Good and Poor Imagers

Area

226

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Inf Tri
Frontal Mid
Temporal Cortex
Temporal Sup
Temporal Inf
Temporal Mid
Parietal Cortex
Supramarginal

Parietal Inf
Motor/Premotor Cortex
Supp Motor Area

Occipital Cortex
Lingual
Subcortical Areas
Insula
Cerebellum (VI)

a

b

L /R

Good Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
Coordinates (MNI)c
Sized
x
Y
Z
k

Tvaluee

Poor Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
Coordinates (MNI)c
Sized
x
y
z
k

Tvaluee

L
L

-42
-36

32
32

12
38

233
33

5.68
4.34

R
R
R

60
62
52

-26
-28
-30

20
-16
-14

441
4
3

5.01
4.13
4.02

R
L
L

52
-64
-56
-56

-32
-38
-44
-36

28
28
28
46

441
426
426
426

5.20
5.11
4.95
3.99

L
R

-12
4

-6
-12

72
78

912
912

5.44
4.73

L

-14

-62

-14

18

3.93

R
R

34
22

-16
-74

6
-16

7054
183

7.00
5.68

12
4

-4
8

70
70

16
7

4.18
3.88

Cerebellum (Crus I)

R

Cerebellum (VIII)

R

Cerebellum (IX)
Cingulum Mid

L
L

38
32
38
30
20
-22
-4
0

-72
-66
-56
-50
-68
-44
-8
-26

-34
-38
-28
-44
-46
-46
44
46

70
70
4
6
4
4
912
4

4.76
3.84
3.94
4.07
4.04
3.84
5.27
3.74

Thalamus
R
18
-14
8
16
4.15
Vermis
-34
-48
36
3.91
0
a
b
c
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, dExtent threshold k = 3, eT-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.
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Table 3.8
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during KI Compared to IVI for Good and Poor Imagers

Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Inf Tri
Frontal Inf Orb
Frontal Mid Orb
Frontal Sup Orb
Frontal Sup

a

b

L /R

Good Imagers
Local Maxima Peak Coordinates
Cluster
c
d
(MNI)
Size
X
Y
z
k

e

T-value

L
L
R
L
L
R
L

-24

46

42

11

4.13

Poor Imagers
Local Maxima Peak Coordinates
Cluster
c
d
(MNI)
Size
x
y
z
k
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-38
-46
-26
28
-24
-24
20
-18
-20

26
38
28
34
38
56
30
24
64

10
12
-8
-8
-14
-2
-12
56
10

118
118
116
8
116
49
7
7
3

e

T-value

6.23
4.21
5.93
3.99
5.54
4.85
4.21
3.92
3.73

Parietal Cortex
Supramarginal
L
-56
-32
32
65
4.42
Parietal Inf
L
-52
44
56
5
3.97
Motor/Premotor Cortex
Supp Motor Area
L
-10
22
66
15
4.28
Subcortical Areas
Pallidum
L
-10
8
-4
125
4.96
Cingulum Mid
L
-2
-6
48
10
3.95
Caudate
R
14
8
22
40
4.48
Hippocampus
L
-22
-26
-6
6
4.01
Cerebellum (Crus II)
R
34
-68
-38
7
3.86
Cerebellum (VIIb)
R
28
-74
-46
6
3.93
Cerebellum (VIII)
R
18
-68
-40
8
3.94
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local maxima thresholded at the p <
0.001 level.

Table 3.9
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during IVI Compared to EVI for Good and Poor Imagers

Area

Motor/Premotor Cortex
Supp Motor Area
Occipital Cortex
Cuneus
Subcortical Areas
Caudate

a

b

L /R

R
L

Good Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
Coordinates (MNI)c
Sized
x
Y
z
k
14

-6

68

4

Tvaluee

Poor Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
Coordinates (MNI)c
Sized
x
y
z
k

Tvaluee

3.79
-4

-78

26

24

3.88
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R
16
22
-4
51
4.96
L
-12
22
-4
3
3.90
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.

Table 3.10
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during EVI Compared to IVI for Good and Poor Imagers

Area

a

b

L /R

Good Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
Coordinates (MNI)c
Sized
x
Y
Z
k

Tvaluee

Poor Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
Coordinates (MNI)c
Sized
x
y
z
k

Tvaluee

Parietal Cortex
Parietal Inf
L
-38
-46
46
7
3.92
Note. aL = left hemisphere, bR = right hemisphere, cMNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, dExtent threshold k = 3, eT-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.
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Table 3.11
Brain Areas Significantly Activated during EVI Compared to KI for Good and Poor Imagers

Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Mid
Temporal Cortex
Temporal Sup
Temporal Inf
Temporal Mid

231

Parietal Cortex
Parietal Inf
Postcentral Gyrus
Supramarginal Gyrus
Motor/Premotor Cortex
Precentral

La/Rb

Good Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
c
Coordinates (MNI)
Sized
X
Y
z
k

Tvaluee

R

40

32

24

7

3.98

R
R
L

46
54
-46
-46

-24
-62
-62
-70

60
-4
16
20

497
23
66
66

4.68
4.21
4.13
3.94

R
L

48
-48
-48
36

-38
-14
-8
-38

54
46
58
42

497
213
213
497

5.74
4.77
4.53
6.59

-40
-22
-30
46
52
0

-8
-14
-18
8
12
-30

56
64
58
32
36
68

213
50
50
43
43
3

4.23
4.46
3.76
4.10
3.92
3.82

R
L

R

Poor Imagers
Local Maxima Peak
Cluster
c
Coordinates (MNI)
Sized
x
y
z
k

Paracentral Lobule
R
Occipital Cortex
Occipital Mid
R
38
-70
24
9
Subcortical Areas
Insula
R
42
20
26
11
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local maxima
thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.

Tvaluee

3.98
4.06

Table 3.12
Brain Areas Significantly Different between Good and Poor Imagers during EVI Compared to Rest
Area

La/Rb

Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)
x
Y
z

Cluster Size

T-value

K
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Motor/Premotor Cortex
Precentral
L
-16
-14
70
55
4.04
Supp Motor Area
L
-2
-2
54
4
3.42
Occipital Cortex
Lingual
R
20
-88
-26
3
3.43
Subcortical Areas
Cerebellum (VIII)
R
24
-50
-40
23
3.96
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.

Table 3.13
Brain Areas Significantly Different between Good and Poor Imagers during IVI Compared to KI
Area

La/Rb

Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)
X
Y
z

Cluster Size

T-value

K

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Inf Orb
R
28
38
-8
15
3.82
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.
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Table 3.14
Brain Areas Significantly Different between Good and Poor Imagers during KI Compared to Rest
Area

La/Rb

Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)
x
Y
z

Cluster Size

T-value

K

Subcortical Areas
Caudate
L
-10
8
20
22
3.68
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.
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Table 3.15
Brain Areas Significantly Different between Good and Poor Imagers during All Imagery Conditions Compared to Rest
Area

La/Rb

Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)
x
Y
z

Cluster Size

T-value

K

Subcortical Areas
Caudate
L
-8
6
20
73
3.64
Cingulum Mid
R
16
-44
38
5
3.49
Note. aL = left hemisphere, bR = right hemisphere, cMNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, dExtent threshold k = 3, eT-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.
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Table 3.16
Brain Areas Significantly Different between Good and Poor Imagers during EVI Compared to KI
Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Sup Orb
Frontal Mid Orb
Temporal Cortex
Heschl
Parietal Cortex
Postcentral Cortex
236

Motor/Premotor Cortex
Precentral
Supp Motor Area
Subcortical Areas
Putamen

La/Rb

Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)
x
Y
z

Cluster Size

T-value

K

R
R

20
32

36
58

-12
-4

30
17

3.93
3.61

R

48

-10

6

3

3.43

R
L

50
-48

-18
-14

56
42

8
18

3.62
3.59

L

-20
-22
-10

-16
-14
-6

72
64
72

271
271
271

4.24
4.13
3.94

L
R
L

20
20
-2
208
4.92
-28
14
2
123
3.60
-20
10
2
123
3.57
Caudate
R
4
20
2
208
3.88
Insula
R
40
14
-8
66
4.12
Pallidum
R
20
-22
-4
26
3.55
L
-14
2
0
123
3.69
Note. aL = left hemisphere, bR = right hemisphere, cMNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, dExtent threshold k = 3, eT-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.

Table 3.17
Brain Areas Significantly Different between Poor and Good Imagers during EVI Compared to KI
Area

La/Rb

Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)
x
Y
z

Cluster Size

T-value

K

Subcortical Areas
Cingulum Mid
L
-6
-28
-46
37
3.41
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.
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Table 3.18
Brain Areas Significantly Different between Poor and Good Imagers during KI Compared to EVI
Area

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Mid Orb
Temporal Cortex
Heschl
Parietal Cortex
Postcentral
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Motor/Premotor Cortex
Precentral
Subcortical Areas
Putamen

La/Rb

Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)
x
Y
z

Cluster Size

T-value

k

R

32

58

-4

17

3.61

R

48

-10

6

3

3.43

R
L

50
-48

-18
-14

56
42

8
18

3.62
3.59

L

-20
-22

-16
-14

72
64

271
271

4.25
4.13

R
L

20
20
-2
208
4.92
-28
14
2
123
3.60
-20
10
2
123
3.57
Caudate
R
4
20
2
208
3.88
Thalamus
L
-10
-6
72
271
3.94
Insula
R
40
14
-8
66
4.12
Pallidum
R
20
-2
-4
26
3.55
L
-14
2
0
123
3.69
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level.

Table 3.19
Brain Areas Significantly Different between Poor and Good Imagers during KI Compared to IVI
Area

La/Rb

Local Maxima Peak
Coordinates (MNI)
x
Y
z

Cluster Size

T-value

K

Frontal Cortex
Frontal Inf Orb
R
28
38
-8
15
3.82
a
b
c
d
e
Note. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, Extent threshold k = 3, T-value: local
maxima thresholded at the p < 0.001 level
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Figure 3.1
MIQ-3 arm rotation task
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Figure 3.2
Electromyography surface sensor placement
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Figure 3.3
Chronological order of experiment
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Session #3
•fMRI Scan
•PostExperiment
Debriefing
Questionnair
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Parameter Estimates for KI minus Rest for Good Compared to Poor Imagers
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Parameter Estimates for IVI minus KI for Good Compared to Poor Imagers
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Parameter Estimates for EVI minus KI for Good Compared to Poor Imagers
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Parameter Estimates for KI minus EVI for Poor Compared to Good Imagers
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APPENDIX A – INFORMED CONSENT
“Differentiating Self-Report Imagery Ability with Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging”
Brian D. Seiler, MS, PES, CES, ATC, Principal Investigator
Department of Physical Education and Athletic Training
Introduction and Purpose:
You are invited to continue your participation in a research study conducted by
Brian Seiler, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Physical Education and Athletic
Training at the University of South Carolina. I am completing this research study as part
of the requirements for my doctoral degree in physical education. This study is funded
by the College of Education and the McCausland Center for Brain Imaging, and it
examines the validity of self-report imagery ability questionnaires. This form explains
what you will be asked to do in the MRI portion of the study if you decide to continue
your participation. Please read it carefully and feel free to ask any questions before
making a decision about continuing your participation in the study.
Description of Study Procedures:
You have qualified to take part in the MRI portion of this study because of your
scores on the pre-screening questionnaires you previously completed. As a selected
participant, you will complete two subsequent testing sessions. For the second visit
(current visit), an fMRI simulation scanning procedure will be completed. This will
include the measurement of how many times that you report imagining an upper
extremity movement (MIQ-3 protocol) (see Figure 1) in 30 seconds and the muscle
activity (i.e., electromyography) produced by this movement. Electromyography
electrodes will be places on the surface of the skin on the following muscles: pectoralis
major and anterior portion of the deltoideus (See Figure 2). This session will be
conducted individually and take approximately 30-45 minutes.
Figure 1. MIQ-3 protocol.
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Figure 2. Electromyography (EMG) electrode placement.

You will be invited back a second time to individually complete the MIQ-3
protocol during an fMRI scan at the McCausland Center for Brain Imaging at Richland
Hospital, Columbia, South Carolina. You will be positioned supine on a table with your
head immobilized using foam cushions. In addition, you will be required to wear MRIcompatible headphones to indicate phases of the scan. Once positioned in the scanner,
you will be required to imagine the MIQ-3 protocol according to various conditions.
Instructions will be provided on a computer screen that can be clearly seen through a
mirror attached to a head coil positioned in front of your face.
After reading the instructions, you will be required to close your eyes and
imagine the movement using the condition identified in the directions. Each imagery
period (approximately 30 seconds) will be separated by a beeping sound transmitted
through MRI-compatible headphones to indicate the end of each trial. Each imagery
period will be separated by a rest period of approximately 30 seconds. After competing
each imagery period, you will be required to open your eyes and read the next condition
on the screen. You will repeat the aforementioned procedure for a session of
approximately 10 minutes.
After the fMRI scan, you will be debriefed. Here, you will be asked to rate your
experience and your ability to complete the imagery tasks during the scanning session.
The fMRI session will be completed individually and last approximately 60 minutes.

Task
Location
Time
Commitment
Payment

Session 2
fMRI Simulation Scanning Procedure
Discovery Building (University of
South Carolina, main campus)

Session 3
fMRI Scanning Session
McCausland Center for Brain Imaging,
Richland Hospital, Columbia, South Carolina

30 minutes

60 minutes

$20

$30
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Risks of Participation:
The risks of participation in the MRI scanning procedure are minimal. Special
considerations are made for the following:
 Metal: The MRI machine produces a constant, strong magnetic field. If you have
metal implants and clips within your body they may be influenced by the
magnetic field and shift in position. If you have such implants you must inform
the study staff and withdraw from the study. Metal earrings and necklaces also
must be removed prior to the study. If you have shrapnel, surgical implants, or
other pieces of metal in your body that cannot be removed, you may not be able
to participate. In many cases, if you have dental appliances in your mouth you
can participate, but you should notify the primary investigator to be certain.
 Induced Currents: Due to changing magnetic fields during the course of
operation, there is a possibility that you will experience a localized twitching
sensation. This is not unexpected and should not be painful.
 Hearing: Functional MRI scanning produces a loud, high frequency tone that can
cause hearing damage if appropriate hearing protection is not used. Adequate
hearing protection will be provided and required.
 Claustrophobia: The functional scanning coil fits closely around your head, so if
you feel anxious in confined spaces, you may not want to participate. If you
decide to participate, and then at a later time decide to discontinue, just let the
primary investigator know and we will stop the experiment.
 Anxiety: You may also experience some boredom and/or anxiety from being
required to lie still for the duration of the scan.
Participant Injury:
In the unlikely event that you are injured as a result of your participation in this
study, the study staff will assist you in obtaining appropriate medical treatment.
However, you will be responsible for any costs associated with medical treatment.
Incidental Findings:
Some MRI scans can detect medical conditions, such as cancer, brain injury and
abnormal blood vessels; however, this functional MRI is carried out purely for
experimental purposes and we are not looking for brain disorders. Furthermore, we are
not trained in diagnosing brain disorders; therefore, we are not qualified to off any
medical opinions concerning your scan (good or bad). It is possible that we might notice
something in your scan that appears unusual and/or abnormal. If this occurs, we will
inform you of the finding and provide you with a copy of your scan, which you may take
to a medical expert for further review and diagnosis. Being told about such a finding
may cause anxiety as well as suggest the need for additional tests and financial costs.
Any costs associated with a clinical follow-up opinion are your responsibility.
If you do not wish to be informed of this type of finding, you should not participate in
the study.
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Benefits of Participation:
Taking part in this study is not likely to benefit you personally. This project is
designed to examine how the brain functions while you imagine a movement task.
Alternatives:
The alternative to this study is not to participate.
Costs:
There will be no costs to you for participating in this study other than parking or
gas expenses you may incur to get to the testing sites.
Payment:
If you fully participate and complete all parts of the study you will receive a total
of $50 and copy of your brain scan on a CD-ROM. This $50 will help reimburse you for
your time and transportation expenses incurred as a result of the study. You will receive
two payment installments. The first installment of $20 will be awarded after the
completion of the fMRI simulation session at the Discovery Building located at the
University of South Carolina (main campus). A second installment of $30 will be
distributed at the study’s conclusion at the McCausland Center for Brain Imaging
(Richland Hospital, Columbia, South Carolina).
Circumstances for Dismissal from the Study
You may be dismissed from the study without your consent for various reasons,
including the following:
 If you do not keep appointments for study visits or fail to complete study
activities (e.g., complete forms).
 If you do not follow the instructions you are given.
 If the primary investigator believes that it is not in your best interest to continue
in the study.
Confidentiality of Records
Participation in this study is voluntary. You can withdraw from the study at any
time and request that data obtained through your participation be destroyed in your
presence.
All information gathered will remain confidential. Throughout the study, the
study staff will maintain a link to your identity. Only these individuals will be able to link
your information with your name. Study records/data will be stored in locked filing
cabinets and password protected computer files at the University of South Carolina. The
results of the study may be published or presented at meetings, but your identity will
not be revealed.
While the study staff will make every effort to protect your privacy, it cannot be
absolutely guaranteed. The primary investigator and other study staff members will
have access to your identifiable information. In rare cases, a research study may be
evaluated by an oversight agency, such as the USC Institutional Review Board or the U.S.
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Office for Human Research Protections. If this occurs, records that identify you and the
consent form signed by you may be inspected so that they may evaluate whether the
study is properly conducted and your rights as a participant were adequately protected.
At any time after the study, you can request that data obtained through your
participation be destroyed in your presence.
Voluntary Participation
Participation in this study is voluntary. You are free not to participate or to
withdraw at any time, for whatever reason, without negative consequences. In the even
that you do withdraw from this study, the information you have already provided will be
kept on file in a confidential manner, and you will not receive compensation.
Participation is not related to regular course work and participation or withdrawal will
have no impact on grades for those participants that are students. If participants are
students and complete the study, a portion of their professional requirement of the
department will be provided.
Contact Persons
For more information concerning this research, or if you believe you may have
suffered a research related injury, you should contact the primary investigator Brian D.
Seiler at 803-348-1067 or brian.d.seiler@gmail.com, faculty advisor Dr. Eva Monsma at
803-777-1386 or eavadocz@mailbox.sc.edu, or Dr. Roger Newman-Norlund at 803-7777167 or rnorlund@mailbox.sc.edu.
If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject contact, Lisa
Marie Johnson, IRB Manager, Office of Research Compliance, University of South
Carolina, 901 Sumter Street, Byrnes 515, Columbia, SC 29208, Phone: (803) 777-7095 or
LisaJ@mailbox.sc.edu. The Office of Research Compliance is an administrative office
that supports the USC Institutional Review Board. The Institutional Review Board (IRB)
consists of representatives from a variety of scientific disciplines, non-scientists, and
community members for the primary purpose of protecting the rights and welfare of
human subjects enrolled in research studies.
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Participant and Witness Signatures:
Your signature indicates that you have read this informed consent form, and
your questions have been answered by the primary investigator or a study staff
representative.
__________________________________________
Participant Name

__________________
Date

__________________________________________
Participant Signature

__________________
Date

__________________________________________
Witness Name

__________________
Date

__________________________________________
Witness Signature

__________________
Date
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APPENDIX B – DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Name: _________________________________ Date: _____ / _____ / __________
Please fill in the blank or circle the appropriate answer for each of the following
questions.
1. What is your ethnic group?
Caucasian
African American
Hispanic/Latino
Asian
American Indian
Pacific Islander
Other (specify) __________________________
2. What is your highest level of education completed?
High School Diploma
Associate Degree (specify) _________________
Bachelor of Arts (BA)
Bachelor of Science (BS)
Master of Arts (MA)
Master of Science (MS)
Doctorate (PhD/EdD)
3. What is your academic major(s) (area(s) of study)?
4. Do you have a history of neurologic or psychiatric disorders?
YES
NO
5. Are you currently taking any medications that alter neurologic activity (i.e.,
antidepressants or ADHD)
YES
NO
6. Do you have a history of drug use or substance abuse (including alcoholism)?
YES
NO
7. Do you have a history of seizures?
YES
NO
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8. Do you have a history of head trauma (including concussions) within the past five
years?
YES
NO
If yes, when was your last head injury?
9. Do you have normal or normal-to-corrected vision?
YES
NO
10. What is your sport history? (Example: Football – 2 years; Track & Field – 4 years;
Soccer – 9 years; Basketball – 1 year)
11. Do you know what mental imagery is?
YES
NO
12. What is your general attitude toward mental imager?
13. Have you previously used mental imagery for performance enhancement?
YES
NO
If yes, please explain.
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APPENDIX C – MRI PARTICIPANT SCREENING DOCUMENT
McCausland Center for Brain Imaging
MRI Participant Screening Document
You must properly answer ALL the questions on this form to be considered for scanning
in the MRI. If you choose not to answer any of the questions, DO NOT SIGN this
document and inform the researcher that you wish to withdraw from the experiment.
HEIGHT _____ ft ______ in

WEIGHT __________ lbs

Date of Birth _____ / _____ / ________
1) Participant History
____Yes ____ No Have you ever done metal grinding, welding or machine shop work
(job, hobby or student)?
____Yes ____ No Have you ever had metal removed from your eye(s) (including metal
shavings, slivers, and bullets)?
____Yes ____ No Are you claustrophobic?
____Yes ____ No Do you experience vertigo or other vestibular abnormalities?
2) Participant History
____Yes ____ No Do you have sickle cell anemia?
____Yes ____ No Do you have a medical history of cancer (your history, not family
history)?
____Yes ____ No Are you pregnant or breast-feeding?
(Date of last menstrual period? _____ / _____ / ________ )
3) Do you have any of the following in or on your body?
____Yes ____ No Cardiac wires or defibrillator
____Yes ____ No Venous Filter, basket or stent
____Yes ____ No Dental Implants
____Yes ____ No Eye Implant
____Yes ____ No Bullets, BBs, Pellets, Metal Fragments of any kind
____Yes ____ No Implanted device (pain pump, bone stimulator, tissue expander, IUD,
etc.)

322

____Yes ____ No Implanted Catheter
____Yes ____ No Penile Prosthesis
____Yes ____ No Fractured bones repaired with metal
____Yes ____ No Ear Implant
____Yes ____ No Joint Replacements
4) Do you have any of the following in or on your body?
____Yes ____ No Orthodontic Braces or Permanent Retainer
____Yes ____ No Permanent Makeup (eyeliner, etc.) or Tattoo
Date of Tattoo:
______________________________________
Location of Tattoo Parlor:
________________________________
5) Do you have any of the following in or on your body?
____Yes ____ No Artificial limbs
____Yes ____ No Removable dental work
____Yes ____ No Hearing aid (must be removed before entering scan room)
____Yes ____ No Body piercing jewelry
____Yes ____ No Medication patches (including nicotine)
____Yes ____ No Underwire Bra
6) List all past surgical procedures:
________________________________________________________________________
7) List all allergies: (e.g. Latex)
________________________________________________________________________
8) Have you had an MRI before? ____Yes ____ No
The possible hazards of an MRI scan have been explained to me, and I understand that I
can withdraw at this point for any reason, and that I do not have to disclose that reason
to the experimenter. Your signature below indicates that you understand this screening
form and attest to its accuracy. If protocols require anonymous screening forms, then
your signature on the Informed Consent Form will indicate compliance with this
screening instrument.
_______________________________________
Participant Signature

__________________
Date

_______________________________________
Witness Signature

__________________
Date
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APPENDIX D – EDINBURGH HANDEDNESS QUESTIONNAIRE
Please indicate with a check () your preference in using your left or right hand in the
following tasks.
Where the preference is so strong you would never use the other hand, unless
absolutely forced to, put two checks ().
If you are indifferent, put one check in each column ( | ).
Some of the activities require both hands. In these cases, the part of the task or object
for which hand preference is wanted is indicated in parentheses.
Task / Object

Left Hand

Left Hand

Right Hand

1. Writing
2. Drawing
3. Throwing
4. Scissors
5. Toothbrush
6. Knife (without fork)
7. Spoon
8. Broom (upper hand)
9. Striking a Match (match
hand)
10. Opening a Box (lid hand)
Total Checks:
Cumulative Total:
Difference:
Result:
Interpretation:

LH =
RH =
CT = LH + RH =
D = RH – LH =
R = (D / CT) x 100 =
Left Handed: R < -40
Ambidextrous: -40 ≤ R ≤ +40
Right Handed: R > +40
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Right Hand

APPENDIX E – MOVEMENT IMAGERY QUESTIONNAIRE-3
Movement Imagery Questionnaire-3
Full Questionnaire with Instructions
Instructions
This questionnaire concerns two ways of mentally performing movements which are
used by some people more than by others, and are more applicable to some types of
movements than others. The first is attempting to form a visual image or picture of a
movement in your mind. The second is attempting to feel what performing a movement
is like without actually doing the movement. You are requested to do both of these
mental tasks for a variety of movements in this questionnaire, and then rate how
easy/difficult you found the tasks to be. The ratings that you give are not designed to
assess the goodness or badness of the way you perform these mental tasks. They are
attempts to discover the capacity individuals’ show for performing these tasks for
different movements. There are no right or wrong ratings or some ratings that are
better than others.
Each of the following statements describes a particular action or movement. Read each
statement carefully and then actually perform the movement as described. Only
perform the movement a single time. Return to the starting position for the movement
just as if you were going to perform the action a second time. Then depending on which
of the following you are asked to do, either (1) form as clear and vivid a visual image as
possible of the movement just performed from an internal perspective (i.e., from a 1st
person perspective, as if you are actually inside yourself performing and seeing the
action through your own eyes), (2) form as clear and vivid a visual image as possible of
the movement just performed from an external perspective (i.e., from a 3rd person
perspective, as if watching yourself on DVD), or (3) attempt to feel yourself making the
movement just performed without actually doing it.
After you have completed the mental task required, rate the ease/difficulty with which
you were able to do the task. Take your rating from the following scale. Be as accurate
as possible and take as long as you feel necessary to arrive at the proper rating for each
movement. You may choose the same rating for any number of movements “seen” or
“felt” and it is not necessary to utilize the entire length of the scale.
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RATING SCALES
Visual Imagery Scale
1
Very
hard to
see

2
Hard to
see

3
Somewhat
hard to see

4
Neutral
(not easy
or hard to
see)

5
Somewhat
easy to see

6
Easy to
see

7
Very
easy to
see

6
Easy to
feel

7
Very
easy to
feel

Kinesthetic Imagery Scale
1
Very
hard to
feel

2
Hard to
feel

3
Somewhat
hard to
feel

4
Neutral
(not easy
or hard to
feel)
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5
Somewhat
easy to
feel

1. STARTING POSITION: Stand with your feet and legs together and your arms at
your sides.
ACTION: Raise your right knee as high as possible so that you are starting on your
left leg with your right leg flexed (bent) at the knee. Now lower your right leg so
you are once again standing on two feet. The action is performed slowly.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to feel yourself making the
movement just performed without actually doing it. Now rate the ease/difficulty
with which you were able to do this mental task.
Rating: _____
2. STARTING POSITION: Stand with your feet and legs together and your arms at
your sides.
ACTION: Bend down low and then jump straight up in the air as high as possible
with both arms extended above your head. Land with both feet apart and lower
your arms to your sides.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to see yourself making the
movement just performed from an internal perspective. Now rate the
ease/difficulty with which you were able to do this mental task.
Rating: _____
3. STARTING POSITION: Extend the arm of your non-dominant hand straight out to
your side so that it is parallel to the ground, palm down.
ACTION: Move your arm forward until it is directly in front of your body (still
parallel to the ground). Keep your arm extended during the movement, and
make the movement slowly.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to see yourself making the
movement just performed from an external perspective. Now rate the
ease/difficulty with which you were able to do this mental task.
Rating: _____
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4. STARTING POSITION: Stand with your feet slightly apart and your arms fully
extended above your head.
ACTION: Slowly bend forward at the wait and try and touch your toes with your
fingertips (or, if possible, touch the floor with your fingertips or your hands).
Now return to the starting position, standing erect with your arms extended
above your head.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to feel yourself making the
movement just performed without actually doing it. Now rate the ease/difficulty
with which you were able to do this mental task.
Rating: _____
5. STARTING POSITION: Stand with your feet and legs together and your arms at
your sides.
ACTION: Raise your right knee as high as possible so that you are starting on your
left leg with your right leg flexed (bent) at the knee. Now lower your right leg so
you are once again standing on two feet. The action is performed slowly.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to see yourself making the
movement just performed from an internal perspective. Now rate the
ease/difficulty with which you were able to do this mental task.
Rating: _____
6. STARTING POSITION: Stand with your feet and legs together and your arms at
your sides.
ACTION: Bend down low and then jump straight up in the air as high as possible
with both arms extended above your head. Land with both feet apart and lower
your arms to your sides.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to see yourself making the
movement just performed from an external perspective. Now rate the
ease/difficulty with which you were able to do this mental task.
Rating: _____
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7. STARTING POSITION: Extend the arm of your non-dominant hand straight out to
your side so that it is parallel to the ground, palm down.
ACTION: Move your arm forward until it is directly in front of your body (still
parallel to the ground). Keep your arm extended during the movement, and
make the movement slowly.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to feel yourself making the
movement just performed without actually doing it. Now rate the ease/difficulty
with which you were able to do this mental task.
Rating: _____
8. STARTING POSITION: Stand with your feet slightly apart and your arms fully
extended.
ACTION: Slowly bend forward at the waist and try to touch your toes with your
fingertips (or, if possible, touch the floor with your fingertips or your hands).
Now return to the starting position, standing erect with your arms extended
above your head.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to see yourself making the
movement just performed from an internal perspective. Now rate the
ease/difficult with which you were able to do this mental task.
Rating: _____
9. STARTING POSITION: Stand with your feet and legs together and your arms at
your sides.
ACTION: Raise your right knee as high as possible so that you are starting on your
left leg with your right leg flexed (bent at the knee. How lower your right leg so
you are once again standing on two feet. The action is performed slowly.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to see yourself making the
movement just performed from an external perspective. Now rate the
ease/difficulty with which you were able to do this mental task.
Rating: _____
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10. STARTING POSITION: Stand with your feet and legs together and your arms at
your sides.
ACTION: Bend down low and then jump straight up in the air as high as possible
with both arms extended above your head. Land with both feet apart and lower
your arms to your sides.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to feel yourself making the
movement just performed without actually doing it. Now rate the ease/difficulty
with which you were able to do this mental task.
Rating: _____
11. STARTING POSITION: Extend the arm of your non-dominant hand straight out to
your side so that it is parallel to the ground, palm down.
ACTION: Move your arm forward until it is directly in front of your body (still
parallel to the ground). Keep your arm extended during the movement, and
make the movement slowly.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to see yourself making the
movement just performed from an internal perspective. Now rate the
ease/difficulty with which you were able to do this mental talk.
Rating: _____
12. STARTING POSITION: Stand with your feet slightly apart and your arms fully
extended above your head.
ACTION: Slowly bend forward at the waist and try and touch your toes with your
fingertips (or, if possible, touch the floor with your fingertips or your hand). Now
return to the starting position, standing effect with your arms extended above
your head.
MENTAL TASK: Assume the starting position. Attempt to see yourself making the
movement just performed from an external perspective. Now rate the
ease/difficulty with which you were able to do this mental task.
Rating: _____
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After you have completed the mental task required, rate the ease/difficulty with
which you were able to do the task in the space provided below. Take your rating
from the provided scale. Be as accurate as possible and take as long as you feel
necessary to arrive at the proper rating for each movement.
RATING SCALES
Visual Imagery Scale
1
Very
hard to
see

2
Hard to
see

3
Somewhat
hard to see

4
Neutral
(not easy
nor hard)

5
Somewhat
easy to see

6
Easy to
see

7
Very
easy to
see

6
Easy to
feel

7
Very
easy to
feel

Kinesthetic Imagery Scale
1
Very
hard to
feel

2
Hard to
feel

3
Somewhat
hard to
feel

4
Neutral
(not easy
nor hard)

5
Somewhat
easy to feel

1) Knee lift

Rating:_________

7) Arm Movement

Rating:_________

2) Jump

Rating: _________

8) Waist Bend

Rating: _________

3) Arm movement

Rating: _________

9) Knee lift

Rating: _________

4) Waist Bend

Rating: _________

10) Jump

Rating: _________

5) Knee lift

Rating: _________

11) Arm movement Rating: _________

6) Jump

Rating: _________

12) Waist bend
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Rating: _________

APPENDIX F – VIVIDNESS OF MOVEMENT IMAGERY QUESTIONNAIRE-2
Movement imagery refers to the ability to imagine a movement. The aim of this
questionnaire is to determine the vividness of your movement imagery. The items of the
questionnaire are designed to bring certain images to your mind. You are asked to rate
the vividness of each item by reference to the 5-point scale. After each item, circle the
appropriate number in the boxes provided. The first column is for an image obtained
watching yourself performing the movement from an external point of view (External
Visual Imagery), and the second column is for an image obtained from an internal point
of view, as if you were looking out through your own eyes whilst performing the
movement (Internal Visual Imagery). The third column is for an image obtained by
feeling yourself do the movement (Kinaesthetic imagery). Try to do each item
separately, independently of how you may have done other items. Complete all items
from an external visual perspective and then return to the beginning of the
questionnaire and complete all of the items from an internal visual perspective, and
finally return to the beginning of the questionnaire and complete the items while feeling
the movement. The three ratings for a given item may not in all cases be the same. For
all items please have your eyes CLOSED.

Think of each of the following acts that appear on the next page, and classify the images
according to the degree of clearness and vividness as shown on the RATING SCALE.
RATING SCALE. The image aroused by each item might be:
Perfectly clear and as vivid (as normal vision or feel of movement) ……………RATING 1
Clear and reasonably vivid
……………RATING 2
Moderately clear and vivid
……………RATING 3
Vague and dim
……………RATING 4
No image at all, you only “know” that you are thinking of the skill ……………RATING 5
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Moderately clear and
vivid

Vague and dim

No image at all, you
only know that you are
thinking of the skill

Perfectly clear and
vivid as normal vision

Clear and reasonably
vivid

Moderately clear and
vivid

Vague and dim

No image at all, you
only know that you are
thinking of the skill

Perfectly clear and
vivid as normal vision

Clear and reasonably
vivid

Moderately clear and
vivid

Vague and dim

No image at all, you
only know that you are
thinking of the skill
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1.Walking
2.Running
3.Kicking a
stone
4.Bending to
pick up a coin
5.Running up
stairs
6.Jumping
sideways
7.Throwing a
stone into
water
8.Kicking a
ball in the air
9.Running
downhill
10.Riding a
bike
11.Swinging
on a rope
12.Jumping
off a high wall

Feeling yourself do the movement
(Kinaesthetic Imagery)

Clear and reasonably
vivid

Item

Looking through your own eyes whilst
performing the movement (Internal Visual
Imagery)

Perfectly clear and
vivid as normal vision

Watching yourself performing the movement
(External Visual Imagery)

5
5
5

4
4
4

3
3
3

2
2
2

1
1
1

5
5
5

4
4
4

3
3
3

2
2
2

1
1
1
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5
5
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4
4
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3
3
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2
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1
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2

1
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4

3

2

1
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4

3

2
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5

4

3

2

1

5

4

3

2

1

5

4
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APPENDIX G – DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions: Please answer the following questions according to your mental imagery
experience in the fMRI scanner.
1. Please rate to what extent you were able to focus on each imagery perspective
during the scanning
Not at
all

Greatly

2. Please rate to what extent you were able to focus on each imagery modality
during the scanning.
Not at
all

Greatly

3. Please rate to what extent you switched between the imagery perspectives.
Not at
all

Greatly

4. Please rate to what extent you switched between the imagery modality.
Not at
all

Greatly

5. Please rate to what extent you were able to focus on the task during the
scanning?
Not at
all

Greatly
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APPENDIX H – MRI SIMULATION PROTOCOL
Setting-Up the Workspace
1. Place the Dell laptop next to the desktop computer on the table in the MRI simulation
lab and plugin the AC adaptor into the wall electrical outlet.
2. Place the Trigno electrode box next to the Dell laptop on the table and plugin the AC
adaptor into the wall electrical outlet.
3. Connect the Trigno electrode box to the Dell laptop via the USB cord.
4. Clean the MRI simulation table.
Setting-Up the Computers
Dell Laptop Computer
1. Turn on the Dell laptop.
2. Sign-in to the computer by using the Username and Password provided on the orange
sticky note on the laptop.
3. Open the “EMGworks 4.0 Acquisition” software by using the icon on the desktop.
4. Once the “EMGworks 4.0 Acquisition” software is open, click on the Workflow
Environment Pro icon in the middle of the screen.
5. Open the folder titled “Imagery/Brain Fun.”
6. Click on the “Imagery/Brain Fun” option (icon with the wrench).
Desktop Computer
1. Turn on the desktop computer.
2. Sign-in to the computer by using the Username on the bottom left of the computer
monitor and the Password “research.”
3. Double click on the “MRI FX” icon on the desktop.
4. Once the “MRI FX” software is open, select the following sound effects in order.
a. Siemens_Ambient (Make sure this is playing before the participant enters the
MRI simulation room)
b. Siemens_Localizer
c. Siemens_MPRAGE
d. Siemens_EPI
5. Set all sound effects to 50%
Beginning the Session – Informed Consent
“Hello, my name is _____________________. Thank you for coming in today to complete the
second session of the study. Today we will be measuring your muscle activity via
Electromyography (EMG) and taking you through an MRI simulation protocol. First, we would
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like to start with having you review the informed consent document for the second part of the
study. In addition, please complete the MRI Participant Screening Document.
1. Have the participant read over the informed consent document for the MRI portion of
the study.
2. Review the informed consent document and ask the participant if they have any
questions concerning the MRI portion of the study. The researcher will answer all
questions appropriately.
“Do you have any questions after reading the informed consent document?”
“Thank you for reviewing the informed consent document. Please print, sign and date the
informed consent document at the bottom of the last page. Thank you.”
3. Have the participant print, sign and date the informed consent document.
4. The researcher will print, sign and date the informed consent document as the witness.
“In order to save paper, we will be providing you a copy of this informed consent document in an
e-mail following this session to keep for your records.”
5. Place the participant’s informed consent document in the appropriate folder and inform
the participant that they will receive a copy of the informed consent document in their
e-mail following this session for their records.
“If there are no further questions, I will review the MRI Participant Screening Document with
you.”
6. Review the MRI Participant Screening Document with the participant and “de-metal”
the participant.
“Now we will go through the de-metaling process. Please remove all metal from your body. This
includes anything in your hair, earrings, watches, rings and bracelets, belts, anything in your
pockets, or any other type of metal.
7. The researcher will complete the pantomime so that the participant will follow along.
“Ok. Now we will set you up for the MRI simulation. For this session and for the final session
(session three) at Palmetto Richland Memorial Hospital we are going to have you perform the
arm rotation task that is part of one of the motor imagery ability questionnaires that you
completed during the pre-screening session.”
8. The researcher will have the participant read the instructions for this movement and
demonstrate the movement.
“Now we are going to apply the surface EMG electrodes to your shoulder area. We are using
EMG to record the muscle activity you produce while you physically complete and imagine the
arm rotation task.”
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Setting-Up the Participant
1. Select electrodes #1 and #2 from the Trigno electrode box.
2. Place the Trigno sensor adhesive interface strips on electrodes #1 and #2.
3. Place electrode #1 on the superior portion of the pectoralis major muscle, making sure
that the arrow on the electrode is in line with the muscle fibers of the pectoralis major.
The researcher will use the correct manual muscle test to find the muscle appropriately.
4. Turn on electrode #1 by pressing the button on the electrode, making sure that a
green/yellow light appears.
5. Place electrode #2 on the anterior portion of the deltoideus muscle, making sure that
the arrow on the sensor is in line with the muscle fibers of the deltoideus. The
researcher will use the correct manual muscle test to find the muscle appropriately.
6. Turn on electrode #2 by pressing the button on the electrode, making sure that a
green/yellow light appears.
Running the Session
1. Verify that you completed the test subject information page.
a. Last Name: Participant’s initials and study number (e.g., FL-1).
b. Display Name: Participant’s initials and study number (e.g., FL-1).
c. Gender: Female
d. Date of Birth: ___/___/______.
e. Weight: ______.
f. Height: ______.
2. Click the “Start Test” icon on the bottom right of the screen.
3. Verify the information in the Test Run Name box.
4. Click “OK.”
5. Verify that the study design is correct.
a. Box 1: Plot and Store.
b. Box 2: Plot and Store x 3.
c. Box 3: Plot and Store x 3.
d. Box 4: Plot and Store x 3.
e. Box 5: Plot and Store x 3.
6. Click “Run Task.”
“For the first part, we are going to check to see if we have the electrode placed in the correct
position to receive a good EMG recording.”
7. Click “Start” to begin the first task (Box 1: Plot and Store).
8. During the first task, the researcher will check the participant for the correct Trigno
electrode set-up by manually muscle testing the participant and verifying that muscle
activity is occurring on the computer monitor.
“Now we will be going through the first trial. For this trial, we are asking you to physically
perform the arm rotation task with your eyes closed for 30 seconds. We will be doing this three
times.”
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9. Inform the participant that they will be completing the physical task first. This task will
consist of the participant physically completing the arm rotation task of the MIQ-3 three
times. The participant will read the instructions for the task as they are written in the
MIQ-3.
a. Starting Position: Extend the arm of your non-dominant hand straight out to
your side so that it is parallel to the ground, palm down.
b. Action: Move your arm forward until it is directly in front of your body (still
parallel to the ground). Keep your arm extended during the movement and
make the movement slowly.
“Do you have any questions about the movement?”
“If you do not have any questions, Please start performing the arm rotation task when I say
start. When I say stop, please stop performing the task. Also, please make sure you keep your
eyes closed the entire time and do not talk.”
“Start”
10. The participant will physically complete the arm rotation task three times.
“Stop”
11. Simultaneously, instruct the participants to begin the physical task and click “Next Task”
on the Dell laptop to begin the second task (Box 2: Plot and Store x 3). This task will
consist of three trials. Repeat step three times. There will be a rest period between each
trial. At this time, record the number of repetitions of the arm rotation task that the
participant completes during the 30 second time period.
“The next part of the session will take place in the MRI simulator. We are going to be completing
a similar protocol to the one that you just completed, but instead you will be imagining the arm
rotation task in various imagery conditions. During the time that you are in the MRI simulator,
we ask that you remain as still as possible as if you would be in a real MRI scanner.”
“The next part will follow a PowerPoint presentation that you will be able to view on a laptop
screen through a reflection on a mirror attached to the head coil. There will be three different
screens that you will see: 1) instructions, 2) blank (where you will have your eyes closed), and 3)
a cross-hair that will be separated by a beeping sound. First, please read the instructions on the
screen and imagine the task that is stated. Once you hear the beep, please close your eyes and
imagine the task until you hear another beep. At this time, please open your eyes and remain in
a resting/relaxed state looking at the cross-hair on the screen, and report how many full
repetitions of the arm rotation task that you were able to imagine.
“Do you have any questions?”
“If you have no further questions, we will have you get onto the scanner table. Please use the
step stool and sit in the middle of the table. How, swing your legs toward the bottom of the
table, placing your head in the head coil, and making sure that your shoulders are touching (or
close to) the bottom of the head coil. How we will put the top part of the head coil on that has
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the mirror attached so that you will be able to read the instructions on the screen while in the
MIR simulation scanner.”
12. Place the participant on the MRI simulation scanner table.
a. Move the scanner table out of the MRI simulation machine.
b. Instruct the participant to lay supine on the scanner table in a comfortable
position.
c. Place the head coil around the participant’s head.
d. Instruct the participant to remain as still as possible throughout each task.
e. Move the scanner table into the MRI simulation machine.
“How are you doing in there?”
“Are you ready to begin?”
“Ok. The first part is a localizer so that the MRI scanner knows where your head is. This will take
about 15 second. Please remain still.”
13. Select the “Siemens_Localizer” sound effect for approximately 15 seconds.
“Ok. The localizer is complete. Are you still okay in there?”
“Ok. The next part will be the anatomical scan. Today we will do this for approximately 30
seconds, but the real scan will take approximately 6:30 minutes. Are you read?”
14. Select the “Siemens_MPRAGE” sound effect for approximately 30 seconds.
“The anatomical scan is complete. How are you doing in there?”
“Great! Now we will start the functional scans with the imager tasks. As a reminder, you will see
a number of screens that come up in sets of three on the screen separated by a beeping sound.
The first will have instructions indicating the task and an imagery condition. Once you hear the
beep, please close your eyes and imagine the task in that imagery condition. When you hear the
next beep, please open your eyes and attend to the cross-hair on the screen while reporting how
many repetitions you were able to complete of the arm rotation task. Please make sure that you
remember to count each trial. Also, please remain quiet and as still as possible during each trial.
Do you have any questions?”
“If you have no additional questions, we will begin. This part of the session will take
approximately 14 minutes. If at any time that you want out of the scanner because you do not
feel comfortable, please let me know and I will remove you from the scanner.”
15. The research will inform the participant that for the next task they will only be using
imagery. Have the participant read the task instructions. This task will consist of the
participant imagining, from an external visual perspective, the arm rotation task of the
MIQ-3.
16. Simultaneously, instruct the participant to begin the imagery task with their eyes closed
and click “Next Task” to begin the third task (Box 2: Plot and Store x 3). This task will
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17.

18.

19.

20.

consist of three trials. Repeat step three times. There will be a 30 second rest period
between each trial. At this time, the participant will inform the researcher the amount
of full repetitions of the arm rotation task that they were able to complete during the
30 second trial.
The researcher will inform the participant that for the next task they will only be using
imagery. Have the participant read the task instructions. This task will consist of the
participant imagining, from a kinesthetic perspective, the arm rotation task of the
MIQ-3.
Simultaneously, instruct the participant to begin the imagery task with their eyes closed
and click “Next Task” to begin the fourth task (Box 3: Plot and Store x 3). This task will
consist of three trials. Repeat step three times. There will be a 30 second rest period
between each trial. At this time, the participant will inform the researcher the amount
of full repetitions of the arm rotation task that they were able to complete during the
30 second trial.
The researcher will inform the participant that for the next task they will only be using
imagery. Have the participant read the task instructions. This task will consist of the
participant imagining, from an internal visual perspective, the arm rotation task of the
MIQ-3.
Simultaneously, instruct the participant to begin the imagery task with their eyes close
and click “Next Task” to being the fifth task (Box 4: Plot and Store x 3). This task will
consist of three trials. Repeat step three times. There will be a 30 second rest period
between each trial. At this time, the participant will inform the researcher the amount
of full repetitions of the arm rotation task that they were able to complete during the
30 second trial.

“Okay. The session is now over. Please remain still as we move the scanner table out of the MRI
simulation scanner.”
21. Move the scanner table out of the MRI simulation scanner. Remove the head coil. Have
the participant sit up and slowly step down from the scanner table using the step stool.
Concluding the Session
1. Debrief the participant of the purport for the session, and answer any additional
questions that the participant may have.
2. Indicate to the participant that by completing this session that they receive a $20
compensation. Provide the participant with the $20 payment (single $20 bill) for
completing the second session in a white envelope with the participant’s name.
3. Have the participant print, sign and date the appropriate payment form for receiving the
payment.
4. Explain the third session of the experiment, including location, directions, and parking.
5. Schedule the final session of the experiment with the participant.
6. Ask the participant if they have any remaining questions, and answer the appropriately.
7. Wipe down all surfaces with an anti-bacterial wipe.
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APPENDIX I – GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Term

Abbreviation

Abduction
Apraxia

Autonomic nervous system

ANS

Basal Ganglia
Bioinformational theory

Blood oxygenation level
dependent

BOLD

Central nervous system

CNS

Cerebellum

Contralateral

Controllability
Cortical
Deconvolution

Echo-time

TE

Definition
To draw away from the midline of the body or
from an adjacent part or limb.
Inability to execute learned purposeful
movement, despite having the desire and the
physical capacity to perform the movements.
Part of the peripheral nervous system that acts
as a control system, functioning largely below
the level of consciousness, and controls
visceral functions.
Collection of nuclei associated with the control
of voluntary motor movements.
Based on the assumption that an image is a
functionally organized set of propositions
stored in the brain.
Method used in fMRI to observe difference
areas of the brain, which are found to be
active at a given time.
Part of the nervous system consisting of the
brain and spinal cord.
Base of the brain that regulates motor
movements/coordinates voluntary
movements.
Relating to or denoting the side of the body
opposite to that on which a particular
structure or condition occurs.
Ease and accuracy that the image content can
be manipulated and transformed.
Involving or resulting from the action or
condition of the cerebral cortex.
Algorithm-based process used to reverse the
effects of convolution (mathematical
operation on two functions, f and g, producing
a third function) on recorded data.

Time interval between an excitation pulse
and data acquisition (defined as the
collection of data from the center of kspace), usually expressed in milliseconds
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Edinburgh handedness
inventory

EHI

Electroencephalography

EEG

Electromyography

EMG

External visual imagery

EVI

F-wave

Fitts’ law

Functional equivalence
theory

Functional magnetic
resonance imaging

Global imagery score

Gradient-echo

Gradient-echo echo-planar
imaging

fMRI

Measurement scale used to assess the
dominance of a person’s right or left hand
in everyday activities.
Recording of the difference in electrical
activity between various points of the
cortex using electrodes placed at specific
point on the scalp.
Technique for evaluating and recording
the electrical activity produced by skeletal
muscles.
Where the imager is watching him or
herself performing the action from an
observer’s position; as if watching him or
herself on television.
Second of two voltage changes observed
after electrical stimulation is applied to the
skin surface.
Model of human movement predicting
that the time required to rapidly move to a
target area is a function of the distance to
the target and the size of the target.
Hypothesizes that mental images are
internal representations that work in the
same way as the actual perception of
physical objects.
Procedure using the different magnetic
properties of oxygenated (arterial) and
deoxygenated (venous) blood to identify
blood flow.
Method to select good and poor imagers
using the formula: (ANS score + imagery
questionnaire score + auto-estimation
score) – (mental chronometry score).
Signal that is detected in a nuclear
magnetic resonance spectrometer
produced by varying the external magnetic
field following the application of a single
radio-frequency pulse.
One of the two primary types of pulse
sequences used in MRI; it uses gradients to
generate the MR signal changes that are
measured at data acquisition.
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Gyrus
Hemodynamic response
Horizontal flexion
Internal visual imagery

IVI

Interpolation

Ipsilateral
Kinesthetic imagery

KI

Magnetic resonance
imaging

MRI

Mental chronometry

MC

Mental rotation
Motor evoked potential

MEP

Motor imagery

MI

Motor imagery index

MII

Movement imagery
questionnaire-3

MIQ-3

Ridge on the cerebral cortex.
Relating to or functioning in the mechanics
of blood circulation in response to stimuli.
Moving the arm forward in a horizontal
plane.
Where the imager is looking out through
his or her own eyes while performing an
action.
Method of constructing new data points
within the range of a discrete set of known
data points.
Belonging to or occurring on the same side
of the body.
Where the imager feels him or herself
performing a movement, specifically
detecting bodily position and movement of
the muscles, tendons, and joints.
Imaging technique that uses radio waves
to excite atoms in the brain, which are
detected by a large magnet that surrounds
the individual.
Use of response time in perceptual-motor
tasks to infer the content, duration, and
temporal sequencing of cognitive
operations.
Ability to rotate mental representations of
objects.
Electrical potential recorded from the
nervous system following presentation of
a stimulus.
Mental process by which an individual
rehearses or simulates a given action.
A combination of psychometric tests,
qualitative procedures, chronometric
methods, and psychophysiological
techniques to measure MI quality.
12-item questionnaire to assess
individual’s ability to image four
movements using internal visual imagery,
external visual imagery, and kinesthetic
imagery.
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Neural substrates

Parietal lobe

Pitch
Positron emission
tomography

PET

Precuneus

Prefrontal cortex

PFC

Premotor cortex

PMC

Primary motor cortex

M1

Psychoneuromuscular
theory

Putamen

Region of interest

ROI

Regional cerebral blood
flow
Repetition time

rCBF
TR

Roll
Root mean square EMG

EMGrms

Indicates a part of the nervous or brain
system that underlies a specific behavior
or psychological state.
One of the four major lobes of the cerebral
cortex of the brain integrating sensory
information among various modalities.
Rotation of a rigid body about its
transverse (side-to-side) axis.
Nuclear medicine, functional imaging
technique that produces a threedimensional image of functional processes
in the body.
Part of the superior parietal lobule
involved with episodic memory,
visuospatial abilities, and motor activity
coordination strategies.
Brain region that plays a role in the
regulation of complex cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral functioning.
Complex area of interconnected frontal
lobe areas that contributes to motor
function.
Brain region located in the posterior
portion of the frontal lobe responsible for
planning and executing movements.
Proposes that imagery facilitates the
learning of motor skills because of the
nature of the neuromuscular activity
patterns activated during imaging.
Round structure located at the base of the
forebrain that regulates movements and
influences various types of learning.
Selected subset of samples within a
dataset identified for a particular purpose.
Blood supply in the brain at a given time.
Time interval between successive
excitation pulses, usually expressed in
seconds.
Rotation of a rigid body about its
longitudinal (front/back) axis.
Method used to produce waveforms that
are more easily analyzable than raw EMG.
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Signal-to-noise ratio

Simulation theory

Single photon emission
computerized tomography

SPECT

Somatosensory cortex

Somatosensory evoked
potential
Spatial resolution

SEP

Statistical parametric
mapping
Subcortical

SPM

Sulcus
Supplementary motor area

SMA

Symbolic learning theory

T1-weighted

T2*-weighted

Temporal resolution
Tesla
Thalamus

T

Relative strength of the signal compared
with other sources of variability in the
data.
Predicts a similarity, in neural terms,
between the state where an action is
simulated and the state of execution of
that action.
Nuclear medicine tomographic imaging
technique using gamma rays to provide
true three-dimensional information.
Outermost layer of the brain that receives
and interprets most of the human sense of
touch.
Electrical potential recorded by stimulating
peripheral nerves.
Ability of an imaging device to distinguish
the smallest discernible detail of an image.
Software package designed for the analysis
of brain imaging data sequences.
Of, relating to, involving, or being part of
the nerve centers below the cerebral
cortex.
Depression or fissure in the surface of the
brain.
Part of the cerebral cortex that contributes
to the control of movement.
Suggests that imagery may function as a
coding system to help people understand
and acquire movement patterns.
Images that provide information about the
relative T1 values of tissue; also known as
T1 images.
Images that provide information about the
relative T2* values of tissue; T2*-weighted
images are commonly used for BOLDcontrast fMRI.
The precision of a measurement with
respect to time.
Unit of measurement quantifying the
strength of a magnetic field.
Structure in the brain responsible for
relaying sensation, spatial sense and
motor signals to the cerebral cortex.
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Transcranial magnetic
stimulation

TMS

Vividness

Vividness of motor imagery
questionnaire-2

Voxel
Yaw

VMIQ-2

Method that uses a magnetic field to
stimulate specific cortical neurons during
imagery to determine the stimulated
area’s contribution to imagery.
Self-report of how clear and real an image
is; related to the level of interest,
meaningfulness, and affect associated with
the image generated.
36-item questionnaire to assess individual
ability to vividly image 12 movements
using internal visual imagery, external
visual imagery, and kinesthetic imagery.
Represents a value on a regular grid in
three-dimensional space.
Rotation of a rigid body about its vertical
axis.
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